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INTRODUCTION
A central issue in the contemporary debate about how statutes
ought to be interpreted is the proper role of legislative history.' The
See, e.g., WILIJAM N. ESKRII)GE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPREIATION 207-38
(1994) (providing a historical sunmiary of the various uses of legislative history and
explaining the technique's present-day role); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAIIER OF IN-
TERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-37 (1997) (criticizing the increas-
ing reliance on legislative history by judges and lawyers and calling for "an end to [the]
brief and tailed experiment" of legislative history as an interpretive device); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of O4ginal Intent in Statulory Construction, II HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POt,'Y 59, 61 (1988) (using two cases-Calfo rnia Federal Savinngs & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272 (1987), and United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)-to consider the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation and to develop a textualist approach);
John F. Manning, 7extualism (is a Nondeegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675
(1997) (developing an argument that "lextualism ... rest[s] on a special constitutional
injunction against the legislative creation of tnenacted interpretive authority," and that
the use of legislative history violates a "well-settled element of the separation of pow-
ers-the prohibition against legislative selfldelegation"); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts
and the Congress: Shorld ]udges Disdain Political Histoy?, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 242, 243
(1998) (responding to Manning's argument that textualisin is constitutionally required
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use of legislative history in statutory interpretation is often seen as
problematic, in part because the legislative process, involving many
different legislators with different points of view, provides contradic-
tory information about a statute's meaning. Scholars of very different
normative stripes-including textualsts," purposivists,' and those who
by suggesting that "[j]udicial willingness to learn from and respect the political history
of legislation ... is a necessary element of appropriate legislative-judicial relation-
ships"); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative I-Iistoy in the Supreme Court,
2000 WiS. L. REV. 205, 206-10 (arguing that.Justices Breyer and Stevens have developed
a jurisprudence Tiefer terms "institutional legislative history" during the 1990s in order
to respond to textualist attacks on the technique's role in judicial decision making);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Histmy and the Limits of ludicial Competence: The Untold Stoty
of/Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1838-39 (1998) (contending that, even
if legislative history is a constitutional interpretive technique, structural characteristics
of the adjudicative process will lead courts "systematically to err in their attempts to
discern legislative intent from legislative history," and arguing that a textualist ap-
proach will, in fact, more accurately approximate legislative intent); Patricia M. Wald,
The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative Histomy in Constining Statutes in the 1988-89 Teon
of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. RtEv. 277, 281-86, 308-09 (1990) (conclud-
ing that the textualist view of legislative history rejects the use of any extrastatutory ma-
terials, and arguing in favor of a role for extrinsic materials in illuminating ambiguous
text).
The debate over the utility of legislative history goes back many years. See, e.g.,
Felix Frankfurter, Some I?ections on the Reading f Slatutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 542-
43 (1947) (surveying the gradual incorporation of legislative history as a tool of statt-
tory interpretation and offering the following examples of relevant legislative materi-
als: "A painstaking, detailed report by a Senate Committee bearing directly on the
immediate question may settle the matter. A loose statement even by a chairman of a
committee, made impromptI in the heat of debate ... will hardly be accorded the
weight of an encyclical."); Harry Wilner Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25
Iow,\ L. REV. 737, 741 (1940) (discussing the benefits of using "extrinsic evidence,"
such as legislative history, to interpret when "legislative intention" is vague or nonex-
istent); Charles B. Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic
Evidence, 20 B.U. L. REV. 601, 607-10 (1940) (questioning the use of legislative materi-
als to assist statutory interpretation); Max Radin, Slatutoly Intele)retation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 863, 873 (1930) (providing the seminal treatment of the textUalist approach:
"Successive drafts of a statute are not stages in its development.... That is not to say
that some conclusions, principally negative ones, can not be drawn from the legislative
history .... But in the end, all that we know is that the final form displaced the oth-
ers .....
- See, e.g., SCAIA, suna note 1, at 29-30 ("My view that the objective indication of
the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads
me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history shottld not be used as an
authoritative indication of a statute's meaning."); Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 66 ("An
appropriately modest judicial role would depend less on imputed intent-'intent' that
ultimately can be found only in the mind of the judge."). See generally William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr., 'he Nev Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 625 (1990) (finding that the tex-
tualist objection to using contextual evidence for stattitory interpretation was, at the
time, prevalent in the Supreme Court and suggesting how the Court might further im-
plement textualist principles).
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eschew reliance on legislators' will altogether 4-raise questions about
the historical reconstruction of legislative intent. Indeed, a common
conclusion in the literature on statutory interpretation is that legisla-
tive history can be used to rationalize any point of view," leading some
to conclude that it is useless to the enterprise of statutory interpreta-
tion.
In this Article, we revisit this enduring conversation about the
proper place, if any, of legislative history in. statutory interpretation.
Our perspective is distinct from traditional arguments in that it relies
on a different underlying theoretical foundation and, significantly, a
positive political theory of statute creation. This theory, in turn, pro-
vides both a theory of legislative rhetoric and of statutory interpreta-
tion.
To summarize the basic theory: Legislation is the product of
choices made by legislators pursuing strategic aims within the struc-
ture of legislative institutions, rules, and norms." The principle of ma-
3 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBEIRT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN TI1E MAKING AND AI'PLICATION OF LAW 1375 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickev eds., 1994) ("The words of a statute, taken in their context, serve both
as gUides in the attribution of general purpose and as factors limiting tie particular
meanings that can properly be attributed.").
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 316 (1986) (arguing for a method of
statutory interpretation that "takes note of the statements the legislators made in the
process of enacting [the statute], but ... treats them as political events important in
themselves, not as evidence of any mental state behind them") ;JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMEN'NT 142-46 (1999) ("There simply is no fact of the matter concerning a
legislature's intentions apart from the formal specification of the act it has per-
formed."); Heidi M. Hurd, SovOeoignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945, 952 (1990) (challeng-
ing the idea that statutes are communications, and in turn challenging "those who are
convinced that legislative interpretation ought to proceed via an inquiry into the
authorial intent ions of the legislators responsible for drafting or enacting particular
statutory provisions"); Michael S. Moore, A NaInral Law Thery of Inteuprefation, 58 S.
CAt.. L. REV. 277, 338 (1985) ("[N]o concept of legislative intention is appropriate to
legal interpretation.").
, Justice Scalia has made the argument that
[I]egislative history provides ... a uniquely broad playing field. In any major
piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and there is something
for everybody. As judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look
over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends. The variety and speci-
ficity of result that legislative history can achieve is tUnparalleled.
SCAI.IA, sitnra note I, at 36.
,; This insight is at the foundation of theories that are broadly characteristic of the
positive political theory of legislation. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
P4ositive Theories nf Con gressional Institutions, in POSITIVE TIIEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL
INSTrITUTIONS 5, 10-32 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Bany R. Weingast eds., 1995) (discuss-
ing fottr perspectives on the positive political theory of legislation and offering con-
cerns and criticisms of the informational and partisan rationales Underlying these ap-
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jority rule requires that legislators collect a majority of votes to trans-
form their hopes into law. For most contemporary social legislation,
this democratic imperative is hard to achieve.7 On important legisla-
tive issues, ardent supporters and ardent opponents can fulfill their
objectives only by collecting enough support from moderates and un-
decided legislators-legislators whose support is pivotal to the final
outcome. As a price of this support, ardent supporters must typically
accept compromises to their legislative vision. Although these com-
promises typically leave the bill with less than they had originally
sought, ardent supporters nonetheless accept the compromise be-
cause they judge it superior to no legislation at all.8 Moreover, it is
these negotiations that transform the initial legislative proposal-one
that cannot pass-into a bill that becomes law. '
This conclusion may perhaps seem so commonplace as to ap-
proach a truism, yet, as we show below, its implications for statutory
interpretation are not commonly understood. First, it implies that
legislation is the product of coalitions of legislators with different
views about the legislation. Second, it yields a theory of legislative
rhetoric: different legislators typically say different things about the
legislation. Ardent supporters, for example, usually emphasize expan-
sive readings of the legislation; moderates, by contrast, typically focus
on the compromises necessary to garner their support, a focus which
may narrow the scope of the legislation or restrict it in various ways.
Our theory of legislative rhetoric helps explain why the legislative
record yields contradictory accounts of the legislation and hence its
proaches); see also WILLIAM H. RIKFR & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO
POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 1-7 (1973) (using positive political theory to explain poli-
tics as, at a minimum, "the selection, enforcement, and evaluation of social choice");
Morris P. Fiorina, Formal Models in Political Science, 19 AM. J. POL. SC. 133, 150 (1975)
(stating that most models in political science are rational choice models, which "reflect
a view of man as a purposive being: individual behavior is seen as an attempt to naxi-
mize individually held goals"). See generally infra Part I1 (considering the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act from the perspective of positive political theory).
7 See, e.g., CHARI-ES STEWART 111, ANAlY_ZING CONGRESS 337-41 & 340 tbl.9.1 (2001)
(detailing the "hurdles that all legislation must jump in the two chambers").
8 This does not mean that ardent supporters will always do so. Of course, if, under
these circumstances, the ardent supporters refuse to compromise their vision, then the
legislation is unlikely to pass. See infra text accompanying notes 43-54 (noting that the
positive political theory of legislative decision making stresses that legislatures must act
through collections of coalitions to pass laws).
9 Two influential recent books that put this insight into explicit, theoretical terms
are DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK: POLITICS AND POI.I(C
FROM CARTER TO CLINTON (1998); KEITH KREIHBIEI, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF
U.S. LAWMAKING (1998).
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meaning. Because legislator preferences and aspirations about the
legislation differ, the legislators create a record reflecting these dis-
agreements. Of necessity, therefore, the legislative record for com-
plex acts contains multiple and conflicting views.
The theory of legislative rhetoric also explains how these contra-
dictions in the legislative record grant judges a degree of freedom in
interpretation. To rationalize expansive readings of the act, judges
emphasize the evidence provided by the ardent supporters; to ration-
alize narrow readings,judges emphasize the evidence provided by the
moderates. Hence, Judge Harold Leventhal's well-known aphorism
has it exactly right: aspects of statutory interpretation are akin to a
judge looking over a crowded room and picking out his friends.'
Our fundamental claim is that the nature and scope of the bar-
gain struck by the ardent supporters with the coalition of pivotal legis-
lators is central to the meaning of the statute." When supporters alter
the legislation to gain the pivot's support, these changes become part
of the legislation. Unfortunately, these changes are often ignored
when the courts focus largely on the legislative champions, who typi-
cally are ardent supporters. Put another way, we do not privilege the
pivot by virtue of her being the last to join the support coalition.
Rather, the focus on the pivot is in part an accounting device to focus
attention on the changes in the legislation that got her on board. By
virtue of transforming legislation from a proposal that would not pass
into a bill that did pass, the changes as well as the resulting text are
part of the law and should be considered such by the courts.
it) See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 36 (citing leventhal's aphorism); Patricia M. Wald,
Some Obsemations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA
L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (recounting a similar conversation with Judge Leventhal); see
al.so Convoy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993), (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Judge Har-
old Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of enter-
ing a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's
friends.").
1 This perspective draws on the recent work of Professors McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast (collectively, "McNollgast"). See, e.g., McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of
Positive Political Theory in Statutoy Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994,
at 3, 7 [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent] (proposing a method for interpreting
legislation that identifies the pivotal political actors who were able to strike legislative
bargains when developing coalitions around particular bills); McNollgast, Positive Can-
ons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Inter)retation, 80 GEO. LIJ. 705, 711-12
(1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons] ("[l]f statutory interpretation is
guided by the principle of honoring the spirit of the legislative bargain, it most not fo-
cus only on the preferences of the ardent supports, but also on the accommodations that
were necessary to gain the support of the moderates.").
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To resolve legislative ambiguities, courts often turn to those who
write the legislation for an understanding of the legislation's meaning.
Yet this approach can be misleading, as the bill's authors are typically
ardent supporters who have strategic incentives to expand the mean-
ing of the act-in part by speaking to courts in their interpretive
role-and to minimize the impact of the changes necessary to gain
the moderates' support. Because the ardent supporters' proposed
legislation would not pass, this version cannot be considered the law;
the moderates' support typically requires legislative compromises in-
tegral to the legislation and hence to its meaning.
Another implication of our theory, then, is that contradictions in
the legislative record do not imply that reliance on legislative history is
hopeless and necessarily arbitrary. Our theory provides a means for
understanding the logic of the contradictions and hence for steering
through the thicket of contradictory evidence. It is from the vantage
point of the pivotal legislators and the views they communicate via the
statute's legislative history that we can critically examine judicial in-
terpretations of the statute.
We apply our approach to reading legislative history to the pas-
sage and interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act)2.
The history of the Act is interesting in its own right;"' by any measure,
this statute represents one of the landmark pieces of modern social
legislation and a major effort by the national government to address
racial injustice in twentieth-century America. Further, the Act is an
excellent vehicle for the consideration of our analysis of statute mak-
ing, legislative rhetoric, and the relevance of our views to the current
normative debate over statutory interpretation.14
Standard accounts of the Act's history properly emphasize over-
coming the Senate filibuster by southern Democrats as the central di-
12 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
13 See, e.g., PIIILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 273-78 (1999) (describing how for-
eign policy interests, the need for domestic order, and the effect of the Kennedy assas-
sination combined to push the Act through Congress); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS
AND POIC.iY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS 259-71 (1968) (discuss-
ing the historical and legislative processes driving the creation of the Act).
H For similar reasons, Professors William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth
Garrett open their well-known text with the story of the Act. See WILI.IAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND TIlE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POICY 2-23 (3d ed. 2001) (telling "the story of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the procedures of statute-creation").
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lemma underlying the bill's passage. 15 The basic legislative dilemma
was this: A vote of cloture to end the filibuster required sixty-seven
votes in the Senate. Although there were sixty-seven Democrats in the
Senate, twenty were from the solid South and thus ardent opponents
of the legislation. Thus, at most forty-seven Democratic votes were
available for cloture. This basic legislative arithmetic helps explain
why Congress failed to enact significant civil rights legislation during
the nearly one hundred years following Reconstruction." To pass the
bill in 1964, then, northern Democrats needed at least twenty of the
thirty-three Senate Republicans to vote for cloture. Although there
were, in the early 1960s, some liberal and moderate Republicans,
there were not twenty of them. As demonstrated below, the median
Republican was more conservative then eveiy northern Democrat and
nearly as conservative as the median southern Democrat.'7 This sim-
ple fact of Senate life in the 1960s implies that the conservative Re-
publicans were the political pivots. Without their support, no civil
rights legislation could become law. 1
15 See, e.g., ROBERT D. LOEvW, To END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF TIHE
PASSAGE OF THE CIVIl. RIGHTS A(" OF 1964, at 7 (1990) ("[l]n the Senate, and by far
the largest obstacle of all, was the filibuster."); NINA M. MOORE, GOVERNING RACE:
POLICY, PROCESS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 64-65 (2000) (arguing that the civil rights
debates generated "a,'guably the fiercest active opposition ever pitted against a set of
legislative proposals"); SUNDQUIST, supra note 13, at 222 (describing the filibuster as
"[t]he one insurmotntable obstacle"); STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL TiHERN-
STROM, AMERICA IN BLACKAND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 143 (1997) ("The bill
would be especially difficult to get through the Senate, where it would take a two-thirds
majority to break the filibuster that southern senators would inevitably employ to block
it."); CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HIsTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHITS ACT 148 (1985) (" [Supporters] would face a fierce
filibuster ... that could be stopped only by cloture. And cloture ... had never been
successful on a civil rights bill.").
It See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLITICS: RACE AND TIlE MAINSPRINGS
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 256-58 (1997) (discussing the split between northern and
southern Democrats over social and racial issues during the 1930s and 1940s); MOORE,
supra note 15, at 38-50 (chronicling the opposition to civil rights and then the slow
emergence of the civil rights movement after World War 11). For a discussion of the
struggle over the 1957 Civil Rights Act, see, for example, ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS
OF LYNI)ON JOHNSON: MASTER OF TIlE SENATE 886-989 (2002); THERNSTROM &
TiiERNSTROM, sapra note I5, at 117-18.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 146-49 (comparing the voting patterns of Re-
publicans with those of northern and southern Democrats).
18 To be sure, the political baseline facing supporters had shifted in the years lead-
ing tip to 1964. While the threat of the filibtIster, along with entrenched committee
obstacles, made the prospects of passage quite difficult, it ought not to be overlooked
that the number of civil rights supporters within Congress had increased during this
period. See, e.g., EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE
AND TIE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 59-84 (1989) (disctLssing the rea-
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But how would the support of pivotal Republicans be won? Most
standard histories are schizophrenic on this question. Nearly all
scholars emphasize the fight over the filibuster as the central drama of
the Act's passage. ' Yet most also minimize the impact of this fight on
the substance of the legislation.!" These accounts give the most credit
to the leaders (and hardest workers) of the civil rights coalition, in-
cluding Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and President Lyndon B. John-
21
son, who ostensibly outmaneuvered the Republicans and succeeded
in getting passed a relatively pure version of their bill.
2
2
Circumstantial evidence supports the standard account. Republi-
can leaders at times discussed a major restructuring of the Act-a re-
structuring that never happened. Moreover, although the Republi-
cans sought dozens of amendments, most scholars deem them as
rather modest2 2 Further, the Republicans themselves contributed to
this standard view because few of them made credible counterclaims
that they materially altered the Act.
lignment of parties in the racial debates between 1940 and 1980); Charles S. Bullock
I1, Congressional Voting and the Mobilization of a Black Electorate in the South, 43 J. PO..
662, 670-73 (1981) (studying the impact of increased black participation in elections
on southern legislators' voting patterns); Mar-y Alice Nye, Changing Support for Civil
Rights: House and Senate Voting, 1963-1988, 46 PO.. RES. Q. 799, 807-21 (1993) (using
cohort analysis to show changes in voting patterns for civil rights between 1963 and
1988).
9 Sources cited supra note 15.
21) There are important exceptions to this account. See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972,
at 141-52 (1990) (detailing the role played by Republican minority leader Senator
Everett Dirksen in reaching a compromise with the bill's supporters); NEIL MACNEIL,
DIRKSEN: PORTRAIT OF A PUBLIC MAN 229-38 (1970) (recounting the extraordinary
steps Senator Dirksen undertook to compromise with Democrats, bring his fellow Re-
publicans on board, and win the cloture vote); MOORE, supra note 15, at 72-78 (same).
21 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 15-22 (highlighting the maneuvering of
President Johnson and Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield).
22 See id. at 19-20 (reporting that President Johnson refused to compromise on
weakening the bill, leaving Senator Dirksen with "acceptable but minor amend-
ments"); LOEVY, supra note 15, at 38 (examining the coordination among Senators
Dirksen, Humphrey, and Mansfield to successfully introduce viable civil rights legisla-
tion); THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, sulpra note 15, at 143 ("[I]n the end, Congress
bought the whole loaf .... ); David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin
and Enact ment of the Civil Rights Act qf 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acrr
9, 25-30 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000) (describing how supporters of the Act pushed
the legislation through Congress without significant amendment); see also MICHAEL R.
BESCHLOSS, TAKING CHARGE: TIE JOHNSON WtiITE HOUSE TAI'ES, 1963-1964, at 336-
37 (1997) ("LBJ: '[T]hey would like sely much to say I weakened the bill. And I'm
not going to. That's not my position. I'm against any amendment. I'm going to be
against them right up until I sign them.'").
See infra Part IL.D.I (describing the Innocuous Dirksen Thesis, one interpreta-
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Our approach suggests that we must not take this evidence un-
critically. The theory of legislative rhetoric suggests that statements by
ardent supporters are strategic and should be taken as self-serving;
they are often informative, but not definitive. Based upon our analysis
of this legislative episode, we arrive at very different conclusions from
the standard account described above. Drawing on the positive politi-
cal theory of statute making and legislative rhetoric, we show that the
price demanded by the Republicans was that the Democrats agree in-
crementally, through a large number of seemingly small and innocu-
ous steps, to minimize the impact of civil rights legislation on the
North and hence on Republican constituents. A careful analysis of
the amendments shows that their force was not trivial; rather, these
changes materially affected the legislation.
Why have historians missed this? We begin with an observation:
The Republicans asked for a lower price than they could have, a fact
which seems to corroborate the ardent supporters' claim that they
successfully manipulated the Republicans into supporting their bill.
Yet the fact that the Republicans asked for a lower price than they
could have does not mean that their participation was inevitable or
that their price was zero. Although the Republicans decided in the
end to leave the Act's structure intact, we demonstrate that the
changes they demanded were far from trivial and have often been ig-
nored in the literature.
In addition, and more importantly, we argue that the Republicans
had three strategic reasons to conspire with the Democrats to allow
the latter to play center stage and claim the lion's share of credit for
the bill, thus minimizing the perceived importance of the Republican
changes. First, we show that all supporters of the legislation-ardent
and pivotal members alike-had incentives to minimize the impact of
the Republicans' alterations so as to increase the likelihood that the
House would accede to the Senate's changes. If the House had called
for a conference committee to reconcile differences, it would have
risked dooming the bill. Second, the Republicans downplayed their
role for fear that emphasis on their changes would allow the Demo-
crats to paint them as selling out in the upcoming elections. Third,
and most subtly, the civil rights legislation had the potential to loosen
the Democrats' solid hold on the South-a potential Democratic loss
tion by scholars in which the changes made by Senate Republicans amounted to tech-
nical, minor amendments).
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and Republican gain. Hence, the Republicans had incentives to lay
low and obtain long-term rewards as they made electoral inroads in
the South. Moreover, the stronger and more offensive the bill to the
South, the better the bill would serve Republican southern electoral
ends. This helps explain why the Republicans asked for less than they
could have and why their strategy of weakening the bill's impact on
the North did not hurt their "southern strategy." In sum, because par-
ticipants had strategic reasons for their rhetorical claims, historians,
legal theorists, and courts should not be misled by strategic rhetoric of
the participants.
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 2 had fundamental effects on American politics and society.
First, they altered racial relations and ended a range of institutional-
ized discrimination. Second, and more important for our purposes,
this legislation altered the American political landscape, transforming
American national politics from the New Deal era dominated by
Democrats to one of divided government where Republicans more of-
ten than not held the presidency.'
Our analysis of the Civil Rights Act has several implications for
statutory interpretation. We emphasize the role of the pivotal Repub-
lican legislators, particularly Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen of
Illinois. We demonstrate that the bill that passed the Senate and was
enacted into law reflected the compromises struck within a divided
Senate. These compromises fundamentally altered the ensuing Act's
meaning and these alterations ought, for reasons we explain below, to
affect how ambiguous statutory terms are interpreted. Moreover, our
conclusions not only bear on the interpretation of the Act, but on all
24 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971
(2000)).
25 See EARL BLACK & MERI.E BLACK, TLi RisE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 77
(2002) ("Desegregating public accommodations and protecting black voting rights
meant that white supremacy no longer defined the southern political order and that
black citizens would be an integral part of the political community."); JAMES L.
SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PART'Y S'Y'STEM: ALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1973) (examining the political realignment
caused by both race issues and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s). But cf
THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, su/lra note 15, at 149-80 (exploring how the legislative
victories of 1964 andI 1965 were undone in the eyes of "ordinary working people" by
"[r]iots, a skyrocketing crime rate, ugly black power rhetoric, [and] a marked increase
in the number of welfare dependents").
2t See, e.g., BLACK & BLACK, sun/a note 25, at 74-83 (describing the civil rights era
and its legislative battles as turning points in contemporary southern politics and the
character of the Democratic party).
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statutes in which there is evidence of similar compromise and negotia-
tion among ardent supporters and pivotal legislators.
Moving from theory to application, we examine a series of cases
involving interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to reveal
how the courts have used legislative history in arriving at their results.
In a number of key civil rights cases, federal courts relied on the his-
tory and purposes of the statute to support what can fairly be de-
scribed as expansionary readings..27 Two of the more notable cases are
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in which the Supreme Court read the Act to
provide a cause of action for employer conduct that created a dispa-
rate impact on protected employees,2 and United Steelworkers v. Weber,
in which the Supreme Court permitted a company to adopt hiring
goals for African American craft trainees. " ' In these, as in many other
important Title VII cases, the Court drew from the Act's broad provi-
sions and, at least as the Justices saw it, its aspirational history to sup-
port a view of the statute consistent with the hopes and dreams of its
most ardent supporters. Indeed, the powerful rhetoric of leading civil
rights advocates, such as Senator Humphrey and Representative
Emanuel Celler, found its way into the published legislative history of
the Act and, eventually, into judicial decisions. The Act's ardent sup-
porters succeeded not only in their effort to pass a historic bill, but
also in their effort to shape the meaning of the Act through expan-
sionaryjudicial decisions. In important ways, the Supreme Court's in-
terpretations ignored the central compromise that made the Act's
passage possible.
In reviewing the history of the Civil Rights Act and its interpreta-
tion by the courts, we should emphasize what this Article is not about.
It is not about whether civil rights should have been broadened be-
yond the 1964 Act. There are many reasons for rationalizing an ex-
27 See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MIcHI. L. RI. 1723, 1733 (1991)
(reviewing HUGii DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTs ERA (1990)) (observing that, de-
spite Senator Dirksen's attempts to statutorily limit the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission's complaint processing role, the Supreme Court validated a broad
reading of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Gpiggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), that was, in the EEOC's own estimate, "at odds with explicit statutory lan-
guage"); se, also infra Part Ill.A (explaining that the expansive rulings of the courts re-
flect an effort to give the Act a meaning beyond that negotiated by pivotal legislators);
cf. William N. Eskridge,Jr., Reneging on !-istoty? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Came, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 618-32 (1991) (arguing that the Court acted inde-
pendent of legislative history and statutory purpose both in expanding and later re-
stricting the scope of civil rights legislation).
2 401 U.S. at 434-36. See infra Part l1I.A. I for a discussion of Gliggs.
29 443 U.S. 193, 202-08 (1979). See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of Weber.
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pansion of civil rights beyond that envisioned by the 1964 Act. We do
not join the debates over these reasons or the best form of civil rights
policy.
Instead, the purpose of this Article is to examine the explicit rea-
sons articulated by the Supreme Court to justify the expansion of civil
rights. The Court relied heavily on the legislative record and used its
reading of the record to justify its rulings. It is this reasoning that we
contest.
Further, we are persuaded by William Eskridge's positive political
theory argument that, had the courts not broadened statutorily
granted civil rights in the 1970s, Congress would likely have passed a
new, more expansive civil rights act. Thus, civil rights appears not to
be a straightforward case of activist judges imposing their preferences
on a reluctant society, whose representatives-per positive political
3theory models-are impotent to resist. Again, the point is to exam-
ine the logic underlying judicial use of legislative history.
Part I of this Article presents our positive political theory of legis-
lative decision making, on which our characterization of coalitional
strategies and statute making is based. We focus on three intersecting
questions. First, what is the structure of legislative decision making
within which bargaining over the legislation's scope takes place? Sec-
ond, what coalitions form to consider, and then to influence, the leg-
islation? And third, how and why do legislators undertake to influ-
ence the implementation of the statute through the strategic use of
Cf ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 81-85 (considering the resilience of
the Griggs decision as a function of the civil rights policies embedded in the holding).
31 See infra Part III.A (discussing the Court's interpretation of the Act).
32 Eskridge, supra note 27, at 650-53.
Standard positive political theory models emphasize a range of judicial discre-
tion on statutory interpretation issues given the multiple veto points in Congress. The
classic model is BRIAN A. MARKS, A MODEl, OF JUDICIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL
POLICYMAKING: GRtoV CrT Coi.LE.GE v. BE.L (Hoover Inst., Working Papers in Political
Sci. No. P-88-7, 1988). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &,John Ferejohn, The Article 1,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 556-64 (1992) (using game theory to analyze judicial
review of administrative decisions in light of legislative delegation and statutory direc-
tives); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Suneme Court Statutoy
Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
263, 265-66, 295-96 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court makes decisions based on
self-interest and ideology, subject only to political constraints by Congress and the
President); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Admin-
istrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 440-44, 48 1-
82 (1989) (using positive political theor , to show that, to be effective, Congress must
control administrative decision making ex ante and illustrating this argument by refer-
ence to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 6 7 1 q (2000)).
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legislative rhetoric? We show that these three overlapping aspects of
the modern legislative process are necessary to understand the mean-
ing of legislation.
In Part II, we analyze a set of critical events in the legislative his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We provide a reevaluation of that
history focusing on the problematic issues in interpreting the Act
given the fact that the assent of pivotal legislators was critical in secur-
ing passage of the Act. We also reanalyze the fight to end the filibus-
ter, demonstrating, first, the pivotal nature of Senate Republicans;
second, the nontrivial price they exacted for their support; and, third,
the strategic logic underlying both the Democrats' legislative rhetoric
in claiming credit for the Act and the Republicans' legislative rhetoric
in downplaying their own role.
We next consider, in Part III, how courts, in pursuing expansion-
ary constructions in the early years following the Act's passage, relied
on the legislative history produced by ardent supporters of the Act.
The ardent supporters' strategic rhetoric insisted that the Senate
amendments did not materially change the Act and, therefore, that
the broad reach of the Act portended by the House version was main-
tained in the final version of the legislation. Both contentions are
challenged in Part III. We focus on a few cases to illustrate this point
and discuss how the courts have confused notions of legislative intent
and statutory purpose.
Lastly, in Part IV, we suggest how our approach to interpreting
legislative history helps shed light on the politics of civil rights, on
theories of legislation and statutory interpretation, and on the pat-
terns of modern American politics and social policy. Our objective, in
the end, is to draw from our approach, and from a revisionist view of
the Civil Rights Act, lessons of general applicability for the interpreta-
tion of the legislative history of statutes. This project, then, presages
further analytical work on the puzzles of legislation and its interpreta-
tion.
I. LAWMAKING PROCESSES, STATUTORY DESIGN, AND THE
THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE RHETORIC
Understanding how to extract the meaning of legislation through
the process of interpretation requires a clear understanding of how
legislators construct legislation and how they communicate both sepa-
rate and collective views about what the legislation means. To provide
this understanding, we draw on positive political theory and its impli-
cations for a preliminary theory of legislative rhetoric. From this the-
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ory, we derive a positive theory of legislative intent and statutory pur-
pose.
A. Principles of Positive Political TheoryA4
The positive political theory of legislative decision making" de-
scribes the statute-making process as a collection of purposive, strate-
gic decisions made by rational decision makers within the structure of
legislative institutions. These legislative institutions are themselves the
creation of legislators acting to maximize their own varied interests
through collective choice mechanisms. ' The "industrial organization
of Congress" represents the constructed environment within which
legislators bargain with one another in order to facilitate their indi-
34 The ideas developed in this Section build specifically upon a recent positive po-
litical theory literature that includes Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 33; John Fere-
john & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutoly Interpretation, 80 GEO.
L.J. 565 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn & Weingast, Limitation of Statutes];John A. Fere-
John & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Inteqretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn & Weingast, Statutory Inteqpretation]; McNoll-
gast, Legislative Intent, supra note I1; McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 11;
McNollgast, The Theory of inteqretive Canon and Legislative Behavior, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 235 (1992); Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213 (1990); Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative
Intent, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1994, at 51; Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael
Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court
Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). The ideas build
more generally on the positive political theory of legislative decision making as de-
scribed in, for example, Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regula-
tory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 52-80 (1994).
13 At various junctures, we use "legislative decision making" as a synonym for statu-
tory enactment. This is a convention of convenience, for we recognize, of course, that
legislatures do much more than enact statutes. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. KIRST, GOV-
ERNMENT WITHOUT PASSING LAwS 1-11 (1969) (focusing on the impact of nonstatutory
means of congressional action, such as appropriations proceedings, hearings, and the
adjustment of funding levels). Since we confine our inquiry to statute making, we do
not engage the extensive literature that considers positive theories of legislative action
in addition to, or separate from, the enactment of statutes.
36 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF 'TiE WASHIN(;rON
ESTABLISHMENT 3747 (2d ed. 1989) (criticizing Congress for establishing a legislative
system advantageous to members seeking to remain career politicians); D. RODERICK
KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, TIlE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL
PARTIES AND THIE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 231-37 (1991) (claiming that congressional
parties have successfully managed the delegation of policymaking authority to their
members serving on committees); KEITH KREHIBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE
ORGANIZATION 247-58 (1991) (examining the role of internal legislative organization
on public policy); KREHBIEL, supra note 9, at 20-48 (creating a new theory to identify
pivotal players in political decision making).
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vidual and collective goals. 7 Statutes-including both the text of the
enacted law and the legislative "history" encoded into the public rec-
ord of the statute-reflect not only legislative specialization and ex-
pertise, but the vitally important object of trade and negotiation. The
legislators' statements that make tIp the legislative history that attaches
to the statute also reflect these important objects.,"8 Critically, the stat-
ute's implementation will be influenced by the meaning given to it by
interpretations. :' '
To accomplish their aims within this dynamic process of legislative
decision making, legislators act within coalitions. A legislature is, after
all, a "they" not an "it"; decisions-statutes included-are made only
by collections of legislators acting in concert."" The basic democratic
principle of majority rule, established in Article I of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, ensures that legislators must create a coalition at least as large as
a majority of the legislators in each house in order to enact legisla-
tion.' The process of legislation, then, is shaped by the decisions
made by legislators to form and maintain coalitions within the institu-
tional structure of the legislature and within the structure of those
nonlegislative institutions (the presidency, the judiciary, and the bu-
37 On the general "industrial organization of Congress," of which there are multi-
ple theories, see Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congres-
sional Institutions, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 149 (1994). See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW
D. MCCUBINS, LEGISIVIIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 1-15
(1993) (viewing political parties as "legislative cartels" that usurp rulemaking power for
the legislative process); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMI'TFEES 94-114
(1974) (exploring the decision-making importance of congressional committees);
KREIIBIEL, sunra note 36, at 30-42, 66-67 (offering distributive and informational theo-
ties of congressional organization); DAVID R. MAYH'IEW, CONGRESS: THiE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 1-9 (1974) (focusing on reelection as the driving force behind congres-
sional decision making and organization); Barry R. Weingast & WilliamJ. Marshall, The
Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, like Firms, Are Not Organized as
Markets, 96J. POL. ECON. 132, 132-37 (1988) (providing a theory of legislators based on
the theory of firms and contractual institutions).
38 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutoty Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 220-25 (1992) (considering how Congress uses legislative
history to influence statutory interpretation).
49 See, e.g., R. SHEI' MELNICK, BETWEEN TIlE LINES: INTERPRETING WELrARE RIGHTS
3-22 (1994) (giving examples of how judicial interpretation of statutes can change the
meaning of legislative provisions).
40 See David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 118L, 1181-86 (1989) (modeling legislative equilibria based on theories of
bargaining); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, " Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 IN"L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239-42 (1992) (arguing that collections of in-
dividuals cannot have intent, and thus judges, lawyers, and legislators misplace their
reliance on legislative intent).
,11 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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reaucracy) upon which legislators rely to facilitate their legislative
4I2
aims.
As far as legislative purposes are concerned, we need not imagine
that legislators share some collective meta-intent. '":' Indeed, it is often
clear that different members of Congress support a piece of legisla-
tion for very different reasons. Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler's
study of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 provides a good illus-
tration: when environmentalists sought to amend the Clean Air Act,
they found they did not have sufficient support to pass their legisla-
tion."" To pass their bill, pro-environment legislators in Congress ne-
gotiated with representatives of unionized coal miners."5 This coali-
tion produced an act that compromised some of the envi-
ronmentalists' principles, thereby addressing environmental problems
less efficiently.4' Yet, faced with the choice between a compromise bill
and no bill, the environmentalists chose the compromise bill.
The positive political theory of legislative decision making empha-
sizes that legislatures act through collections of coalitions; it is in the
understanding of the formation, maintenance, and actions of these
42 See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 33, at 466-68 (illustrating how an accept-
able bill can emerge from three distinct stances by the Senate, House, and President).
43 We would volunteer, though, that one is probably on safe ground in assuming
that coalitions of legislators are madei up of a variety of individuals with different goals,
dreams, personalities, and such. See, e.g., john A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, Pur-
posive Models qf Legislative Behavior, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 407, 412 (1975) (presenting a
political scientist's view that legislators "desire[] reelection, good public policy, and
institutional influence-different mixes for different Representatives").
4"! BRUCF A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAt/DIR'rY AIR 29 (1981);
cf B. Peter Pashigian, Enviro,nental Regulation: Vhose Seif-Inerests Are Being Protected?,
23 ECON. INQuIRY 551 (1985) (considering the 1976 amendments to the Clean Air Act
as a function of self interest, geography, and regional growth).
45 ACKERMAN & HASSLER, sipra note 44, at 31.
46 See id. at 42-56 (describing the diminished standards of the ftinal bill). Gilligan,
Marshall, and Weingast's study of the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion provides another illustration. They argue that the Interstate Commerce Act did
not serve a single purpose, such as allowing the railroad industry to create a cartel.
Instead, it was a compromise between railroads, seeking a cartel, and one type of ship-
per (so-called "short-haul" shippers) against another type of shipper (so-called "long-
haul" shippers). See Thomas W. Gilligan et al., Reg-ulation and the Theoty of Legislaive
Choice: Te lIerstate Commerce Act of 1887, 32J.L. & ECON. 35, 48-51 (1989) (stating that
the compromise bill made both railroads and short-haul shippers better off, but nei-
ther was as well off individually as would have been tile case under pending legislative
alternatives).
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coalitions that the general theory of legislative decision making must
be grounded .
The fact that legislators must collect themselves into coalitions in
order to pass statutory proposals raises a number of difficulties for the
statutory enactment process."' In the tackling and surmounting of
these difficulties, the contours of the positive theory of legislative deci-
sion making come into relief.
Consider, first, the set of impediments to bargaining faced by leg-
islators. ' In order to facilitate their purposes, legislators must negoti-
ate with one another over the design of a proposal. What is the ap-
propriate scope of the statute? What is the optimal enforcement
regime? Should there be exemptions for certain individuals or
groups? Even supposing they can agree among themselves, this pro-
posal must nonetheless run a daunting gauntlet of legislative proce-
(lures including, most significantly, consideration on the chamber
floor."' Once on the floor, the problems of chaotic decision making
forecasted by social choice theory-including cycling, agenda manipu-
lation, strategic amendments, and other maneuvers-can turn pro-
posals into recreations that bear little resemblance to the bargains
struck by coalition members. ' Given the potential for uncontrollable
47 See sources cited supra note I I (arguing for a method of interpreting legislation
that accounts for legislative bargaining); see aLso Baron & Ferejohn, supra note 40, at
1183-201 (explaining how a hill is passed and how its political benefits are distributed
among individual legislators or coalitions of legislators depending on the legislature's
amendment rules and session frequency).
4s See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 88-
118 (1990) (discussing strategies for assembling coalitions with which to support or
oppose legislation).
19 See Baron & Ferejohn, supra note 40, at 1200 (contrasting coalition-based form
with "the noncooperative bargaining theory of legislatures"); Weingast & Marshall, so-
pra note 37, at 138-39 (explaining that bargaining is hampered by the "tucertainty
over the future status of today's bargain").
50 The Senate filibttster is one of the key procedural obstacles that legislation may
ftce. Recognizing this, the pivotal politics model describes the filibuster pivot as one
of the "key" pivots in enacting legislation. BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 9, at 17;
KREHI IIE'L, so/na note 9, at 23-24; see also Weingast & Marshall, supra note 37, at 138
(describing problems with the legislative exchange).
,See, e.g., Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting ModeLs
and Some lmplications fir Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 479-81 (1976) (de-
scribing manilpulation of voting agendas); Charles R. Plott, A Notion o] Equilibrium and
Its Possibility Under Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787, 796 (1967) ("The exchange of
information associated with any decision process may serve actually to change the Util-
ity function."); William H. Riker, lmplications fiom the Disequilibriumt of Majoity Rule for
the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 432, 445 (1980) ("[O]utcomes are the
consequence not only of instittttions and tastes, but also of the political skill and art-
istry of those who ... exploit the disequilibrium of tastes for their own advantage.").
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and even chaotic amendments on the floor, and thus wasted legisla-
tive effort, why bother?
The answer concerns institutions: The structure of legislative
rules, party organization, processes, and mechanisms are designed in
part to facilitate legislative bargaining and statutory enactment by en-
suring that decisions will be respected-or, perhaps more aptly, pro-
tected-by the body.52 Self-interested legislators create institutions to
facilitate bargaining and control.5' When successfully constructed and
maintained, these institutions guard against chaotic, unpredictable
decision making; they insure the maintenance of what has been called
a structure-induced equilibrium, which undergirds the industrial organi-
zation of Congress.5 '
For our purposes, the most important institutional details of Con-
gress concern the complex set of institutions granting individuals or
groups special powers .55 Not only must legislation command majori-
For a sUmma-y of', and introduction to, these results, see MELVINJ. HINICH & MICHAEL
MUNGER, ANALYTICAL POLITICS (1997); KENNETi A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCIEK,
ANALWING PoLITics: RAIONALITY, BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1997).
52 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, inslitutional Artangements and Equilibrium in Multi-
dimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. Pot.. Sci. 27, 35-37 (1979) (explaining mathemati-
cally how institutional arrangements allow legislatures to reach equilibrium); Kenneth
A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibriam and Legislative Choice, 37
Pun. CHoicE: 503, 507-11 (1981) (showing that "institutional restrictions on the do-
main of exchange induce stability"); ef Gordon Tullock, Why So Much Stability, 37 Pul.
CHOICE 189, 193-200 (1981) (documenting the influence of committees and formula
allocation of ftnds in getting legislation passed easily).
53 See FENNO, sup/a note 37, at xv (illustrating how member goals and environ-
mental constraints interact within legislative committees to shape decision-making
processes and, finally, decisions); FIORINA, sulra note 36, at 121-22 (explaining how
subcommittees help promote bargaining despite "[h]eterogeneity of interests across
districts and states"); KREI IlBIEL, sura note 36, at 264 (observing that congressional in-
stitutions lead to specialization, sharing policy expertise, harnessing self-interest, and
"aligning ... individual incentives with collective goals"); MAVi-IEW, su/ra note 37, at
110-25 (explaining how legislators manipulate office structure, committees, and parties
in order to win passage for a bill).
See soturces cited supra note 52 (describing the stabilizing effect of institutional
structures on legislattires); see aLsoJOHN H. ALlRICI1, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND
TRANSFORMATION OF PAR'IY PO ITIC.S IN AMERICA 221-26 (1995) (evaluating the "ho-
mogeneity of preferences" and "status quo policy" of Congress); Cox & MCCUBBINS,
supra note 37, at 79-82 (suggesting that most House committees reflect the preferences
of the House as a whole, with "draft legislation reflecting the diversity of interests in
the chamber"); DAVID W. ROIDE, PARTIES AND L.ADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HousE
162-92 (1991) (explaining how partisanship can lead to an emphasis on party politics
at. ihe expense of institutional arrangements); Shepsle & Weingast, su/na note 52, at
511-14 (explaining how instittttions induce stability).
55 The recent literature on congressional institutions is reviewed in Shepsle &
Weingast, supra note 6. Other contributions to the volume Positive Theories af Congnes-
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ties, it must also gain the approval of committees in each house, the
majority party, and the Rules Committee in the House and succeed
against any attempt at filibuster in the Senate. The majority party also
retains numerous controls in each chamber to make sure that legisla-
tion serves its interests; for example, in the House, the majority partyS 57
caucus serves this function.. Legislation must also be approved by the
President, subject to the veto-override provisions of the Constitution!",
These details are all well known. What are frequently ignored are
their implications for statutory interpretation.5'  The fact that there
are many specific sites of power within Congress not only means that
legislation is difficult to pass; it also means that the pivots will differ
across legislation, where the political pivot is defined as that legislator
whose support at the margin is needed to ensure the legislation's pas-b5
sage. Thus, for some bills, a member of the relevant House commit-
sional Institutions, suplra note 6, suggest the range of approaches in contemporary
scholarship on congressional institutions. Other important works include ALDRICH,
supra note 54; Cox & MCCUBBINS, supra note 37; KREHIBIEL, supra note 36; ROHDE, su-
pra note 54; ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION
AND TI IE DEVELOPMENT OF TIE U.S. CONGRESS (2001).
56 See, e.g., STEWARI, supra note 7, at 274-335 (detailing the formation and func-
tion of committees).
57 Scholars, including Aldrich, Cox, and McCubbins, have focused on the role of
parties in legislative decision making. E.g., ALDRICH, supra note 54; COx & MCCUB-
BINS, sulpen note 37.
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the
Politics of Structure, LAW & CONTEMI'. PROIBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 22 ("[G]overning struc-
tures are designed subject to presidential veto, and thus with sensitivity to presidential
concerns.").
59 But see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 33, at 533-64 (outlining how statutory
interpretation has shifted to accommodate bicameralism, presentment to the Presi-
dent, and, most notably, the emergence of lawmaking by agencies dominated by the
president); Ferejohn & Weingast, Limitation of Statutes, supra note 34, at 580-82 (sug-
gesting a method through which Congress can consciously protect its interpretation of
a newly enacted statute against possible judicial review); McNollgast, Legislative Intent,
supra note 11, at 36 (arguing that congressional institutions and processes allow one to
find the pivotal moments leading to a bill's passage and thereby identify the intent of
pivotal legislators); McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 11, at 718-27 (identifying
the main issues of proper statutory interpretation as figuring out which coalitions en-
abled the bill to pass, identifying the legislators in those coalitions, deciding whether
the President was aligned with those coalitions, and identifying the interpretation un-
derstood by the pivotal members of those coalitions). An important recent critique of
the relevance of positive political theory to theories of statutory interpretation is JERRY
L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CiOICE THEORY TO
IMI'ROV. lPuBniC 1xxW 81-105 (1997).
GO See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 21 (identifying the following
issues in determining pivotal legislators: a member's preferences for, and knowledge
of, a bill's effects, which members ensure the bill is veto-proof, and centrists' knowl-
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tee will be the pivot; for others, the senator required to break a filibus-
ter will play that role; and, for other bills, the pivotal actor will be the
President.'
These institutions imply that the process of building a legislative
coalition is not simple, nor is there a general pattern, at least in the
American context, that holds across all bills.' 2 What remains to be ex-
plored is how coalitions are formed, what legislators expect from the
bargains struck within these coalitions, and, further, what our expecta-
tions are as readers of the statute. On this latter point, we are brought
back to the central question of this project, namely, what does this
theory of legislative decision making tell us about the proper ap-
proach to interpreting legislation?
B. A Typology of Statutory Coalitions
A central, often unstated, presumption in the standard approach
to statutory interpretation based on legislative history is that there are
two relevant groups in the enactment process, the supporters and the
opponents. These two sides present their arguments, compete for po-
litical support, and then one wins. Of course, after enactment these
groups become the "winners" and the "losers." In its simple form, this
description functions both as a basic principle underlying how legisla-
tion is successfully enacted and as a data point in competing norma-
tive theories of statutory interpretation. These theories quite naturally
credit the arguments of winners in this process. To interpret the legis-
lation, we inquire what the winners said it meant. The losers' history
is correspondingly not referred to by courts seeking to understand
legislative intent.' "
edge of, and stake in, a bill); McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 11, at 724 (focus-
ing on the intent of pivotal coalition members-those members who "hold key veto
gates in the legislative process").
61 For analyses that identify the congressional "pivot" in different political settings,
see BRADN' & VOLDEN, su)ra note 9; KREI[BIEL., supna note 9.
62 See MASHAW, supma note 59, at 98 (discussing the intentions of "enacting coali-
tion [s]").
63 See, e.g., BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 1,15 (1983) (White,
J., dissenting) ("[T] he characterization of a bill by one of its opponents has never been
deemed persuasive evidence of legislative intent."); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 203 n.24 (1976) (classifying remarks "made in the course of legislative de-
bate" as "entitled to little weight," especially so "with regard to the statements of legis-
lative opponents"); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66
(1964) ("[W] e have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of
reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they
understandably tend to overstate its reach.").
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On closer inspection, this dichotomous characterization fails to
capture the complexity of statutory decision making. The simplifying
presumption that there are just two relevant groups is fundamentally
misleading, and traditional theories of interpretation that build upon
this idea are therefore inadequate. To undergird a more complete
theory of statutory interpretation, we need a more nuanced concep-
tion of legislative decision making that reflects the coalitional realities
of drafting statutes.
To begin, we look at the legislative process as multifaceted. For
major policy issues, legislators cannot be dichotomized into two sim-
ple supporter and opponent groups. Rather, multiple views are rep-
resented.' Furthermore, the contents of the bill itself are not set in
granite but evolve over the legislative process. Although this is a tru-
ism, its implications are often ignored in the process of statutory in-
terpretation. Put simply, the coalition structure supporting the bill
and the bill's contents evolve simultaneously."' Supporters of the bill
seek alliances with legislators in order to enact their version of the bill;
opponents do likewise in efforts to kill or cripple the proposal. With
these shifting alliances, some versions of a bill simply cannot pass for
want of a majority; other, perhaps less extreme versions of the bill,
may become more successful. ';':
&I Analysts of particular pieces of legislation commonly adopt this perspective.
Nearly all analysts of the Act divide legislators into three groups with distinct interests:
northern Democrats, southern Democrats, and Republicans. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
sula note 14, at 4-23 (recounting the interaction among these groups in the House
and Senate); GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 125-29 (surveying the gauntlet of southern
Democrats in essential committee positions that faced President Kennedy during the
introdiction of the bills that would become the 1964 Act); WHALEN & WHALEN, supra
note 15, at 100-23 (explaining the role of Republicans and northern Democrats in
maneuvering H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963), through debate on the House floor). For
multifaceted analyses of the Clean Air Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, and the sav-
ings and loan bailout respectively, see ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 44, at 42-54;
Gilligan et al., supra note 46, at 53; John Romer & Barry R. Weingast, Political Founda-
tions of the Thrift Debacle, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTIES 175, 175-204
(Alberto Alesina & Geoffiey Carliner eds., 1991). See aLho BRADY& VOLDEN, sapra note
9, at. 14 (using a continutum to illustrate legislator positions); KREIIBIEt, supra note 9,
at 51-75 (explaining how congressional diversity beyond the two parties' traditional
interests helps alleviate gridlock).
(;5 Indeed, the drama accompanying many accounts of the passage of particular
acts often flcuses on negotiations with pivotal legislators, simultaneously adjusting the
legislation's contents and changing the set of legislators who support it. For an exam-
pie of one of the classic "bill becomes a law" texts, see T.R. REID, CONGRESSIONAL
ODYSSEY: THE SAGA OF A SENATE BILL (1980). As we show in Part II, the drama and
suspense surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also exhibits this fea-
ture.
6 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Iresumiption f Reiervability: A Study in Canoni-
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To see the larger implications of how the problem of coalition
structure is important for understanding legislative intent, let us sup-
pose that a proposal is before a legislative chamber. We can break the
legislators down into three groups. First, the ardent supporters repre-
sent those legislators who enthusiastically support a strong version of
the proposed legislation. Whether these supporters will support a
weaker version to no version is uncertain; assessing this requires that
we know more about their preferences and strategies. All that is criti-
cal to our analysis here is that their support is ardent with respect to
alternative versions of a legislative proposal, where such versions can
be arrayed along a continuum from weak to strong.
At the other extreme are the ardent opponents, that is, those legisla-
tors who not only oppose a strong legislative proposal but oppose any
proposal to alter the status quo as favored by the ardent supporters,
no matter how weakened it may become by subsequent amendment
and revision. Of course, the reasons for their opposition may differ
within this group; all that unites them is a preference for the status
quo over all pertinent policy proposals.
Finally, and critical to our picture of legislative decision making,
there is an intermediate collection of legislators, those whom we call
moderates or the pivotal legislators. In this group are legislators who are
willing to support moderate versions of the ardent supporters' pro-
posal but not strong versions. This group may be more or less hetero-
geneous with respect to the general or particular views of the legisla-
tors within the group's purview. What defines the members of this
group as pivotal is that the fate of the legislation is in their hands: if
they support it, it will pass; if they oppose it, it will fail. For most major
legislation, we cannot reliably forecast ex ante whether pivotal legisla-
tors will support or oppose the proposal on the table.' " Support of the
pivotal legislators depends in part on the compromises ardent sup-
cat Constriction and Its Consequences, 45 VANI). L. REv. 743, 768-76 (1992) (discussing
the difficulties of forming a majority to approve a bill and then maintaining that ma-
jority to add an amendment precludingjudicial review).
We use three subsets of legislators for convenience. Nothing about this argu-
nent requires that there be but three groups of legislators. Indeed, a generalization of
this argument holds when every legislator feels differently about the policy in question.
See McNollgast, Legislative hItent, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that "[t]he number of leg-
islators does not change the basic dynamic of policymaking"); McNollgast, Positive Cai-
ons, supra note 11, at 741 (explaining that a multidimensional issue can generate a ma-
jority coalition).
For a preliminary discussion of this typology, see Ferejohn & Weingast, Limita-
tion of Statutes, su/ra note 34, at 575-76; McNollgast, Legislative Intent, su/ra note 11, at
I6-21; McNollgast, Positive Canons, snpra note 11, at 718-27.
1440 UNIVEIRSIT"Y OFI4FNNSYLVANIA LAWIE VIEW [Vol. 151:1417
porters are willing to make in adjusting the content of their proposed
legislation from their ideal legislation in order to suit the demands of
the pivotal legislators. Sometimes no compromise desired by the
moderates is acceptable to the ardent supporters, in which case the
legislation typically fails. Yet many times the ardent supporters and
the moderates find a mutually beneficial compromise that members
of both groups prefer to the status quo. This brief description illus-
trates the principle noted above: the coalition supporting the legisla-
tion and the legislation's contents-and hence its meaning-evolve in
tandem. "
Before we proceed to consider these three subsets of legislators in
action, allow us to describe more thoroughly this third category of
pivotal legislators. We have said that this group may be quite diverse
within itself-there may be liberals and conservatives, those inclined
to support the bill and those inclined to oppose it. Moreover, we will
concede that this group is dynamic; that is, as the contents of the pro-
posed legislation change, members may shift so that those inclined to
support may, in the end, oppose the legislation.
These parallel changes respond to the evolution over time of two
interrelated processes: the legislation's textual contents and how the
legislation is perceived among constituents. Either change can alter a
legislator's position. We focus on the first process, noting that which
members belong to which coalitions is not static but rather endoge-
nous, depending on the contents of the legislation. Thus, there is
nothing settled or predetermined about our typology of legislative
coalitions. Yet, this typology permits Lis to see how the preferences of
individual legislators forming themselves into coalitions interface with
versions of legislative proposals, which can be arrayed from weak to
70
strong.
A particular methodological step is critical to our analysis. Legis-
lative preferences are often regarded as revealed preferences, that is, a
legislator reveals her preferences through her votes on particular bills.
The dichotomous structure of legislative decision making makes sense
when one sees legislators acting only through their votes on bilateral
options, that is, "yes" or "no" on specific legislative proposals. This di-
chotomy further makes sense to the extent that scholars usually evalu-
69 Cfi MOORE, suira note 15, at 15-17 (discussing the relationship between policy
bargaining and "the actual substance of the bill for which advocates are attempting to
build support").
See id. at 15-19 (discussing bargaining and policy compromiise by advocates who
initially sought a stronger bill).
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ate either the prediction that a certain legislator will vote "yea" or
"nay" on a proposal, or the statutory result itself. In neither case is it
necessary to get at a description of the legislator's preference any
71richer than that revealed by her vote.
However, this characterization misses the texture of legislative de-
cision making prior to a final vote on a version of the proposal. To
the extent that positive political theory contributes the insight that
legislative bargaining is ubiquitous, occurring not only during floor
consideration but throughout the period prior to the bill's floor con-
sideration, we need to explore more thoroughly how legislators shape
legislation in the enactment process. We need to understand the ways
in which coalitions take form and how they operate in combination
and competition with one another with the objective of bargaining
toward a final version of the proposal to be considered by the entire
body.72 The methodological question, then, is how to characterize leg-
islators' preferences in a way other than by looking at their final votes.
We offer a preliminary answer to this question through our analysis of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as described more systematically in Part
The basic methodological answer lies in the examination of legis-
lators' preferences by looking at their propensity to support or oppose
versions of legislation of this type. We do this in two ways. First, by
studying the legislative record, including the early legislative and
committee statements, to see the patterns in the types of legislators
71 There is an extensive literature on the formation of legislator preferences from
the perspective of representation, that is, how (and whether) legislators incorporate
into their decision-making matrices the preferences, wishes, and agendas of their con-
stituents. This is not so much about preferences as it is about the elements that go into
legislator decisions about how to act; however, certain theories of representation surely
reengage the question of how legislator preferences do or should intersect with con-
stituent preferences. See, e.g., HANNAH FENIEHIEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REP-
RESENTATION 144-67 (1967) (considering the "mandate-independence" controversy
regarding whether a representative should do what her constituents would want or
what the representative herself believes is best for her constituents). Modern congres-
sional analyses of this topic draw on RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME SnI.E: HOUSE
MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS (1978); MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTAIVES, ROLL
CALLS AND CONSTITUENCIES (1974).
72 See ARNOLD, supra note 48, at 88-118 (analyzing how congressional coalition
leaders employ persuasive and procedural strategies to build support for their chosen
positions).
73 Moreover, this type of analysis is standard in studies applying the pivotal politics
model. See BRADY& VOLDEN, supra note 9, at 14-15 (using the pivotal politics theory to
argue that there is a "'gridlock region' within which no policy change can occur");
KREIBIEL, supra note 9, at 20-48 (proposing the theory of pivotal politics to describe
how policy change is brought about by breaking legislative gridlock).
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supporting all forms of legislation, those opposing all forms of legisla-
tion, and those who seem willing to support some forms of legislation
but not others. Second, we use various types of statistical methods to
associate members of Congress with the propensity to support certain
types of legislation 4
In this view, whether legislation is enacted depends on whether
the ardent supporters and the pivotal legislators negotiate an effective
compromise. If the moderates seek only modest compromises in the
ardent proponents' ideal legislation, compromise is likely. When the
pivot demands drastic changes to the legislation in order to support it,
the ardent supporters may deem this sacrifice too great, preferring
the legislation to die instead of supporting a bill they deem as too
weak or merely symbolic.
75
C. Strategic Elements in Communicating Legislative Intent
Insofar as the issue of statutory interpretation fundamentally con-
cerns how to understand the final bill, we need a better understand-
ing of the strategies of legislators bargaining with one another over
the language and history of a statute.
Legislative communication is, in part, an exercise in spin control.
The meaning of legislation is a product of the statutory "history" as
explicated in the documents upon which courts rely in interpreting
the statute.7 Because legislators know that courts often turn to legisla-
7, These methods fall into two categories. First, political scientists rank or score
legislators according to some criterion, often on a scale of 0 to 100. These scores typi-
cally reflect interest group rankings (the most well-known of which are ADA scores
created by the Americans for Democratic Action). Second, political scientists also use
statistical methods, such as logit and probit analysis, to study the determinantLs of con-
gressional voting. The most well-known of these methods is associated with Professors
Poole and Rosenthal. See KEITH '. POOuL & HOWARD ROsENTHAL, CONGRESS: A
POLITICAI-ECONOMIc HISTORY OF ROIL CALL VOTING (1997) (using statistical analysis
to study the dynamics of roll call voting).
75 Although we discuss persuasion here only in the context of intralegislative ne-
gotiation, we are aware that ardent supporters will be engaged in the process of per-
snlading the public as well. See ARNOLD, supra note 48, at 92-99 ("At times coalition
leaders mount large-scale campaigns to shift elite and mass opinion toward a major
pro gIammatic initiative .... ").
i See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 937-1039 (defining legislative history
as "the entire circumstances of a statute's creation and evolution"); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative Histoty and the lIte5/retation of.Statutes: Toward a Fac/-In)nding Model f Stattmy
Inteipretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1357-60 (1990) (criticizing "[t]he Court's present
mode of analyzing history" because it fails to explain stich questions of legislative proc-
ess as the ways in which legislative history is produced, and arguing that the Court
should adopt a fact-finding model to better understand legislative histories).
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tive indicia to resolve ambiguities in the legislation, legislators have an
incentive to influence-and even manipulate-the record to serve
their ends rather than those of others.7
Legislators' propensities to manipulate and manufacture legisla-
tive histories confound efforts to recover accurate indicia of legislative
intent.7" The confusion is not insoluble, however. We can do better
than the contemporary literature suggests in discovering probative
evidence of the purposes shared by pivotal legislators. This involves
an attempt to distinguish the various types of strategic descriptions of
legislative intent offered by legislators positioned to encode their
preferences into accessible legislative histories. 79 The quest for a more
accurate rendition of legislative intent is in essence a quest for a co-
herent theory of legislative rhetoric.
We start by considering the dimensions of legislators' incentives.
All legislators seek to advance their particular interpretation of the
legislation, in part to claim credit with their constituents and in part
to influence future interpreters of the legislation. Because legislators
have different views of the legislation and its purposes, they seek to
advance different interpretations. Ardent supporters share a common
interest in characterizing a piece of legislation strategically in order to
implement their particular vision of sound policy. When the bill is be-
ing considered in the legislature, ardent supporters face crosscutting
incentives: In order to garner and maintain the support of pivotal leg-
islators, they have an incentive to accommodate pivotal legislators by
characterizing the bill in a moderate, ameliorative fashion. Describ-
ing the proposal as narrow, limited, and, where appropriate, pur-
posively opaque or ambiguous, moreover, can serve the function of
reassuring pivotal legislators who are concerned with the scope of the
proposal. The other incentive faced by ardent supporters cuts in pre-
cisely the opposite direction. In many circumstances (to be detailed
77 See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentaty on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1994) (noting the
"windows of opportunity" that exist in the creation of legislative history).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11 (looking beyond the rhetoric of ardent
supporters, who may create a record with an eye toward expansive future interpreta-
tions of the ensuing statute). Congress may also engage in more direct strategies of
regulating the process of interpretation. Cf. Nicholas Quinn .Rosenkranz, Federal Rules
of Statutoy Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2(185, 2090-92 (2002) (suggesting that Con-
gress has "at least some constitutional power over interpretive methodology").
7!i See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 11, at 718-27 ("The question to be
answered by an interpretive method, then, is what agreement the coalition thought it
might be making that is not explicit in the language of the statute.").
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below), ardent supporters will also seek to push interpreters in the di-
rection of a strong, clear version of the bill, that is, away from the lim-
iting compromises necessary to gain the support of pivotal legislators.
Accordingly, as any lawyer knows, legislative history is often rife with
bold statements purporting to reveal the clear, unalloyed meaning of
a law. Because of these countervailing incentives, ardent supporters
often make contradictory statements about the legislation, sometimes
providing expansive readings and sometimes providing moderate and
temperate ones.
By contrast, ardent opponents often seek to temper their extreme
descriptions of legislation in order to encourage courts to interpret
legislation narrowly. Thus we see legislative histories in which ardent
opponents describe a bill as having far-reaching effects in one context
and, in another, a relatively narrow scope.' Although ardent oppo-
nents may well find themselves on the losing end of the battle over a
legislative proposal, they will predictably fight hard to spin the mean-
ing of the legislation in a way favorable to their interests.
Pivotal legislators face strong incentives to articulate the compro-
mise necessary to garner their support of the act. They will thus at-
tempt to engage the ardent supporters in colloquies on the floor that
make explicit this understanding. Of particular importance are provi-
sions added to the legislation that temper the ardent supporters' vi-
sion of the act, perhaps by limiting its scope; redefining its coverage or
including exemptions; or devising arduous procedures that limit an
implementing agency's ability to move quickly-or at all8.
A good example of this latter strategy was the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), in which Congress passed into law a series of ex-
traordinarily cumbersome procedures that set an unrealistic time-
frame within which the Environmental Protection Agency was ex-
pected to act to regulate toxic substances. 8' The result of this
80 Consider, for example, the Court's holding in 1DA v. Brown & Williamson 7o-
bacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), that "Congress has directly spoken to the issue
here," in that case pr-ecluding the FDA from regulating tobacco products.
For examples of cases illustrating the selective use of legislative history to reach
particular outcomes, see Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984); Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
82 See McCubbins et al., supra note 33, at 431 (analyzing the 1977 amendments to
the Clean Air Act as an example of provisions added to legislation that impose limiting
procedures on an agency).
83 Pub. L. No. 94-469 § 6(c), 90 Stat. 2003, 2022-24 (1976) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2000)) (describing the procedures to be followed by the EPA in
promulgating testing rules for regulated chemicals).
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procedural mechanism was that no substances were regulated under• 8,4
the scope of the TSCA for the first twenty-five years of its existence.
The legislative history of this Act suggests that these mechanisms were
introduced by key legislators as a necessary condition for securing suf-
ficient support to enact the bill."
Pivotal legislators may also seek to replace ambiguous phrases in
the bill with more detailed language. Often the latter merely reflects
the shared meaning-among the chamber's members-of the am-
biguous phrase. Because a later reader of the act, such as a court, may
not share this meaning, the pivotal legislators sometimes seek to re-
place such phrases when multiple interpretations can be foreseen. As
we discuss in more detail below, this device was an important element
in the strategy of pivotal legislators in the 1964 Civil Rights Act."
Let us take stock. Thus far we have argued that ardent supporters
have countervailing incentives to express multiple and contradictory
views of an act. So, too, do the ardent opponents, though their visions
will differ from the ardent supporters. Finally, the pivotal legislators
articulate yet another vision.
To make sense of this, we draw on recent developments in the
positive political theory of statutory interpretation to provide a new
theory of legislative rhetoric. A critical distinction for understanding
legislative rhetoric is that between cheap talk and costly signaling. The
distinction hinges on whether the legislator making the statement in-
curs a cost, such as diminishing the likelihood legislation will pass, for
a misinterpretation or misrepresentation. For example, consider an
ardent supporter who engages in a colloquy on the chamber floor
with a pivotal legislator over the nature of their compromise. The ar-
dent supporter's propounding of an ideal and expansive interpreta-
tion-one that deviates from the understanding of the compromise
necessary for the pivotal legislator to support the legislation-jeopard-
S See Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, The Con gressional Foundations of Agency
Performance, 51 PUB. CHOICE 173, 184-86 (1986) (explaining the effect of the TSCA's
procedural requirements in particular regulatory efforts).
See id. at 183 (describing the conflict in Congress and among governmental
agencies surrounding the passage of the TSCA).
86 See infra Part III (considering the effect of legislative history in the implementa-
tion of a stattte, and explaining the incentives for strategic manipulation of the his-
torical record).
87 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 21-29 (discussing the econom-
ics of signaling); cf Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Ac-
countability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1994, at 91, 94-95 (explaining
what can be learned from legislative signaling).
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izes the pivot's support and hence the bill's passage. Such statements
are thus costly signals about the bill's meaning because the speaker
bears a real cost for misinterpretation. In contrast, an ardent sup-
porter writing his memoirs after the legislation has become law is en-
gaged in cheap talk-he bears no penalty, in terms of the act's pas-
sage, for misinterpretation." Similarly, legislators' statements inserted
in the Congressional Record or made in press conferences are typically
cheap talk."" Alternatively, interpretations provided by a committee
report are costly since misrepresentations potentially jeopardize an
act's passage. Legislators, in their remarks opening committee and
floor consideration of legislation, typically engage in grandstanding-
statements offered more to their constituents than to each other.
These statements are therefore typically cheap talk. An ardent sup-
porter, acting on the floor as bill manager, represents the quintessen-
tial costly signaler; an ardent supporter outside the legislature, par-
ticularly after the legislation has passed, represents the quintessential
cheap talker"
Another important distinction concerns the timing of remarks.
Remarks made at the beginning of the legislative process are often
prior to the critical compromises necessary to produce a bill that can
pass. As such, we must be wary of taking them as representations of an
act's meaning since, typically, they reflect a version of the legislation
that could not pass.
Our theory of legislative rhetoric implies that multiple interpreta-
tions of an act exist simultaneously in the legislative record. Those
who criticize constructing original intent from legislative indicia are
clearly correct in claiming that legislative history in and of itself fails to
8 On the application of signaling models to political science, see JEFFREY S.
BANKS, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 57 (1991); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME
THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISiS 219-57 (1994); Randall L. Calvert, The Value of Bi-
ased Inforiation: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J. POL. 530, 552 (1985);
Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Infornation, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 390, 395-96 (1992). See also Lupia & McCubbins, suna note 87, at 94-95 (discuss-
ing the difference between truthful and untruthful signals).
89 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 11, at 28-29 (asserting that, because
of the incentives to act strategically, "a statement by a member acting as an individual,
and minority views and reports, should carry no weight in statutory interpretation").
See id. at 26-29 (describing the behavioral norms that produce such statements).
On the role of presidential-signing statements, see William D. Popkin, Judicial
Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 713-14 (1991); Rodri-
guez, sunra note 38, at 226-28.
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provide a unique and unproblematic indication of an act's meaning.9
2
Our theory demonstrates why. Legislators have incentives to provide
multiple interpretations and, in some cases, to obscure the meaning
of the compromise reflected in the legislation.' The advantage of a
theory of legislative rhetoric, however, is that it allows us to pull apart
these various and seemingly contradictory strands of interpretation. It
thus gives us a basis to rescue legislative history from the criticism that
it is hopelessly incoherent and unhelpful.'
Cheap talk by ardent supporters is especially likely at the begin-
ning of the legislative process. This follows because the early legisla-
tive stages typically occur prior to the critical negotiations necessary to
gain the pivotal legislators' support.': Put simply, ardent supporters at
this stage typically do not yet know the types of compromises necessary
to pass the act, so they cannot be expected to articulate them even if
they wanted to do so. Under other circumstances-such as floor de-
bate over the critical amendments about the compromises necessary
to gain the moderates' support-ardent supporters have an incentive
to articulate the nature of the compromise, including limitations nec-
essary to gain the moderates' support.
Our theory of legislative rhetoric has three separate dimensions.
First, because legislators of different types face incentives to character-
ize an act in different ways, we must determine which type of legislator
made a given statement, that is, whether the given legislator is an ar-
dent supporter, ardent opponent, or pivotal legislator. Second, we
must assess whether statements are costly signals or cheap talk. To the
extent that such a distinction is not made in practice, legislators have
strong incentives to propound multiple interpretations of the act,
hoping that a sympathetic judge will subscribe to their point of view.
Third, we must assess when particular statements were made, in par-
ticular, whether they were made before or after critical compromises
affecting the act.
92 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of legislative
history as a product, in part, of manipulation by individual legislators).
9 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV.
627, 641 (2002) ("Ambiguity... allows legislators to claim short-term victory, and to
shift accountability for a potential eventual defeat to the courts." (footnote omitted)).
4 Cff supra text accompanying notes 76-77 (considering the unreliability of legisla-
tive history and the factors that explain it).
95 On the stages of legislative enactment in the modern Congress, see generally
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEw LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN IHE
U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 2000).
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The strategic components of legislative rhetoric provide guide-
lines for choosing among multiple and conflicting statements about
an act's meaning. Because ardent supporters have an incentive to bias
the interpretation of an act in their favor and away from the final
compromise needed to ensure passage, we must give greater weight to
their costly signals than to their cheap talk. Pivotal legislators, in
contrast, have strong incentives to provide a clear understanding of
the compromise, and thus their statements and understandings tend
to be the least problematic. In parallel with traditional theories, our
approach gives the least weight to statements by the act's opponents .
We focus on the statements by pivots in part because they have the
strongest incentives to communicate reliably the act's meaning,
whereas ardent supporters have countervening incentives and oppor-
tunities for cheap talk, causing many of their statements to be mislead-
ing.
If the theory of legislative rhetoric conjures up an image of con-
gressional speech, then the modern legislature is a veritable market-
place of ideas in which legislators pitch their positions and make their
histories for the purpose of shaping and implementing statutory pol-
icy. As we will see in our examination of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
strategic legislators will characterize and recharacterize a legislative
proposal at variousjunctures for various purposes throughout the leg-
islative process.
D. Lessons for Statutory Interpretation
The theory of legislative rhetoric demonstrates why a more com-
plete method of constructing legislative history must be based on a
theory of legislative decision making. The theory of legislative rheto-
ric explains why the process of statute enactment necessarily implies
that multiple and conflicting interpretations of an act exist simultane-
ously in the record. Without an objective means of choosing among
these competing views-that is, without a means that does not rely on
the interpreter's own preferences and prejudices-statutory interpre-
tation based on legislative indicia is hopelessly arbitrary."" Courts fre-
96 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supma note 11, at 26 ("Observing costly actions
can help judges exclude some alternative interpretations.").
97 See supnra note 63 (outlining cases in which the Supreme Court expressly re-
jected any reliance on opponents' statements).
' Cf supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of strate-
gic legislator behavior in anticipation of judicial reliance on the legislative record).
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quently select from disparate sources of legislative history to support
one or another result. )
The late Judge Harold Leventhal captured this phenomenon of
random selection of historical evidence nicely when he described the
process of interpreting legislative history as akin to looking over a
crowded room and picking out your friends.' This image fits well
with patterns of judicial practice. Our theory of legislative rhetoric
shows that multiple and conflicting statements necessarily exist simul-
taneously in the record. Accordingly, ajudge interested in expanding
the scope of a statute can frequently find support for her view in the
legislative record; likewise, ajudge determined to read the statute nar-
rowly will grasp onto other information in the record. Without any
basis to evaluate these multiple and conflicting statements, we are in
no position to criticize one judge or the other. She is, after all, merely
selecting her friends from the crowd.
The lesson that many scholars and judges draw from this pre-
dicament is that all interpretations based upon legislative history are
equally plausible; therefore, there can be no basis to assess a judge's
use of such history.' °  We believe that this is the wrong lesson. A more
consistent, and ultimately more defensible, rendering of the legislative
history will emerge if judges focus deliberately on the process and
theory of statutory enactment. Specifically, judges should focus on
statements by pivotal legislators and on statements by ardent support-
ers that are costly signals, rather than on such supporters' cheap talk.
Once we understand the processes of legislative decision making and
of legislative rhetoric, we are in a position to evaluate more sensibly
the proper uses of legislative history. In the remainder of this Section,
99 For a general survey of the repors, bills, and hearings from which a court rec-
reates legislative history, seeJorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Suleme Court
and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICSJ. 294, 298-306
(1982). See generally ESKRIDGE ET Al., suia note 14, at 937-1012 (examining judicial
use of legislative statements made in committee reports, Cluriing hearings and floor de-
bates, and by bill sponsors).
100 See sources cited supra note 10 (recoutingJutdge Leventhal's aphorism).
101 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualisin and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASIH1. L. REV.
1119, 1120 (1998) ("[T]he judicial branch serves best by enftorcing enacted words
rather than unenacted (more likely, imagined) intents, purposes, and wills. An inter-
preter who bypasses or downplays the text becomes a lawmaker without obeying the
constitutional rules for making law."); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legilative Hisory
Be an impeachable Offrnse?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 807, 812 (1998) (recognizing the
"widespread misuse of legislative history to achieve substantive ends" and the corre-
sponding refusal of manyjudges to rely on it).
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we trace out some ideas about how we ought to think about legislative
history in light of the preceding positive political analysis.
To the extent that interpretation in hard cases is about the unrav-
eling of legislative intent, positive political theory suggests that we are
not interested in just any legislator's intent; instead, we are interested
particularly in the intentions of those in a critical position to forge a
final legislative compromise and whose assent is critical to the act's
enactment.12 As we have emphasized, these views are important, not
because the pivot signs on last, but because they are the most reliable
indicators of the compromises necessary to produce a bill that can
pass. Without the pivot's assent and the compromises necessary to
gain it, there would be no legislation. These legislative compromises
are therefore central to an act's meaning. Further, as we argue in Part
IV, courts that ignore this process of bargaining and compromise hin-
der the legislative process-moderates are far less likely to help pass
legislation if they believe that courts will set aside the compromises
necessary to gain their support.
In one sense it can be said that every legislator who voted for a bill
was equally critical; who is to say ex ante whether one or another vote
was expendable with regard to the final legislative outcome? In a
more fundamental sense, however, this seemingly intuitive claim is
false. Positive political theory emphasizes: (a) the structure of legisla-
tive decision making; (b) the building of legislative coalitions; and (c)
the strategies of legislative communication of statutory meaning.'1 "
Using this approach, we can better sort out the strands of legislative
decision making.
As we have noted, positive political theory emphasizes that coali-
tions and the legislation's contents evolve simultaneously: as leaders
adjust the legislative contents, who favors and opposes the bill also
102 In criticizing the relevance of positive political theory to statutory interpreta-
tion, Professor Mark Movsesian challenges the use of analogies to contract law noting,
quite plausibly, that there are too many salient differences between the legislative pro-
cess and the multilateral contracting process tojustify this analogy. See Mark L. Movse-
sian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Baigains"? The Failure (Y the Contract Analoy in State-
to y Inteiljetation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1167-90 (1998) (highlighting differences in
contracting and statutory interpretation, especially focusing on third-party effects and
the problematic concept of legislative intent). In the main, we agree with his critique.
The structure of the legislative process is fundamentally distinct firoi the private or-
dering that occurs in contractual negotiations and drafting. See id. at 1167-90 (describ-
ing why the contract analogy fails). However, the connection Movsesian draws be-
tween this critique and the generally "problematic concept of legislative intent," id. at
1181, is more controversial. hia Part III.B.
103 See inf/ra Part IV (applying these key tenets of positive political theory).
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shifts. This observation has striking implications for understanding
legislation. The ardent supporters who typically initiate the legislative
process often cannot pass legislation to suit their ends. Put simply,
most proposals devised by the ardent supporters cannot pass the
United States Congress and become public law. For legislation to suc-
ceed, the ardent supporters are typically forced to adjust the legisla-
tion's contents to attract pivotal legislators on whose support the legis-
lation's future depends. We observe this process again and again with
respect to major national legislation."" Because the adjustment of leg-
islative content is both fundamental and necessary to garner the sup-
port of the pivotal legislators, the bargains associated with these ad-
justments are essential to understand the meaning of the laws that
Congress does pass.1115
The positive political theory of legislative rhetoric arms an inter-
preter with the tools to understand what legislators were attempting to
communicate-not merely sincerely, but also strategically. WAhich leg-
islators were communicating which message? Was this communica-
tion cheap talk by legislators who were predisposed to support or to
oppose the proposal? Worse yet, was it a message of legislators aiming
to spin the proposal in a direction inconsistent with the understand-
ing of the majority whose assent is necessary to its passage? Or was
this communication indicative of an understanding of legislators
whose support was crucial to constructing the bargain which is the ob-
ject of the interpretation? What is centrally at stake is the ability of
conscientious interpreters to separate useful from useless legislative
history. 106
I Professor Moore describes this situation well:
[P]olicy compromise typically entails concession(s) on the part of advocates,
such that what is offered in return for support is a weakening of the policy
provisions initially sought by supporters. The proposal is scaled back in one
respect or another.... [Sluch concessions typically affect the scope and en-
forcement provisions of a proposed bill, more so than the proclamation por-
tions of the bill.
MOORE, supra note 15, at 17.
I05 See Movsesian, supra note 102, at 1150-53 (discussing the contract theory of
statutory interpretation expounded by McNollgast, which would require a court to
"search the statute's legislative history for 'implicit bargains,' relating to interpretation
and other matters, that do not appear in the statutory text" in order to "capture the
complete agreement").
Ultimately, this analysis requires a normative basis. That is, the lessons for in-
terpretation provided by otur positive account of legislative decision making and rheto-
ric turn squarely on what one regards as the essential project of statutory interpreta-
tion. For reasons that are mostly beyond the scope of this Article, we insist that the
project must be abotIt the determination of legislative meaning recovered from the
1452 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWRI VIEW [Vol. 151:1417
1I. THE POLITICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 RECONSIDERED
Our aim in this Part is to use the above approach to understand
the political compromises necessary to assure passage of the landmark
Civil Rights Act of 1964. We study the strategic dilemmas faced by the
relevant coalition leaders in constructing sufficient support to break
the Senate filibuster and hence to pass the Act.
As we have emphasized, political officials' rhetoric is strategic in
the sense that officials try to place themselves and the legislation in
the best possible light, given their electoral and political goals. Be-
cause rhetoric often serves nonobvious ends, we must take care in how
we use the statements of participants.
Because this Part is the Article's longest, we provide a roadmap so
the reader may follow the logic as it unfolds. In Section A, we detail
the legislative predicaments precluding easy passage of a major new
civil rights act in late 1963 and early 1964. Section B studies the coali-
tion structure in Congress, focusing on the central strategic dilemma
of creating a support coalition sufficiently large to overcome the
southern Democrats' filibuster. Section C recounts the history of the
Act's passage, with an emphasis on the Senate. Section D presents the
heart of our new analysis, including the political compromises neces-
sary to gain the pivotal Republicans support; a detailed analysis of the
architecture of the compromise emphasizing the price extracted by
the Republicans to go along; and the rhetorical incentives of Demo-
crats and Republicans in their strategic presentations of their actions
to the public and, later, to analysts and the courts. We end, in Section
E, by summarizing the central elements in our new account of this his-
toric legislation.
A. The Central Legislative Obstacles Preventing Passage
The essential dilemma faced by those who advocated expansion of
the federal government's role in the protection of Americans' civil
rights was that Congress consisted of a large group of legislators who
were adamant in their opposition to national civil rights legislation.
expressed and, where appropriate, unexpressed intent of the framers of the statute.
We hope to be able to defend this normative premise more systematically in future at-
tempts to work out the implications of this positive theory. Meanwhile, the core les-
sons of the theory of legislative decision making and rhetoric traced out in this Article
relate to how a reconstructed understanding of legislative history can be Used by inter-
preters who pay fidelity to the intent of the statute's makers.
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By far, the most important opposition group of legislators was from
the South.'0 7
Various institutional details of the Congress aided opposition leg-
islators. The seniority system assured that southern representatives
would occupy key gatekeeping roles in both the House and the Sen-
ate, including chairs of major committees. Thus, civil rights legisla-
tion often faced insurmountable obstacles.""5 The judiciary commit-
tees of both houses, in particular, were notorious "graveyard[s] of civil
rights legislation."'W The situation in the Senate was, if anything,
worse than the House, given the fact that a filibuster allowed thirty-
four senators to defeat a proposed bill.'"' The distribution of repre-
sentation in the Senate assured that the southern bloc of senators,
nearly all of whom were dead set against civil rights legislation, could
combine easily with a small number of conservative Republicans to de-
feat efforts at cloture."'
107 See KLINKNER & SMITH, su/Jra note 13, at 242-87 (discussing the role of "Opera-
tion Dixie"-a Republican effort to build a new conservative majority to take an in-
creasingly conservative line on civil rights issues-and how this plan resulted in white
southern opinion turning sharply against the Democratic party); SUNDQUIST, supra
note 13, at 221-86 (discussing minorities, equal rights, and southern resistance to civil
rights initiatives).
1108 See, e.g., KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 13, at 242-87 (reporting instances of
earlier civil rights legislation defeated in either the House or Senate by strong south-
ern resistance).
I09 WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 15, at 4; see also ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF
JERICI-10: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHrs 388 (1996) (chronicling President Johnson's frustration
with House resistance to civil rights legislation).
1 For recent works analyzing the political implications of' the filibuster, see, for
example, BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 9, at 14-20; KREHBIEL, supro note 9, at 93-97;
STEWART, supra note 7, at 363-66.
II The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86, were the first successful efforts in
nearly a century to enact federal civil rights legislation. That said, these bills were sub-
stantially weakened during the enactment process. Southern Democrats successfully
used the filibuster to substantially limit the ability of northern liberals to enact broad
legislation. In particular, no fair employment law could be enacted; moreover, south-
erners effectively blocked efforts to regulate discrimination in the area of public ac-
commodations. In the end, the two laws dealt rather weakly with voting rights. And,
even in that regard, they did little to dismantle the Jim Crow struclture of the South.
Professor Moore reports that
[i]n the end, neither the Civil Rights Act of 1957 nor the Civil Rights Act of
1960 proved to be terribly significant pieces of legislation in terms of actually
improving the sociopolitical progress of blacks. The 1957 act, as one senator
remarked, did not bring the vote to one person.
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Because the number of northern Democrats was far too small to
defeat the filibuster, passing a major new civil rights bill required sup-
port of a large Republican bloc, including many quite conservative
ones who generally opposed new initiatives proposing government in-
tervention. 112
The central strategic dilemma for the pro-civil rights coalition was
therefore to design a compromise that would attract sufficient Repub-
lican votes to defeat the filibuster. The main uncertainty concerned
whether a compromise could be fashioned strong enough to satisfy
liberal Democrats yet be sufficiently attractive to Republicans. Ex
ante, it was not clear that such a compromise existed. The striking
compromises necessary to pass the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts
demonstrate this difficulty."3 i
In addition, supporting the 1964 Act presented the Republicans
with a series of related strategic dilemmas. First, many were against
increasing the role of the federal government in economic and social
affairs, and supporting strong civil rights legislation might have cre-
ated electoral difficulties for those from conservative districts."' Sec-
ond, how could they tailor the bill to suit their needs, inevitably weak-
ening it in important respects, without being easily accused in the
upcoming elections of weakening the Act and, thus, of being soft on
The 1960 act had an equally insignificant impact.
MOORE, supra note 15, at 49-50; see aLtoJOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT:
STALEMATE IN AMERICAN Po.ITIcs 20-23 (1995) (discussing President Johnson, the
1957 Civil Rights Act, and the compromises that "emptied the ... bill of nearly all hut
symbolic meaning").
The best treatment of the 1957 and 1960 legislation in the context of the civil
rights movement as a whole remains SUNDQUIST, suljna note 13, at 222-59. A quite
lively and detailed treatment of the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1957 is
contained in CARO, suna note 16, at 685-1012. On the 1960 debate, see DANIEL M.
BERMAN, A BILL BECOMESA LAw: THE CIviL, RIGHITSACT OF 1960 (1962).
112 See FRANCINE SANDERS ROMERO, CIVIL RIGHTS POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED
STATE ;S: AN INS'i'iT'UTIONAL PERSi'ECTIVE 46 (2002) (citing Senate minority leader
Everett Dirksen's observation that "on both sides of the aisle, you had a very substantial
element who still believed that the states must be predominant, that you mustn't in-
trude too deeply into their affairs").
113 See KLINKNER & SMITi, supra note 13, at 242-54 (surveying both the racial vio-
lence and discrimination that precipitated the passage of these statutes and the politi-
cal constraints that resulted in very limited legislative responses).
I1,1 See SUNDQUIST, snIpra note 13, at 259-71 (contrasting Republican acknowledg-
ment that further legislation was necessary to secure the equality and rights promised
by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with the party's concurrent fear that
such legislation would increase the power of the federal government and upset conser-
vative voters).
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civil rights? '5 Third, could the Republicans trust the Democrats?"'
With the aid of hindsight, we know that, except at the initial House
stage, the northern Democratic coalition held firm for the moderate
compromise fashioned by the administration and the Republicans."
7
Yet the coalition's ability to hold to a compromise was not obvious in
advance, and this posed a dilemma for the Republicans. Suppose that
the Republicans were to support civil rights and help move it down
the legislative path toward passage. Suppose, further, that, at a very
visible legislative phase just before passage, the liberal Democrats de-
cided to defect from the compromise and systematically strengthen
the bill. This defection would present Republicans with three bad
choices: accept a stronger bill than they wanted; be forced to publicly
weaken the legislation, making them vulnerable in many northern,
moderate swing districts in the upcoming elections to the charge that
they weakened civil rights; or kill the measure altogether, again mak-
ing them electorally vulnerable in the North. This vulnerability im-
plied the need for Republican caution in their negotiations with the
Democrats.'1
In short, passage of the Act not only required breaking a seem-
ingly insurmountable filibuster, but unprecedented cooperation be-
tween the parties. The 1964 elections, looming just months ahead,
implied that the two parties would oppose one another. The parties'
positioning for these elections served as a potential barrier to their
legislative cooperation. "
Cf CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 18, at 52-55 (discussing the Republican
transition to a more racially conservative policy after 1964).
Ili; This is a major question investigated by David Filvaroff and Raymond Wolfin-
ger. See Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 18 (analyzing Republican concern
about the consequences of the bill and their fear that "removing barriers to black vot-
ing would disproportionately benefit the Democratic party").
In Subcommittee Number Five of the House judiciary Committee, ardent lib-
erals, with the help of southern Democrats, defected from the compromise by
strengthening the bill. See infra Part II.C.I for a discussion of the passage of the bill in
the House and the Subcommittee's proceedings.
11g See Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 17-19 (voicing Republican concern
over the effects the bill might have had on voters, and observing the party's tendency
to remain "skittish" during the negotiation process).
IM) See CARMINES & STIMSON, su/pra note 18, at 48-55 (examining the positions of
the Republicans and Democrats during this period and concluding that the Democrats
continued to focus on racial liberalism while the Republicans, though not embracing
racial conservatism to the extent associated with Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, re-
mained more conservative than Democrats).
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B. The Civil Rights Coalitions Within Congress
To understand the Act's passage, we need to study the structure,
incentives, and interaction of the three types of legislators noted
above. The ardent supporters of civil rights consisted of a group of
northern liberal legislators, who were mostly, though not exclusively,
Democrats. The ardent opponents consisted mainly of southern
Democrats. As well, a number of northern and western Republicans
predictably opposed civil rights legislation. Moderate legislators were
more distributed geographically. They inluded Republican legisla-
tors from the Midwest, the Northeast and, albeit more rarely, the
West.
1. Republican Opportunities and Dilemmas
All accounts agree on the underlying motivations and, at least
broadly speaking, strategies of the ardent supporters and ardent op-
ponents. What is much more controversial is the role of the pivotal
Republican legislators in the House and in the Senate. The interpre-
tation that reigns supreme in academic studies makes it appear as if
civil rights legislation was all but certain by 1963.12 Leaders, such as
Martin Luther King, Jr., and events, such as those at Selma and Bir-
mingham, had greatly increased awareness of the problem among
northerners whose support for new civil rights legislation was stronger
in late 1963 than at any time in recent decades.''
Such legislation was supported by a substantial majority in the
House and by a majority in the Senate. Critically, the Kennedy and,
following President Kennedy's assassination, Johnson administrations
threw their weight behind the effort to enact landmark civil rights leg-
islation in the Eighty-eighth Congress.
2
1
12) Another valuable perspective is provided by those scholars who consider the
significance of domestic civil rights legislation in terms of its connection to an increas-
ingly tense foreign policy, such as MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGIt-S:
EQUALIlYAS COLD WAR POLICY 1946-1968 (1998); KLINKNER& SMITtH, supra note 13, at
263-67.
121 See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1963-65, at 131-69 (1998) (discussing the political climate and potential for civil rights
legislation in late 1963).
122 See GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 74-79, 125-52 (detailing both Kennedy's and
Johnson's emphasis on America's need to unite all races and focusing on the foreign
policy implications of this domestic agenda); KIINKNER & SMITH, suln-a note 13, at 268-
74 (tracing Kennedy's and.lohnson's support of civil rights in their administrations);
cf. MARK STERN, CALCULATING VISIONS: KENNEDY, JO INSON AND CIVIL RIGiHITS 63-112,
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Faced with this situation, Republicans, so the argument goes,
could not afford to be seen as opposing civil rights and thus were in a
weak bargaining position. Indeed, many analysts appear to argue that
the Republicans had little choice other than to accede to the wishes of
the ardent supporters of the bill, supporters that included the Presi-
dent. 123 William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, for
example, note that Senator Dirksen sought President Johnson's help
in amending the bill but thatJohnson refused, explaining that "there
would be no compromise. ''4 Charles and Barbara Whalen make the
same point: "There was to be no deal on H.R. 7152.... The plain
truth was that Dirksen had been outmaneuvered by Hubert Hum-
phrey."'' From this, they, like most analysts, form the view that Re-
publican support could be expected. 21
Unfortunately, we could find no evidence for this story aside from
cheap talk comments made after the fact by ardent supporters, espe-
cially Hubert Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson, both of whom wanted
to claim credit for this historic Act and minimize the importance of
the Republicans. As analysts, we must be wary of taking the partici-
pants' accounts after the fact at face value. As evidence for their ac-
count, Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett cite the Whalens.' 27  The
Whalens' principal citations are to newspaper accounts that, on in-
spection, contain no evidence of this assertion. For example, the
Washington Post article cited'by the Whalens reports: "[Dirksen] told
reporters later that they barely touched on civil rights. But he told a
visiting church group that he had told the President that the bill sent
161-85 (1992) (examining Kennedy's somewhat hesitant support for civil rights and
Johnson's firmer commitment).
See MANN, suprra note 109, at 367-69 (considering the political response by
House and Senate Republicans during a time in which, in President Kennedy's words,
"[t]he whole world [was] changing, and the whole nation [was] changing"). But cf
HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE F0R BlACK EQuALIY: 1954-1992, at 32-33 (rev. ed.
1993) ("[T]he popularity of Republicanism among African-Americans in 1956 fright-
ened Northern Democrats. They were determined to win back the black votes the
GOP had gained [and] believed that ... civil-rights legislation was the only way to do
it.").
124 ESKRIDGE ETAL., sup/ra note 14, at 19; see aLso MANN, supra note 109, at 391 (de-
scribing Johnson's refusal to "compromise with southerners and conservative Republi-
cans").
125 WHALEN & WHALEN, sultra note 15, at 171-72; cf id. at 29-70 (describing the
attempt to pass H.R. 7152 prior to President Kennedy's assassination).
12 See d. at 155 ('Everett Dirksen did not have too many options open to him.");
see also Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 17-21 (describing the Republicans' deci-
sion to "be as united as possible" in their position on the civil rights bill).
127 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 19.
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over from the House would have to be amended.', 2 8  The article
makes no mention of any response from Johnson. In short, we could
find no evidence to support the thesis that Johnson and Humphrey
outmaneuvered Dirksen.
In our view, this account misrepresents both the history of the Act
and the strategic dilemma involved in its passage. We find little evi-
dence to conclude that Humphrey and Johnson manipulated Dirksen.
This is not surprising given the pivotal nature of the Republicans. In-
deed, there is a strong basis for believing that Republican support for
the 1964 Act was not foreordained but precarious. First, although it is
true that, since President Lincoln, the Republicans had been the party
supporting the rights of African Americans,12 this historical associa-
tion changed to a degree with Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal."'
This shift continued into the 1950s,'' by which time President
Eisenhower was a reluctant supporter of civil rights."'
Second, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Democrats, not Repub-
licans, had become the main advocates of civil rights. It was then-
candidate Kennedy, not Nixon, who advocated new civil rights legisla-
tion in the 1960 presidential campaign;'3 ' and it was the Democrats
who pushed this legislation in 1957 and 1960.1: 4 In contrast, the Re-
129 Richard L. Lyons, Plans for Cloture Vote on Jury Clause Pressed, WASH!. POST, Apr.
30, 1964, at A6.
129 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 25, at 42-57 (describing the association of Re-
publicans with the North and Democrats with southern white supremacy); NANCYJ.
WEISS, FARFWELL TO TIFH PARI OF LINCOLN 3 (1983) ("The Grand Old [Republican]
Party was the party of Lincoln-a party that had held black allegiance for more than
half a century.").
IM See THERNSTROM & TIIERNSTROM, supra note 15, at 62-65 (describing the Roo-
sevelt administration's more liberal views on civil rights and the migration of black
support to the Democratic party in the 1930s despite the harmful effects of New Deal
legislation on black workers).
131 See id. at 88-93 (explaining the increasing role of liberal northern Democrats in
promoting civil rights beginning in the 1940s).
132 See SUNI)QUIST, supra note 13, at 225-30 (describing Eisenhower's initial desire
to "keep[] the civil rights issue quiet" and his ultimate endorsement of the civil rights
legislation).
133 See MOORE, supra note 15, at 59 ("Generally Nixon's campaign was considered
weak and unspecific in the area of civil rights. Democratic nominee Kennedy, on the
other hand, offered a candidacy strongly supportive of civil rights."); TIIERNSTROM &
THERNSTROM, supro note 15, at 122-25 (discussing Kennedy's attempts to address civil
rights issues in his 1960 presidential campaign). But ef GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 30
("[l]n 1960 both presidential parties had positioned themselves considerably to the left
of their congressional counterparts in civil rights matters." (emphasis added)).
1,11 See CARO, sulpr note 16, at 831-85 (describing President Johnson's support of
civil rights); SUNDQUIST, supra note 13, at 230-59 (describing the Democrats' efforts to
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publicans required that these acts be weakened as the price of their
support. 3 5 Although demand for a stronger civil rights act had grown
in the North, Democrats also sought a much more ambitious
agenda.' " Republican support for civil rights legislation in 1963 and
1964 could not be taken for granted.
Third, the primary imperative for the Republicans, we argue, was
to avoid being seen as standing in the way of civil rights. This meant
that they could not overtly collude with southern Democrats to defeat
the bill. However, this did not imply that they had to roll over and let
the Democrats pass any legislation they desired. As in 1957 and 1960,
the Republicans were in a position to ask for serious dilution of the
legislation. :17
Finally, Linder one scenario Republicans had little reason to fear
being blamed by civil rights leaders and by African American citizens
if civil rights failed. That scenario involved ardent supporters insisting
upon a broad civil rights bill, knowing that this insistence could blow
up in their faces. This, of course, was the risk supporters faced in
1957 and in 1960; this prospect is what then-Senate majority leader,
and later President, Johnson protested so vehemently." By all ac-
counts, the civil rights community was, by 1963, becoming very impa-
tient with Congress; '" it was imperative, for the Democratic party na-
tionally, that Congress pass a civil rights bill-and a significant one-
in the Eighty-eighth Congress."0 And, from the vantage point of the
pass civil rights legislation).
135 See sources cited supra note 126 (discussing the Republican response to the civil
rights bills); cf KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 13, at 248 (describing the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 as "weak").
136 See CARMINES & STIMSON, sultra note 18, at 37-44 ("Whereas the civil rights
plank in the 1956 Democratic platform was written in compromise language so as not
to offend southern Democrats, the 1960 plank contained strong and specific support
for civil rights."); THERNSTROM & TIERNSTROM, supra note 15, at 138-48 (describing
changing white public opinion in support of civil rights legislation and President Ken-
nedy's bold civil rights bill).
37 See SUNDQUIST, supra note 13, at 222-59 (describing how the Republicans acted
to put limits on civil rights legislation).
138 See CARO, supflci note 16, at 533-39, 948-59 (describing Johnson's actions and
attitude regarding the civil rights bill).
139 As one colmmentator put it, "Impatience, tactics, and demands escalated,
moreover, because the civil-rights leadership recognized that the new mood in black
America would not be long sustained." HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
EQuALI'Y 1954-1980, at 148 (1981 ).
140 SeeJOHN FREDERICK MARTIN, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE CRISIS or LIBERALIsM: THE
DEMOCRATIC PARrY 1945-1976, at 171-76 (1979) (describing the escalating violence in
the South and Kennedy's recognition that racial discrimination was "a 'moral issue,'
one that would be settled in the streets if Congress did not act").
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liberal wing of the party, the risk was considerably more than zero that
they would be defeated in their efforts and that they would be blamed
for this defeat.'""
By contrast, Republicans were in an ideal political position to in-
fluence.the fate of the Civil Rights Act. As one observer noted, "Re-
publicans held the key to the bill's passage, and many of them sin-
cerely wanted to play a meaningful role in the process. ' ' "I1 They were
pivotal legislators necessary for the legislation's passage-pivotal pre-
cisely because their support could not be counted on without conces-
sions. In significant respects, these pivotal legislators were in the
driver's seat with regard to controlling the bill's agenda. What gave
them this power and influence was the omnipresent risk that they
would walk away from the bargaining table. To be sure, such a deci-
sion would not be costless, especially in the 1964 elections. Yet it is
important to remember that parties do not control their members in
Congress; and those Republicans from the West and from conservative
districts throughout the North faced their own individual electoral
imperatives in their states, not the nation."'' The electoral fortunes of
a large and pivotal group of Republicans simply did not depend on
passing a civil rights bill."' This placed Republicans in a strategic po-
sition to resist supporting Democratic initiatives, and Democratic
leaders could not count on Republican support.
All these factors added up to a strategic opportunity for Republi-
cans.
See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL
POLITICS AS DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 208 (1996) ("[T]he riots that swept through Ameri-
can cities in the middle and late 1960s, and the apparent failure of liberal policies that
the violence seemed to signal, were reviving the Goldwater [Republican and conserva-
tive] racial strategy.").
141 MANN, supra note 109, at 369.
143 Although political scientists disagree about how strong parties are in control-
ling their members, nearly all agree that American parties have less control than do
parties in most western European parliaments, such as the British Parliament. For a
general discussion of the American party system, see AL)RICH, supra note 54, at 3-27;
COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 37, at 1; ROHDE, supra note 54, at 3.
144 See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 74, at 44-45 (describing how the essentially
three-party system in the mid-twentieth century allowed Republicans to join conserva-
tive southern Democrats in voting against northern Democrats on a "wide variety of
non-race-related matters").
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2. A Closer Look at the Coalitions
As we have noted, the Senate filibuster presented the most signifi-
cant hurdle facing any civil rights bill. Because the vote for cloture
required two-thirds of the Senate, liberal and moderate Democrats
alone could not succeed in passing a civil rights bill; they needed a
large group of Republicans to assist them. There were sixty-seven
Democrats in the Senate, twenty-one from states of the old Confeder-
acy, twenty of whom opposed any form of civil rights. (Senator Ralph
Yarborough of Texas was the one southern Democrat who was not an
ardent opponent.) 1,15 This left a maximum of forty-seven Democrats to
support the bill (not all of whom did so in fact), far short of the sixty-
seven senators needed for cloture.
This arithmetic logic had a number of consequences for passing
civil rights legislation. First, it implied that at least twenty of the thirty-
three Republicans were needed for support, and more if some of the
northern Democrats failed to vote to end the filibuster. Second, this
in turn cast Republican leader Everett Dirksen in the role of pivotal
player throughout the entire Senate drama. If he and his supporters
chose to support the bill, it would pass; if they decided not to, it would
fail. His decision depended in part upon the changes to be made in
the bill. The problem for the supporters was to bring Dirksen and his
allies on board without gutting the bill.
The following Table displays the 1964 Senate on a spectrum of
liberal to conservative using the measuring rod of scores produced by
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) using each senator's vot-
ing behavior. 4 Statistical studies show that ADA scores are a good
predictor of Senate voting on civil rights: the higher the ADA score,
the more likely a senator will support the bill.
145 Senator Yarborough's colleague, Republican SenatorJohn Tower of Texas, was
to feature prominently in the debate surrounding the civil rights bill's employment
discrimination provisions. See infra Part ll.A.1.1) (describing Tower's attempts to
amend the Civil Rights Act to secure employer rights to administer employee aptitude
tests).
146 See generally Steven D. Levitt, How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter
Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 425, 426 (1996) (de-
scribing methodology for estimating the various weights senators place on different
considerations in voting); James Snyder & Timothy Groseclose, Estimating Paly Influ-
ence in Congsessional Roll-Call Voting, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 193, 193-94 (2000) (describing
methodology to estimate how partisan considerations affect roll call voting).
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Table 1: 1964 Senate Voting Record, by Party and Region
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ADA Scores range from 100 to 0, and are listed in the Table's first
column on the left. Each symbol represents a senator: R for Repub-
lican; Nfor northern Democrat; and S for southern Democrat. Each
senator is placed at his ADA score. Thus, reading down the Republi-
can column, the Republican senator with the highest ADA score has a
score of 89, while the Republican with the lowest score has an ADA
score of 0. Similarly, ADA scores of northern Democrats range from
a high of 100 to a low of 26, while those for southern Democrats
range from a high of 69 to a low of 2.
The Table demonstrates just how conservative the pivotal Repub-
lican in 1964 was. Although some accounts appear to suggest that
breaking the filibuster could have been accomplished with the sup-
port of liberal and moderate Republicans," this is false. There were
simply too few liberal and moderate Republicans; most were conserva-
tive. In the Whalens'judgment, "of the 33 R~publicans, 21 (including
Dirksen) could be classified as conservatives, only 5 as moderates, and
7 (including [California Senator Thomas] Kuchel) as liberals."
'"5
Our statistical classification reveals the same conclusion. Assum-
ing that all northern Democrats supported the legislation and all
southern Democrats opposed it, twenty Republicans were needed to
pass a motion on cloture. Assuming that the more liberal (higher
ADA) Republicans were more likely to support than conservative ones,
this required nearly two-thirds of the Republicans to favor the bill.
Given our assumptions about voting behavior, the Table shows that
the filibuster pivot, that Senator whose support is needed to break the
filibuster," ' had an ADA score of 17. (The dashed line in the Table
marks this fact.) As 100 is the most liberal and 0 the most conserva-
tive, the Table shows that the pivotal Republican in 1964 was thus
quite conservative. By way of comparison, the median southern
Democrat also had an ADA score of 17. In contrast, the median
northern Democrat had an ADA score of about 87. Senators with
ADA scores of 87 usually support intervention by the national gov-
ernment, while those with ADA scores of 17 usually do not.
In short, in 1964 nothing assured support by pivotal Republicans
for a strong civil rights bill.
1,17 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty of overcom-
ing the filibuster).
148 WI IALEN & WHALEN, supra note 15, at 160.
149 See BRADY & VOLDEN, sulra note 9, at 17-20 (explaining the role of a pivotal
senator in relation to veto and filibuster obstacles to legislation); KREIHIBIEL, s/Ira note
9, at 23-26 (describing how pivots function).
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C. The Enactment Process
Several important studies have examined in detail the process by
which H.R. 7152 became law. For the most part, these accounts tell a
similar story. In what follows, we focus on the Senate, in part because
we agree with the consensus about House passage and in part because
we believe that the necessary compromise in the Senate has been mis-
understood.
We begin with the basic framework of congressional considera-
tion. The bill was first introduced in the House of Representatives
and, when passed by the House, considered and passed by the Senate.
In both cases, supermajority support was needed in order to get
around staunch opposition at key stages prior to the bill being allowed
a floor vote. Supermajority support in the House, though not strictly
required, was necessary as a practical matter to overcome the opposi-
tion of the Rules Committee;5'"" in the Senate, it was necessary to over-
come a filibuster. 'r"
The relative sizes of the various groups combined with the ardent
opposition of the southern Democrats to imply that assembling the
necessary supermajority required a strong and durable bipartisan coa-
lition. It further implied that the marginal supporter in both houses
was a Republican. House and Senate passage are now considered in
turn.
1. Passage in the House
We discuss in detail only one aspect of the House's passage of the
bill because it illuminates a strategic problem also faced in the Senate.
This event concerns the initial consideration of the bill by the judici-
ary Committee. In the beginning, it was not obvious that the commit-
tee would pass the bill. Indeed, many previous civil rights bills had
failed to garner sufficient support within this committee. Supporters
carefully steered the bill to the epononymously named Subcommittee
Number Five, a panel under the leadership of a very strong civil rights
proponent, Representative Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New
NO See LOEVY, supra note 15, at 90-95 (surveying Republican tactics in the House to
place the bill before the Rules Committee); WHALEN & WHAILEN, supra note 15, at 69
(describing the "fast parliamentary maneuvering" that was required to get the bill out
of the Rules Committee).
151 See John G. Stewart, 7he Senate and Civil Rights, in THE CIVIL RIGHiTS AcT OF
1964: TIFE PASSAGE Or THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 149, 150-54 (Rob-
ert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (considering the alternatives available to the bill's opponents to
defeat or compromise with the senators orchestrating the filibuster).
2003] POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF LEGISLA TIVE HISTORY 1465
York and Chair of the full committee. Although this subcommittee
normally considered antitrust matters, Celler assigned the bill to this
subcommittee because of its favorable composition.'15' The bill ap-
peared to have sufficient support on this subcommittee to pass this
stage of the long process. But obstacles loomed ahead.
Democratic proponents of the bill in the administration and Con-
gress had worked out a compromise with the Republicans that had a
chance of passing. The basic tactic was to organize enough moderate
Republicans to collect a majority sufficient to overcome institutional
hurdles within the House and to provide a suitable majority on the
floor."' This bipartisan coalition was necessary not only for smooth
sailing in the House, but also to protect the final House bill from be-
ing stopped in the Senate '' Proponents believed a bill with substan-
tial bipartisan support would be more resistant to the sort of conserva-
tive attacks and strategic compromises that doomed previous civil
rights legislation. 5' ; Thus, the bill sent to Subcommittee Number Five
asked for less than the ardent supporters wanted.'"7
152 See LoEvv, supra note 15, at 46-49 (describing the "favorable forum for a civil
rights bill" that existed in Subcommittee Number Five); WHALEN & WHALEN, s'upra
note 15, at 3-11 (describ ing the introduction of the bill by Representative Celler); see
also Nicole L. Gudron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative Procedural
Histoty of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J. 1201, 1215-18 (pro-
viding a thorough summary of the bill's transition from the subcommittee to the full
committee).
153 See EsKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 7-8 (observing that the subcommittee was
"dominated by civil rights advocates").
154 See generally Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supa note 22, at 14 (explaining that "[t] he
need for Republican support [for a civil rights bill] was obvious").
Key to this strategy was Representative William McCulloch of Ohio. See
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 7-10 (discussing McCulloch's essential role in pass-
ing civil rights legislation in the House); WHALEN & WHALEN, supla note 15, at 9-13
(discussing Democrats' negotiations with MCulloch to obtain his SUlsport for the bill);
Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 16-22 (describing McGulloch's "critical" role in
shepherding the bill through the House).
I See GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 87-88 (recounting the Kennedy administration's
efforts to persuade Republicans to support a compromise bill); W-IALEN & W-IALEN,
supra note 15, at 11-13 (noting the need for Republican support in both the House
and the Senate); Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 16 ("Recognizing the need for
substantial Republican help ... the [Kennedy] administration aimed to develop strong
but reasonable bipartisan provisions ... to defeat the inevitable southern filibuster in
the Senate.").
For example, the original bill did not include any provision concerning "fair
employment practices." For a good description of the process for including prohibi-
tions against employment discrimination into legislative proposals, see GRAHAM, so/na
note 20, at 82-87.
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The surprise event of the subcommittee process was the defection
from the compromise by ardent liberals. Title by title, proponents of
the compromise watched helplessly as liberals, with the aid of south-
ern Democrats, strengthened the bill, potentially dooming prospects
for a compromise that could pass both chambers.:'" The bill reported
from the subcommittee therefore was stronger than the compromise
agreed to by moderate Republicans like William McCulloch and Char-
les Halleck.'15
9
Proponents of compromise in the full Judicialy Committee at-
tempted to restore some semblance of the original bill. Their strategy
was to introduce various amendments-each fashioned by moderate
legislators under the direction of the White House and Representative
McCulloch-designed to ameliorate the effects of the subcommittee's
revisions to H.R. 7152."" Under Representative McCulloch's leader-
ship, a coalition of ardent supporters and moderates emerged to steer
the bill through the committee.
At this juncture, pivotal Republicans proved instrumental in the
progress of the legislation and in determining the compromise it-
self.'5 ' All accounts of the episode agree that McCulloch was a central
player in the negotiations over H.R. 7152."2 His support was essential
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., sn/ra note 14, at 9 (referring to McCulloch's disbelief in
the changes made by liberal Democrats to strengthen the bill); WHALEN & WHIALEN,
supra note 15, at 34-40 (discussing numerous amendments that "put more muscle" into
the bill).
Filvaroff and Wolfinger suggest the following account of what took place:
"Skeptical of both [the administration's] bipartisan strategy and the strength of [its]
commitment, egged on by interest groups that shared this skepticism, and resentful at
being excluded, the subcommittee's liberal Democratic majority seized the initiative in
spectactular fushion." Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 18. There are no re-
ported descriptions of these Democrats' strategy, and this explanation seems the most
plausible account. Another possible explanation is that these ardent supporters had
reason to believe that the subcommittee bill would be refashioned after being reported
by tie sttbcommittee-othewise it would die on the floor.
t60 This strategy initially failed because Illinois Representative Roland Libonati, a
Democrat from Illinois who originally agreed to participate in the compromise's resto-
ration, backed down from weakening the bill. Not only did this retreat backfire in the
lace of moderate civil rights supporters, it also contributted to Representative Li-
bonati's defeat in the 1966 election. See WHAILEN & W IALEN, sunpra note 15, at 65-67
(reporting that "Libonati's disloyalty to the president" caused him to lose the support
of the "Cook County machine" in subsequent elections).
I61 The Whalens, for example, title their chapter on this episode, "Republicans to
the Rescue." I. at 29.
See ESKRIDGE El' AL., suna note 14, at 7-8 ("McCulloch's supsport, and the Re-
publican votes he might bring with him, were essential to success in the HIouse.");
GtRAI JAM, supra note 20, at 87-88 (asserting that McCulloch became the "crucial Repub-
lican dealer" in the lttdiciary Committee); MANN, supra note 109, at 373-74 (consider-
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in saving the bill from ruin in the Judiciary Committee and, later, in
shepherding the compromise through the House.
Per our "Republican pivot" hypothesis, it was die Republicans who
forced a compromise on the moderate version of the bill, rather than
the Democrats compelling Republicans to acquiesce in a stronger bill
than they wanted. This episode also illustrates that there was nothing
at all inevitable about these legislative maneuvers. McCulloch was, af-
ter all, from a very safe district;':' he had few national ambitions, and
there was little likelihood that he would be penalized by his constitu-
ents if the civil rights bill died in committee. In short, McCulloch's
threat to walk away from the table was entirely credible." He was thus
well positioned to steer a compromise through the House precisely
because his support could not be taken for granted by the ardent sup-
porters.
The version of the bill that emerged from this round of negotia-
tions bore a fair resemblance to the original bill that had first been• 165
sent to Subcommittee Number Five. The most important change
was the addition of a fair employment practices provision, which
would become Title VII.'".. The inclusion of Title VII was, as previ-
ously suggested, a significant price of the compromise among moder-
ate Republicans like McCulloch, the Kennedy administration, and ar-
dent congressional supporters.'' 7 With this price tag, the reformed
ing McCtlloch's support of the bill "crucial"); WHAlEN & WHALEN, supra note 15, at
43-66 (detailing McCulloch's negotiations with.judiciary Committee Democrats to pass
a compromise bill); see also Joseph L. Rauh, jr., The Role (ffthe Leadership Confoence on
Civil Rights in the Civil Rights Strggle of 1963-1964, in Ti t, CIvii. RIGirs AC OF 1964:
TiHE PASSAGE OF THE LAw TI iAT ENDED RACIAl. SEGREGATION, silra niote 151, at 49, 58-
60 (explaining the moves that left McCulloch "tied" to the bill); Stewart, su/ra note
151, at 158 (considering the role McCulloch )layed as a target of the administration's
strategy).
t See WHAIEN & WHALEN, sl/fra note 15, at 9-10 (noting that "McCulloch en joyed
wide popularity and respect at home, regularly winning reelection by a comfortable
margin of 65 to 70 percent").
See sources cited supra note 155 (discussing how McCulloch threatened on sev-
eral occasions to withdraw his cricial support).
i65 See Wi AI.EN & WH -ALEN, supro note 15, at 58-59 (describing the changes made
in the subcommittee). But cf LOEV, supra note 15, at 65 ("From the Kennedy admini-
stration's point of view, the subcommittee was completely out of control.... Chair-
man Emanuel Celler himself, who ordinarily was loyal to the Kennedy people....
joined the subcommittee majority in supporting [the Fair Employment Practices sec-
tion].").
166 See GRAI iAM, supro note 20, at 97-99 (discussing the subcommittee's treatment
of legislative proposals regarding job discrimination).
l See WHALEN & WHALEN, su)ra note 15, at 63-64 (discussing the Kennedy ad-
ministration's and ardent supporters' agreement to incorporate the Republicans' fair
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bill was carried on the shoulders of a growing bipartisan coalition to-
ward success in the House.
The two final hurdles to the bill's passage, both of which involved
considerable drama, were the House Rules Committee and considera-
tion by the House floor. "m Although the bill's opponents offered a
number of floor amendments, nearly all of them failed. Interestingly,
an important opposition amendment was adopted, though it did not
ultimately affect the bill's chance of passage: Judge Howard Smith of
Virginia, an ardent opponent, offered an amendment to extend Title
VII's provisions against discrimination to sex. ' ' ' This was not only ac-
cepted as an amendment, but survived to become law.7 " The House
passed the amended bill by a wide margin, 290 to 130.171
2. Passage in the Senate
Passage in the Senate required surmounting two significant hur-
dles. The first was avoiding referral to the Judiciary Committee,
chaired by Senator James Eastland, a southern Democrat from Missis-
sippi. Senator Eastland was sure to use his powers to hold up the bill
if possible-his committee was known as "the graveyard of civil rights
legislation.' 7 " The successful strategy was built around a fairly com-
plicated legal argument developed by the administration with the aid
employment proposals); Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 21 ("The version of
Title VII in the final comlpromise was taken fiom a bill introduced previously by mod-
erate and liberal Republicans.").
168 See WHALEN & WHAL EN, su/)ra note 15, at 84 ("Howard Smith, the 80-year-old
segregationist chairman of the Rules Committee ... [,] planned to do everything in his
)ower to keep [H.R. 7152] captive."); id. at 101-23 (recounting the vigorous floor de-
bate on tie bill); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., sIlna note 14, at 11-12 (describing the bill's
survival, unamended, in front of the Rules Committee).
,9 See IL.OEV, supra lte 15, at 120-22 (reconting the unexpected support for the
amendment within the house).
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of such in-
clividal's... sex .. "); see (lso GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 134-39 (reporting that the
Smith amendment was adopted by a vote of 168 to 133). For a more detailed discus-
sion of the adoption of the Smith amendment, see Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists,
Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Disciniiation in Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 49,1.S. HIsr. 37 (1983).
171 WHALEN & WHALEN, s/nIra note 15, at 121. In the end, thirty-four Republicans
and ten nonsouthern Democrats voted against the bill. Id. As Robert Loevy notes,
"(t] he South had not even been able to keep its own coalition completely together; 11
Southern )emocrats, 4 of them from President Lyndon Johnson's home state of
Texas, voted for the bill." LOEV'Y, su1pra note 15, at 123-24.
1721 WHALEN & WtHAL N, su/ra tlnote 15, at 4.
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of Harvard Law School Professor Paul Freund.' Civil rights oppo-
nents had insisted for years that the federal government lacked the
constitutional authority to enact legislation that proscribed discrimi-
nation in, among other respects, public accommodations and em-
ployment. 7  The image of "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house," an en-
clave of autonomy free from the heavy hand of the federal
government, undergirded southerners' constitutional arguments
against the bill.1'75 The most obvious source of constitutional authority
was Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that
"Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the
substantive provisions of the Amendment. 7'' To anchor the bill in
Section 5, however, would mean that, as a matter of congressional
practice, the bill would be referred to that civil rights graveyard, the
Judiciary Committee. To circumvent this problem, the administration
described the bill as grounded in Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce.'77 As such, the bill was steered clear of the Judiciary
Committee, clearing this first hurdle. In fact, Senate leaders suc-
173 See GRAHAM, supra note 20, at. 91-93 ("Freund cited overwhelming Supreme
Court support for congressional authority to regulate private enterprise, stretching
back a half-centUry to the white slave laws.... [This long regulatory tradition] also
included legislating against various forms of discrimination .... ). See generally Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1183-90 (1963) (brief of Paul A. Freund).
174 See, e.g., GRAHAM, suipra note 20, at 94-95 (referring to North Carolina Senator
Sam Ervin's opposition to the bill as outside Congress's power); LOEVY, suna note 15,
at 302 ("While explicitly recognizing the responsibility of the United States Govern-
ment in the area of civil rights, [Senator] Goldwater asserted that there was absolutely
no constitutional basis for either the public accommodations or equal employment
sections of the bill.").
175 See LOEVY, su/pra note 15, at 51-52 (tracing the origin and implications of the
"Mrs. Murphy" image as either "the average American whose righLs were to be de-
stroyed by the bill," or as revealing "the absturd lengths to which the opponents of the
bill would go in order to seek a basis for attacking the bill"); Rauh, sup/n note 162, at
55 (expanding on the apparent simplicity of this image).
176 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
177 See STEWART, sut/nra note 7, at 343 ("To overcome Eastland's opposition to the
measure, the Civil Rights Bill was drafted so that it invoked the 'commerce clause' of
the U.S. Constitution. Therefore the bill also fell under the jurisdiction of the Senate
Commerce Committee whose chairman ... was a strong, liberal supporter of civil
rights.").
,78 This procedural device would, in the succeeding years, raise enormous difficul-
ties for the constitutionality of the Act and the structure of American constitutional law
generally. In a series of early decisions, the Supreme CouIrt pUt its imprimatur on
Congress's decision to ground this legislation in the Article I, Section 8 power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 253-58 (1964) (holding that Congress had power under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations); id. at 291 (Gold-
berg, J., concurring) ("I agree 'that the action of the Congress in the adoption of the
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ceeded in avoiding committee consideration altogether, taking the ex-
traordinary step of bringing the bill directly to the Senate floor.
The second hurdle was the vote on cloture to end the southern
Democrats' filibuster. 1 This predicament proved the most significant
hurdle in the entire bill's passage. As noted above, achieving cloture
required that the proponents solve two separate problems simultane-
ously. First, they had to get the moderate Republicans, led by Senator
Everett Dirksen of Illinois, to join the coalition. Without Republican
support, the southern Democrats' filibuster could not be stopped.
Second, they had to gain Senator Dirksen's support in a way that did
not jeopardize the House's acceptance of the Senate version. The two
Act ... is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.'');
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (holding that Title II of the Civil
Rights Act was a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
The Court declined to decide whether and to what extent Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment also authorized this legislation. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 292
(Goldberg, .., concurring) (noting that the majority did not "consider whether [the
Act was] additionally sup)ortable by Congress' exertion of its power under [Section] 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also RICHARD C. CORTNER, Civil., RIGti'S AND
Puiic AccOMMO)DATIONS: Ti [EAIt" OF'ANIA M0,2 AN) MCt.UNt CASES, at ix-
x (2001) (noting that the Court's opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel was primarily based
on the Commerce Clause, not the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Heart !f Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 279-80 (Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding that Congress had
power to pass the Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the
Commerce Clause). When the Court consistently read the Commerce Clause broadly,
the state of the law agreed with the legislature's strategic choice. However, the Su-
preme Court took a decisive turn away from these uniformly broad constructions of
the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), holding that a
law prohibiting concealed weapons within a "Gun-Free School Zone" exceeded Con-
gress's power Under the Commerce Clause because the statute in question had "noth-
ing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise." See also United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (ruling that Congress lacked power under the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation that created a civil remedy for gender-motivated
violence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-80 (2000) (holding that Con-
gress cannot waive a state's sovereign immunity through legislation passed under its
Commerce Clause power). Although the Court has not cast doubt on the continuing
vitality of McClung and -leart of Atlanta Motel or other key civil rights/Commerce Clause
cases, the strategic choice of the bill's ardent supporters does appear, from the vantage
point of the current state of federalism jurisprudence, more risky than it might have
appeared at the time. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Fed-
eral Antidisoimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 450
(2000) (arguing that Lopez and Morr'ison "illustrate[] how the Court's revived limita-
tions on the commerce power ... materially constrict the effective scope of federal an-
fidiscrimination legislation").
179 See supra text accompanying notes 15-18 (discussing the need for the bill's pro-
porents to attract substantial bipartisan support to overcome the southern filibuster);
see aLso MOORE, supra note 15, at 11 ("The single most powerful tool Senate policy ad-
vocates have at their disposal to defeat an obstructionist coalition is cloture.").
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houses usually pass major legislation in different forms, requiring that
the differing versions be reconciled through a conference committee.
This procedure provides a routinized forum for negotiation between
the two houses.'" In the case of civil rights, however, resorting to a
conference committee risked enfranchising Senator Eastland of the
Judiciary Committee, thus jeopardizing the bill. Therefore, the strat-
egy of the bill's supporters was to limit the changes made by the Sen-
ate to those that would be acceptable to the House, thereby avoiding a
conference committee. The problem for the bill's supporters was to
bring Dirksen and his allies on board without gutting the bill.
The sequence of events in the Senate between February and June
of 1964 is recounted in detail in various accounts of the civil rights
battle.82 The full Senate began debate on H.R. 7152 in late March.
Through April and May of 1964, Senator Dirksen offered dozens of
amendments, some major and some minor, to Title VII of the bill.
83
At the end of May, Dirksen joined with Senator Mike Mansfield to in-
troduce an amendment in the nature of a substitute, labeled the
Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment."'
We study these amendments in detail below. For the present
analysis, a summary is useful. Although these amendments left the
structure of the Act intact, their primary force was to blunt the impact
of the bill on the North. Dirksen dramatically limited the enforce-
ment powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
which H.R. 7152 had given National Labor Relations Board-like pow-
ers.18 5 Dirksen also deleted the authority of a nongovernmental
180 On the strategic role of conference committees, see Kenneth A. Shepsle &
Barry R. Weingast, 7Te Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
85, 94-97 (1987).
181 Filvaroff and Wolfinger raise a third problem that is not generally discussed in
the literature, yet was unCotubtedly a serious constraint-constructing a compromise
bill acceptable to the Senate's moderate Republicans without having the liberals defect
by attempting to strengthen the bill as they had in the first stage of the House consid-
eration by Subcommittee Number Five. See Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supro note 22, at 18
(describing McCulloch's frustration at liberal members of the subcommittee whose
aggressive amendments would, he feared, result in a bill certain to fail on the House
floor).
182 For a complete chronology of the introduction and passage of the Act, see, for
example, Robert D. Loevy, A Chronology of the Civil Rights Act qf 1964, in THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW TIIAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION,
supla note 151, at 353.
18. See infra Part ll.D.3 (discussing Dirksen's amendments).
14 110 CONG. REC. 11,926-35 (1964).
185 See id. at 11,932 (reprinting the amendment provision relating to the EEOC);
GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 131-32 (describing how H.R. 7152 based the EEOC on a
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group, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People, to sue on behalf of a protected worker;'s" several other
procedural rules were added that would make it more difficult to en-
force the antidiscrimination prohibitions of the Act.5 7 Moreover, the
requirement that the enforcement agency establish a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination was designed to focus federal suits on officially
sanctioned discrimination, and thus away from more de facto dis-
crimination in the North. I" Other provisions of the Act, which would
become the subject of vigorous litigation in later years, were reformu-
lated in the amendments offered by Senator Mansfield, both on his
own behalf and on behalf of his Senate colleague. Among some of
the more contentious of these provisions were those involving senior-
ity systems and affirmative action."
The efforts of Senator Dirksen, as we describe in detail below,
were intended to refashion the bill in order to make it more palatable
to pivotal Republicans and their constituents. Consequently, the
quasi-judicial model like the NLRB). Dirksen's changes, says Hugh Davis Graham,
"further reduce[d] the authority of the EEOC, which he regarded as a potential bu-
reaucratic monster, like the early and runaway NLRB. For the new EEOC, Dirksen
would mandate deference to state and local [fair employment practices] agencies
where they existed, and, more important, strip the EEOC of its prosecutorial role." Id.
at 147.
186 See 110 CONG. REC. 11,932-33 (permitting the EEOC to address alleged unlaw-
ful employment practices only when charged by the person claiming to be aggrieved or
by a member of the EEOC). The impact of this change on the scope of EEOC en-
forcement is described by Professor Graham:
By preventing third-party suits filed by groups like the NAACP, such an ar-
rangement could avoid a sea of unnecessary litigation against businesses while
still providing for some certain measure of enforcement by federal authorities.
On the other hand, Dirksen well knew that the Justice Department was a rela-
tively small, elite cabinet agency, in comparison with the more typical and
large program-running departments like HEW, and so prided itself on en-
forcement through key case selection rather than through massive litigation.
As a result the Justice Department posed a smaller threat of potential harass-
ment to employers than would a new mission agency like the EEOC ....
GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 146.
187 See 110 CONG. REc. 11,932-34 (providing certain time frames within which a
char e must be filed).
8 See LOEVY, supra note 15, at 258-59 ("[T]his 'pattern or practice' formula broke
the impasse with Senator Dirksen that had existed ever since President Kennedy made
his initial civil rights proposals to Congress almost a year earlier."); John G. Stewart,
The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Tactics I, in TI-E CiviL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE
OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION, sulpra note 151, at 211, 257-59 (de-
scribing this provision as a "critical breakthrough").
M See infra Part tll.A (describingjudicial interpretations of these provisions).
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thrust of the amendments was in the direction of ameliorating its im-
pact on American businesses.
The reaction to this onslaught of amendments was predictably
mixed. Ardent supporters of the bill objected to some of the amend-
ments, and many were defeated; other amendments were accepted,
ostensibly on the grounds that they did not change substantially the
structure or purpose of the bill. ' As Joseph Rauh would later put it,
"What a genius Hubert Humphrey was in letting Dirksen think he was
writing the final draft of the bill. Dirksen was only switching 'ands'
and 'buts.' Humphrey pulled the greatest charade of all time. Dirk-
sen sold out cheap."' '
The final salvo by Senator Dirksen on behalf of the coalition of
pivotal legislators was the co-introduction of the Mansfield-Dirksen
substitute bill for H.R. 7152. This substitute attracted sufficient sup-
port among Senate Republicans to pass the motion for cloture. With
cloture assured, he introduced a second substitute amendment, an
amendment which finally attracted seventy-six votes in its favor.1,92 The
final act in the Senate drama occurred on June 19, 1964, with the
Senate voting 73 to 27 in favor of Senator Dirksen's substitute bill.''
3. Reconciling the House and Senate Versions
After passing the Senate, the bill went back to the House. In or-
der to avoid a conference committee,' 4 the proponents sent an offi-
cial message requesting that the House concur with the Senate's
changes to the House Bill. For major bills, concurrence is a rare form
of reconciliation. 195
Yet the leaders of the bipartisan House coalition, Representatives
Cellar and McCulloch, knew that if they were to make even one
change to obtain House passage, this would force a conference com-
S90 See Hubert H. Humphrey, Memorandum on Senate Consideration of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE ILAw THAT ENDED
RACIAL SEGREGATION, supra note 151, at 77, 87-88 ("Actually, Dirksen gave a great deal
of ground. The bill which he finally supported, the substitute, in my mind is as good
or better a bill than the House bill."); Rauh, supra note 162, at 70-71 ("[C]oncessions
had been made to Senator Dirksen in language, and on occasion in substance, but the
basic structure of the House-passed bill remained intact.").
191 LOEVY, supra note 15, at 266-67.
192 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supnra note 14, at 22.
193 WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 15, at 215.
194 On the role of conference committees in resolving interchamber differences
on hhajor legislation, see SINCLAIR, sulna note 95, at 59-68.
) See id. at 57-59 (describing nonconference reconciliation procedures).
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mittee. Because this risked allowing Senator Eastland to participate in
the selection of Senate conferees, making changes risked defeating
the bill. Hence, the Celler-McCulloch strategy was to concur in the
Senate's actions on the bill without revision.
Concurring did not mean that the House members would accept
just any Senate changes at any cost. Senators knew that, to gain House
concurrence, their changes could not be too large. They were there-
fore constrained in the changes they could make. Because holding a
conference would jeopardize the bill, the House bill's supporters-ar-
dent and moderate alike-faced the following choice: accept the
Senate's version or retain the status quo. As a consequence, they ac-
cepted the Senate's version, voting 289 in favor, 126 opposed.'
"
D. The Pivotal Role of Senator Dirksen and the Republicans
The central question of this Section is whether Dirksen and the
Republicans materially altered the Act as the price of their coopera-
tion to break the filibuster. Thus, what is at stake is not merely giving
various leaders their "proper due," but how we understand both how
the Act was passed and the Act's meaning.
Most histories of the Act minimize Dirksen's role in securing
agreement within the Senate on the bill that would eventually become
law.''7 This view follows the expressed opinions of the bill's ardent
supporters-from President Johnson through Senator Humphrey. In
their accounts, they fashioned elaborate schemes to snare Dirksen
and, since Dirksen eventually joined the coalition, many claimed suc-
cess in their schemes. Merle Miller recounts Senator Humphrey's de-
scription of his personal strategy for wooing the "wizard of ooze":
I don't think a day went by when I didn't say, "Everett, we can't pass this
bill without you. We need your leadership in this fight, Everett." And
I'd say, "With you in the lead, Everett, this bill will pass, and we will get
cloture." And I'd say, "This will go down in histoty, Everett," and that
meant, of course, that he would go down in history, which interested him
a great deal.
Oh, I was shameless. But as I say he liked hearing it all, and I didn't
mind saying it.1,
196 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 23.
197 See sources cited supit note 15 (providing such accounts of the Act's passage).
98 MERLE MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL BiOGRAPHY 370 (1980).
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In these explanations, the ardent supporters manipulated Dirksen
into supporting their strong version of the bill.' '
The central problem for understanding the 1964 Civil Rights Act
turns on how one interprets Dirksen's actions and the import of his
seventy or so amendments proposed in the form of the Mansfield-
Dirksen substitute bill. The competing interpretations of Dirksen's
actions noted above lead to markedly different conclusions on this is-
sue. From one perspective, Dirksen was virtually hoodwinked into
making only minor, "clarifying," or cosmetic changes. From another,
Dirksen was the pivotal player, skillfully garnering the necessary sup-
port for cloture by careful revisions of the bill. We call these, respec-
tively, the "innocuous Dirksen thesis" and the "indispensable Dirksen
thesis."
To frame our discussion of Senator Dirksen's contributions to
shaping the Civil Rights Act, we consider the incentives facing the mi-
nority leader. We highlight two mutually reinforcing set of incentives,
the first concerning electoral incentives, the second concerning in-
centives within Congress.
As a major leader of the Republican party in Congress, Dirksen
acted to protect the Republicans against the charge that they sold out
on civil rights. ° Recall the situation in 1963: The Republicans had
lost both the White House three years earlier and substantial support
from the African American community to Democratic president John
F. Kennedy.2 " Once Johnson ascended to the presidency in Novem-
ber of 1963, matters with respect to black support looked even more
problematic .' Although President Eisenhower had signed civil rights
[99 This "manipulation" theme runs through many of the scholarly accounts of the
enactment process. See, e.g., LOEVY, supra note 15, at 229 (noting that Humphrey said
he had been "shameless" in his effort to win Dirksen's agreement and support for the
pro-civil rights position); MANN, supra note 109, at 395 (quoting PresidentJohnson's
advice to Humphrey on how to get Dirksen's support: 'You've got to let him have a
piece of the action. He's got to look good all the time."); WHALEN & WHALEN, supra
note 15, at 155 (discussing a memorandum fr-om Humphrey to President Johnson,
dated March 18, 1964, in which he suggested an approach that would appeal to Sena-
tor Dirksen's desire to secure his place in history); Filvaroff& Wolfinger, supra note 22,
at 23 (discussing Democratic strategy in getting Dirksen to support the bill); Rauh, su-
pra note 162, at 69-72 (describing phone calls and personal visits to both Humphrey
and Dirksen urging a strong bill).
200 See MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 229-38 (describing Dirksen's efforts to create a
bill that both Democratic and Republican senators could support).
201 See supra Part ll.B.1 (noting that, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Democrats
were the strong advocates of civil rights).
202 See KL1INKNER & SMITH, supra note 13, at 272-73 (describing Johnson's emphasis
on civil rights and rights for African Americans after becoming President). See generally
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legislation into law in 1957, the perception that the Republicans were
reluctant draftees into the war for federal protection was persistent,
and certainly Lyndon Johnson, Democratic President and party
leader, worked hard to cement that perception.
Beyond the desire to position the Republican Party for the 1964
elections, Dirksen faced an enduring incentive to solidify the Republi-
cans' power within Congress and particularly within the Senate.
There was a strong political imperative to put the Republicans-and
especially the Republican congressional leadership-as a co-
participant in the civil rights drama as a means of countering the per-
ception that the Republicans had not supported civil rights legislation
in the 1950s and early 1960s.2 "' The Republicans thus had a political
incentive to be perceived as favoring civil rights." "
Perhaps most importantly, the Republican leadership likely con-
sidered the intriguing possibilities posed by the intra-Democratic bat-
tle between North and South. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia had
approached President Johnson and warned him that vigorous advo-
cacy of civil rights legislation would cost him southern Democratic
support and, therefore, risk losing the party's long-term hold on the
South.".
The flip side of Russell's warning, though, is equally important.
Just as Democratic leaders understood that pursuing civil rights risked
losing the South, so too Republican leaders understood that they
BRANCH, supira note 121, at 173-340 (describing tensions between the civil rights
movement and the White House in the first few months of Johnson's presidency).
203 Indeed, the two presidential candidates in 1964 presented stark contrasts, and
the 1964 election helped cement the image of the Democrats as tie progressive, pro-
civil rights party. As Kinder and Sanders observed: "A more important and enduring
legacy of the 1964 campaign was a transformation in the public's perceptions of the
political parties. Thanks in large part to Goldwater andJohnson, Americans came to
see the Democratic and Republican parties in a completely different way." KINDER &
SANDERS, slira note 141, at 206; see also SUNDQUIST, sulpra note 13, at 247 (noting that
Democrats alleged that the Republicans were holding back in their support of the Civil
Rights Act); Philip E. Converse et al., Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election, 59
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 329 (1965) (explaining that there was near consensus of opin-
ion that Johnson was associated with a pro-civil rights position and Republican Senator
Goldwater with a "go-slow" approach).
204 For discussions of the political maneuvering by the Democratic and Republican
parties on civil rights issues, see CARO, supra note 16; MACNEIL, supra note 20.
2 See LOEvY, sulna note 15, at 278-81, 316-21 (suggesting that House members
knew that Dirksen's participation was crucial to the passage of the civil rights bill in the
Senate and would not support the bill in the House Until they were convinced Dirksen
would support the bill in the Senate).
206 Michael Oreskes, Civil Rights Act Leaves Deep Mark on the American Political Land-
scape, N.Y. TIMES,July 2, 1989, § 1, at 16.
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might gain support in the South for the first time in a century. In-
deed, by the early 1960s the Republicans had already formulated their
"Southern Strategy. 21 1 Philip Converse, Robert Steamer, and Donald
Strong, writing in 1963 prior to the Civil Rights Act, all discuss the Re-
publican electoral advances in the South that began in the late 1950s,
and, to varying degrees, they each saw the coming of the two-party
competition in the South. In a remarkably prescient article about
the future of the Republican party in the South, Converse observed
that,
[a]s various southern constituencies drift more nearly within the reach
of the opposition, Republican politicians begin to run candidates where
interparty contests have been rare in the past. In the deeper Confeder-
ate South, for example, the number of national House seats contested
in 1962 was almost three times as great as the number contested in 1958
210
Strong, in his tide, forecasts "[d]urable Republicanism in the
South.",2  Black and Black, Klinkner and Smith, Phillips, and Sund-
207 See id. (reporting Johnson's remark that, with the Civil Rights Act, he had "de-
livered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come"). Earl and Merle
Black show that the Republicans began to contest elections in the South in the years
prior to the Civil Rights Act. BLACK & BLACK, supra note 25, at 40-71. Similarly, Philip
Klinkner and Rogers Smith observe that "Republican eforts to cultivate the South be-
gan in the mid-1950s." KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 13, at 261.
208 See KLINKNER & SMITH, sulpra note 13, at 262 (discussing the Republican meet-
ings in the early 1960s to debate and map out their Southern Strategy).
209 See Philip E. Converse, A Major Political Realigrnment in the South?, in CHANGE IN
THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH 195, 196 (Allan P. Sindler ed., 1963) ("(li]t has not been
unreasonable to look for the development of a South as solidly Republican as it once
was Democratic, thereby joining the rural and small-town conservatism of the South to
that so clearly represented by Republicanism in much of the rest of the nation."); Rob-
ert J. Steamer, Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party, in CHANGE IN THE
CONTEMPORARY SOUTH, su/pra, at 150, 152 (considering the causes of "the disaffection
of Southern voters from ... their traditional allegiance [to the Democratic party]");
Donald S. Strong, Durable Republicanism in the South, in CI HANGE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
SOUTH, su/Ira, at 174, 186-87 (speculating on the connection between the "presidential
two-partyism" revealed by southern support for Republican presidential candidates in
1952, 1956, and 1960, and the possibility of a "full two-party system" in which Republi-
can candidates would compete at every level of southern politics).
210 Converse, supra note 209, at 220.
211 Strong, supra note 209, at 174. Strong's logic is as follows: "The historic Solid
South was an artificial device designed to assure white supremacy." Id. When the na-
tional Democratic party became committed to civil rights, party solidarity disappeared.
"[The Solid South] was held together by the tradition of the Democratic party being
the party of white supremacy. When it became apparent that the Democratic party
had abandoned its historic role, many Southerners began to vote what they regarded
as their economic interest." Id. at 192.
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quist analyze these trends after the fact. 2 Black and Black, for exam-
ple, provide data from the 1950s onward, showing that Republican in-
roads in the South began in the late 1950s and continued for over
three decades. Phillips writes that the "idea was to join the South
and West in a conservative coalition."2 4 Finally, it is worth noting that,
at the presidential level, Eisenhower received forty-eight percent of
the southern vote in 1960, while Nixon received forty-six percent.
2
15
The South was nearly uniform in supporting Goldwater's nomination
at the 1964 Republican convention; Goldwater, focusing much of his
electoral effort at winning southern votes, "articulated a forceful de-
fence of states' rights, reminding his audiences that he had stood
against the Civil Rights Act of 1964."1
In the spring of 1964, Senator Dirksen would thus have foreseen
the civil rights bill as part of the larger project of weakening the
Democratic party's control of national politics. Beyond the immedi-
ate electoral benefits of supporting civil rights, then, the Republicans
had a long-term incentive to support this bill so as to help the Demo-
crats dislodge the southern wing of their party.217
Senator Dirksen also faced a set of internal incentives and con-
straints in Congress. Most important, as we have noted, was the prob-
lem of avoiding a conference committee to reconcile different ver-
sions passed by the House and Senate.2 ' This strong incentive
212 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 25, at 57-71 (analyzing the House elections in
the mid-1950s and the Republican expansion into southern metropolitan areas);
KLINKNER & SMITH, supr note 13, at 261-63 (addressing Republican efforts to gain
support in the South); KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJOREIY 204
(1969) (discussing Republican victories in the deep South (South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana) and losses in the outer South (Tennessee, Vir-
ginia, Florida, Texas, and North Carolina)); SUNDQUIST, suplva note 25, at 252 figs.12-
IC to 1 D (mapping the areas of greatest Republican gains in presidential voting from
1948 to 1952 and 1960 to 1964).
213 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 25, at 61 fig.2.2 (plotting the southern Republi-
can campaign effort from the 1930s to the 1990s).
214 PHIiiLIPS, supra note 212, at 204.
215 Id. at 27.
2116 KINDER & SANDERS, sulra note 141, at 202.
217 See PHILLIPS, supra note 212, at 286-89 (summarizing Republican party strength
in the South from 1932 to 1968). James.Sundquist has examined the transformation
of American politics following the civil rights era. See SUNDQUIST, sl/ra note 25, at
332-54 (analyzing trends in party strength and demonstrating the loosening of party
attachment); SUNDQUIST, sulpra note 13, at 523-37 (discussing party realignment after
passage of the Civil Rights Act and its consequences). We note that this argument does
not require that Dirksen mastermind the Republican southern strategy, but rather that
he be sufficiently aware to take advantage of it.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 180-82, 194-96 (discussing the risks of the
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constrained the Republicans. Were they to gut Title VII, for example,
a conference committee would have almost assuredly been required,
risking the bill's failure. Further, once the Republicans decided to
support the legislation, they wanted to avoid conference for this same
reason.
In sum, these manifold forces all worked together to create a criti-
cal imperative for Senator Dirksen and other Republican legislators.
They had to construct an acceptable (that is, moderate) bill while
downplaying the fact that it was, in important respects, different from
the bill sent by the House to the Senate in February of 1964.
1. The Innocuous Dirksen Thesis
In order to consider the two views of Dirksen's role, we begin with
those scholars who conclude that his role was imocuous. Eskridge,
Frickey, and Garrett, echoing the views of the Whalens, draw the fol-
lowing conclusion:
As April stretched on and Dirksen found himself unable to muster
sufficient bipartisan support for [weakening the bill], he decided to ap-
proach the President in an effort to bluff his way to a compromise....
Forewarned (by Humphrey) of this approach and the inevitability of
Dirksen's support in any eventJohnson refused to take the bait. There
would be no compromise. On May 4, Dirksen met with Mansfield,
Humphrey, and Attorney General, Kennedy, to hammer out acceptable
but minor amendments to H.R. 7152.
Although the Democrats had allowed Dirksen to make changes in the
bill's language, so that he could claim to have significantly rewritten the
bill, virtually all of the changes were cosmetic, giving greater symbolic
recognition to local and state enforcement of civil rights but not weaken-
ing the substantive protections. Dirksen characteristically termed his bill
"infinitely better than what came to us from the House" but Humphrey
had little trouble concluding that he had kept his promise to Bill McCul-
loch not to support a weakened bill.2
1
9
Joseph Rauh, a member of the Americans for Democratic Action
during this period and an ardent supporter of civil rights, provides an
even more striking statement of this view. According to Rauh, Senator
Dirksen really did not change the bill very much at all. "(Humphrey)
would have paid a higher price if Dirksen had really demanded it ....
bill's failure if a conference committee was called and the methods adopted by the
proponents of the bill to avoid a conference committee).
219 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 19-20 (citations omitted).
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Dirksen wanted the credit; Humphrey wanted the bill. ' ''  James
Sundquist concludes that "[t]he 'compromise,' introduced jointly by
Mansfield and Dirksen, made seventy other changes in the House bill,
but most were technical and minor. The House bill remained basi-
cally intact.' ,22 ' Raymond Wolfinger and David Filvaroff, whose ac-
count is especially significant given that they were there at the crea-
tion of the Act and interviewed the major participants in the bill's
enactment, declare that
Dirksen filed over one hundred amendments [ranging] from proposals
to eviscerate each of the maior titles to completely trivial changes.... In
the end, [Dirksen] demanded comparatively few significant alterations.
Most of the differences between the House bill and what was labeled tie
Dirksen-Mansfield Compromise were largely cosmetic, even broad re-
drafting of major sections worked little, if any, substantive change. Once
he decided to cooperate, Dirksen apparently was concerned mainly with
being able to point to the many marks he had left on the bill. Their lim-
ited impact notwithstanding, the nUmber and seeming importance of
the concessions he had won were enough to justify the support of his
22more conservative Republican colleagues.
In sum, according to this interpretation, Dirksen's role in shaping
the bill was relatively minor. His rhetorical flourishes about having
produced a much better bill are seen by various scholarly commenta-
tors and legislator contemporaries as mere credit claiming and self-
serving ego boosting.
Some of the evidence supports this interpretation. Although
Dirksen at times talked about gutting the Act-he never favored the
public accommodations or the fair employment provisions-in the
end he chose not to do so.22" A standard phrase, repeated by many ac-
counts, is that Dirksen's seventy amendments were technical and mi-
nor because they left the bill "intact. ,
' 
4
220 LOEVY, su/ra note 15, at 319; see atso supra text accompanying note 191 (report-
ing Ratih's assessment that "Humphrey pulled the greatest charade of all time. Dirk-
sen sold out cheap.").
221 SUNDQUIST, sLupra note 13, at 269.
22 Filvaroff& Wolfinger, supra note 22, at 25-26.
2123 See MILLER, supra note 198, at 368-70 (describing the Democratic bill sponsors'
efforts to court Dirksen for the cloture vote-primarily by complimenting his "reason-
ableness" as a person).
221 SUNDQUIST, st/na note 13, at 269; see LOEVY, supra note 15, at 318-21 ("King,
Katzenbach, Mitchell, and Rauh, McCulloch, and Humnphrey were fortunate that, in
the end, Dirksen did not demand as much as he might have for delivering the key
votes for cloture."); MANN, supra note 109, at 411 ("Dirksen proposed only minor
modifications to the bill."); Stewart, supra note 188, at 259-64 ("[T]he leaders had no
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In one sense, the phrase is accurate: Dirksen's amendments left
the structure of the Act intact without gutting any of the major sec-
tions. Nonetheless, this is not the only type of change Dirksen could
have made. We cannot conclude, therefore, that Dirksen's failure to
gut the Act implies that he did not alter the Act. As we will see, his
amendments significantly altered the Act in other ways.
2. The Indispensable Dirksen Thesis
To be understood as indispensable, two things must be true about
Dirksen: first, that he.could have credibly declined to support the civil
rights bill and thus held substantial bargaining leverage over the
Democrats; second, that his proposed changes to the bill were signifi-
cant and, therefore, that his role in shaping the civil rights bill materi-
ally altered the resulting Act. There are strong reasons for believing
that both of these claims are true. We consider both in turn, discuss-
ing in this Subsection the evidence for and against the Democrats
outmanetLivering Dirksen and, in the next Subsection, evidence of
whether the amendments can be considered truly cosmetic.
Much of the evidence for the innocuous Dirksen thesis consists of
statements of the major principals, including Senator Humphrey and
President Johnson. Both of these Democratic leaders wanted to take
their place in history as being responsible for the Act and, after the
fact, attempted to minimize the role of Dirksen and the Republicans.
Not surprisingly, they dismissed Dirksen's statements that he had pro-
duced a completely new bill as a mere display of ego . " To be sure,
Dirksen's blustery statement that he had entirely rewritten the bill was
exaggerated. He, like any legislator, had an incentive to spin his role
in a decidedly slanted way. 22 And, as we discussed earlier, there were
problem with Dirksen leaving his mark on the bill so long as this did not jeopardize
any essential aspects of the legislation .... ).
22, See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 190, at 88 ("Dirksen had to be out in front.
Dirksen is a leader, he is a great dramatist, and a fine legislator. He had the right to be
out in front, and I gave him every opportunity to be so.").
It is interesting to note that Dirksen's biographer, fbcusing on the Senator's
materials rather than those of the Act's ardent supporters, uses exactly the same logic
as that quoted above in support of the innocuous Dirksen thesis, only this time to sup-
port Dirksen as a central player in the legislation's drafting:
Attorney General Kennedy in particular tried to resist Dirksen's proposals on
public accommodations and lair employment practices, but Dirksen was insis-
tent. He had the compelling argument that he could not deliver the Republi-
can votes for cloture unless he had a "salable" package. Even when the ad-
ministration officials reluctantly gave way to Dirksen, some of the Republican
senators balked at the final bill.
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some interesting strategic reasons for Dirksen, as leader of his party,
to highlight his role.2 7
just as there is reason to question the face value of Dirksen's re-
marks, there is reason to question the face value of the remarks of the
ardent supporters. In assessing legislative statements that purport to
shed light on the history of a bill, we must ask in what context were
these statements issued and, more precisely, for what purposes were
legislators aiming their statements. Our theory of legislative rhetoric,
discussed above in Part I, implies that legislators have strategic inter-
ests in propounding self-serving views about what a legislative provi-
sion or amendment means.
Because the ardent supporters' statements characterizing Dirk-
sen's role as minor were written after the legislative episode, they are
cheap talk 2 "5 After the Act's passage, Dirksen's support could not be
withdrawn; the episode was over. Hence, ardent supporters could at-
tempt to minimize his role in order to emphasize their own. By way of
contrast, none of the protagonists in the drama (e.g., Humphrey,
Johnson, Celler) declared at the time the Mansfield-Dirksen amend-
ments were being debated that Dirksen's role was inconsequential or
that all the proposals were merely cosmetic, leaving the House's com-
promise bill completely intact. Indeed, much of the ardent support-
ers' rhetoric during their efforts (many of which were successful) to
defeat various amendments highlighted the point that these amend-
ments would potentially ruin the bill.
2
2
Of course, statements exalting Dirksen's role during the time in
which his support was critical would also be suspicious. In an impor-
tant sense, any contemporaneous description of a particular pro-
posal's relative significance or insignificance with respect to the en-
tirety of the bill proper is cheap talk.2 11' This cheap talk is designed to
MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 234.
227 See sopa text accompanying notes 142-46 (addressing the pivotal role Republi-
cans played in the drafting and passage of the bill).
2,, See sn'( text accompanying notes 87-91 (discussing, and questioning the value
of" "cheap talk").
229 For example, the Whalens' report documents the dialogue that occurred dur-
ing the Humphrey-Kuchel team meeting: "'Let's not kid ourselves,' retorted the per-
ennially angry Joe Clark (D, PA), 'This has become the Dirksen bill! I deplore it but
that's it.' 'I've said this since the beginning,' Humphrey pointed out." WHALEN &
WHALEN, soi/np note 15, at 171.
230 This is not to say, however, that all contemporaneoLs legislative statements (For
example, remarks during a floor debate) are cheap talk. The task of reconstructing
legislative history, after all, is to distinguish cheap talk 1rom more probative evidence
of statutory meaning and legislative purpose. Cf McNollgast, Legislative hitent, supra
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reassure constituents and allies, and legislators pay little or no price
for such statements. For example, why ought not Senator Humphrey
and his allies trivialize Dirksen's changes, and why should Dirksen not
cast himself in the role of main deal maker and architect of the "new
and improved" civil rights law?
An important event in many of the accounts of an innocuous
Dirksen is the meeting between Dirksen and Johnson in which Dirk-
sen allegedly attempted to bluffJohnson into concessions in exchange
for Dirksen's support.2 1 According to this account, Johnson success-
fully stonewalled Dirksen.
As we noted above, there are several problems with this story.
First, there were no witnesses to the meeting, other than Dirksen and
Johnson!" Second, the evidence to support this account lies in the
memoirs of ardent supporters attempting to cast themselves in the
leading role. This evidence is cheap talk. To be sure, we are in no
better position than earlier scholars of this episode to know exactly
what was said between Dirksen and Johnson or what this conversation
meant for the outcome of the civil rights battle.11
Our point, rather, is that this is not about what Dirksen-or any-
one else-said. It is instead that the strategic situation dictated that
Dirksen was in the driver's seat. In accord with the lessons of positive
political theory, Senator Dirksen was simply in a better position to
bargain successfully for what he wanted. Standard positive political
theory models show that, in a conflict between the views of two bar-
note 11, at 23-24 (noting that a legislator who is sUbject to sanctions and "loss of repu-
tation" is less likely to engage in "cheap talk").
See ESKRIDGE FT AL., suftra note 14, at 19-20 ("[Dirksen] met with Johnson on
April 29 and offered to deliver 22 to 25 Republican votes for cloture if the Administra-
tion would go along with weakening the bill."); WHALEN & WIIALEN, sulra note 15, at
171-72 (discussing Dirksen's strategic attempt to get Johnson to change the bill).
232 .See ESKRIDGE ET AL., sutpfa note 14, at 19 ('ohnson refuised to take [Dirksen's]
bait. There would be no compromise."); WhIALEN & WHALEN, supra note 15, at 171-72
(stating that Johnson woUld not compromise with Dirksen).
- The newspaper articles cited in the Whalens' account does not provide any evi-
dence supporting this claim fiom the only individuals who could have known what was
discussed in this private meeting. Indeed, Senator Dirksen commented to reporters
that the two men "had barely touched on the subject of civil rights." Wt HALEN &
WI-tALEN, supra note 15, at 172.
231 Although we do have the benefit of primalry sources that imply a more complex
interaction between Johnson and Dirksen. See BESCHLOSS, sn/ra note 22, at 332-33
(reporting a transcripted conversation between President.Johnson and Senator Mans-
field in which Johnson suggested he wottld use the upcoming conversation between
himself and Dirksen to shift Dirksen's focts to the Senate leadership and Attorney
General Kennedy).
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gainers, the pivotal bargainer wins the most.'5 The Democrats des-
perately needed the votes of Dirksen's Republican allies for passage.
The Democrats, acting unilaterally, had no hope of passing this bill,
even if all northern Democrats assented. Many Republicans were
from districts where they would pay little price for opposing civil
rights; the Republicans, as pivots, were in the driver's seat and
237should have been able to write the terms of the bargain .
The final flaw of the innocuous Dirksen thesis is its failure to con-
sider the incentives among all participants to minimize the impact of
the Republican changes. We have already emphasized the ardent
supporters' incentives to claim the most credit for themselves.
Moreover, despite needing Dirksen, Democrats also had an incentive
to paint his changes as small, to help get their Democratic col-
leagues-and the House-to accept the changes.' 8
Our analysis of Dirksen's incentives implies that he too had strong
reasons to downplay his role and that of his amendments. First, once
behind the legislation, Dirksen had to avoid forcing a conference
committee. Therefore, all supporters of the Act-House and Senate,
Democrats and Republicans-had reason to deemphasize Dirksen's
changes regardless of their true beliefs about the magnitude of these
changes. Second, Republicans had to worry about how their actions
and amendments would play in the upcoming 1964 elections. If
Democrats could paint Dirksen's amendments as undermining civil
rights, they would rob Republicans of the value of their legislative
partnership.2:' ' Finally, as we have noted, Republicans had a long-term
incentive to let Democrats claim the lion's share of the credit: if
Democrats' advocacy of civil rights lost them the South, it would be
235 For standard accounts of the median-voter theorem, see STEWART, supraf note 7,
at 20-22.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 142-44 (noting that many Republicans repre-
sented congressional districts less supportive of civil rights legislation).
237 This conclusion is subject, of course, to the significant qualification that ardent
supporters must perceive the bargain as more favorable from their perspective than
the status quo. Cf GILMOUR, spra note 11l, at 22 (observing that, "[t]o many civil
rights activists, a strong bill that failed because of a southern filibuster might very well
have been preferred to a neutered bill that passed").
238 See GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 147 ("As Humphrey and the Senate leadership
took great pains to reiterate in floor debate, the amendments of the compromise
package only clarified and codified the original intention of the administration and
the congressional leadership.").
See supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing the Republican political gains
from the Civil Rights Act).
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the Republicans gain." ' For these reasons, the rhetoric of the partici-
pants-ardent supporters and pivotal Republicans alike-should not
be taken at face value. All had incentives to minimize the perceived
impact of Dirksen's amendments.
We now raise one additional, if subtle, point, the claim that Dirk-
sen's amendments were simply clarifying can be considered accurate
without implying that they were also innocuous. The reason gets to
the heart of a fundamental strategic problem for legislators passing
laws that must later be interpreted by courts: the dilemma of how leg-
islators can communicate with a court reading the legislative record
long after the fact and not party to the shared meanings of terms and
provisions that were common knowledge among all legislators.
Suppose that, among a set of legislators, the purpose of a specific
provision is common knowledge even though the provision's specific
language is not clear. In one sense, making the provision clearer and
more explicit is merely "clarifying" since all legislators already know the
meaning. Such knowledge among the legislators is usually based on
informal communication conducted off the floor and outside of offi-
cial committee hearings. 1 '
Our judgment about whether this type of alteration merely clari-
fies, and is hence innocuous, differs considerably when we turn from
the perspective of an insider-participant (e.g., a member of Congress
or congressional staffer) to an outsider (e.g., a court, historian, or le-
gal scholar) trying to assess the provision's meaning years after its en-
actment. Outsiders, looking at the text long after the fact, are typi-
cally not party to many of the shared meanings held by insiders who
passed the legislation; being understood by all, many of these shared
meanings are never discussed, thereby leaving no evidence in the leg-
islative record. To outsiders, therefore, amendments that make ex-
plicit in legislative text what all legislators understood are often not
mere clarification, but may make all the difference in the world.
Legislator-participants will therefore regard the project of clarify-
ing legislative language differently than will a court charged with de-
4 Supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
241 Although this is where much of the real work of legislative coalition building
and bill drafting occurs, this environment remains rather inaccessible to most outsid-
ers. See su)ra text accompanying notes 40-42 (discussing the coalition-building re-
quirements for successful legislative action). See generally Nelson W. Polsby, The Institiu-
tionalization !f the U.S. House of Representatives, in CONGRESS: STiRUC URE AND POLI(,'N 91
(Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Sullivan eds., 1987) (describing the specialization and
complexity accompanying institutionalization within the House).
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termining the Act's meaning.2 ' To the extent that vague language is
consistent with a wider range of interpretations, the breadth of possi-
blejudicial opinions is larger.2 ll Judges are thus less likely to infer-or
be bound by-shared, common meanings among legislators at the
time of enactment.' 4 A systematic set of clarifications of this sort may
markedly affect how outsidersjudge the meaning of an act.
This argument suggests why we should not equate statements by
ardent supporters that the Dirksen amendments were clarifications
with the idea that Dirksen's role was minor and that the final bill
adopted by Congress was essentially identical to H.R. 7152. Even
viewed as mere clarifications that make explicit what congressional
participants already knew, the changes may be still significant.
A final issue in our assessment of the innocuous versus the indis-
pensable Dirksen theses involves Republican preferences. An implicit
assumption of the innocuous thesis is that most Republicans fa-
vored-or at least felt compelled to support-H.R. 7152 and that
Dirksen had trouble talking them into withdrawing that support. This
argument looms large in the innocuous view. Republicans, so this
argument goes, were determined all along to support the strong ver-
sion of the bill." '  Thus, Dirksen had no role to play in preserving this
coalition; the group was, for all intents and purposes, just another col-
lection of ardent supporters.
This view is deeply misleading. As we have noted, the situation
was just the opposite. H.R. 7152 did not have sufficient support to
pass in its pure form, and Dirksen and many of his conservative Re-
212 See WALDRON, supra note 4, at 144 (arguing that "the elementay circumstances
of modern politics is pltralitv and that the form of legislation ... [is] collective deci-
sion-making").
243 See generally Frederick Schauer, Statitowy Constniction and the Coordinative Func-
tion q/l ai Meaning, 1990 SuP. Ci. REV. 232 (explaining how the Court has grown to
rely on the "plain meaning" of statutes as a way to coordinate different judicial per-
spectives).
2,1,1 See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULEs: MORAIxIY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 119 (2001) (arguing that in a "decision-making
body with multiple members ... intent-based interpretation may fail because there is
no reliable evidence" to help determine the legislators' meaning).
245 See supra text accompanying note 219 (describing how ardent supporters
viewed the Republicans' changes to H.R. 7152 as not substantially weakening the bill).
211. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 142 ("Johnson's consistent public and pri-
vate refusal to bargain away major elements of the civil rights bill, and his deference to
the strategic leadership of his Attorney General, narrowed the maneuvering room that
was available to Dirksen.").
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2,17publican colleagues were needed for its passage.. Although some
Republicans would have supported this version, not enough would
have done so to ensure cloture.48  Given the ardent opposition of
twenty-one southern Democrats and a few Republicans, the bulk of
the Republicans would have to agree to support a compromise. This
required the support of relatively conservative Republicans, tradition-
ally not inclined to support a bill like H.R. 7152.
Although the Republicans wanted to avoid looking like they had
blocked civil rights, they were not obliged to pass any bill; had that
been true, there would have been no drama or uncertainty about the
Senate passage. Indeed, the whole uncertainty about whether the
Act's supporters would succeed reflects exactly this uncertainty. Al-
though Republicans from urban districts in the North felt pressure of
both conscience and constituency to favor civil rights, many Republi-
cans from the West and the more conservative districts elsewhere in
the North had few incentives pushing them to favor civil rights/8
They could have easily avoided supporting the Act without any elec-
toral repercussions. In short, Dirksen's problem was not so much to
dissuade pivotal Republicans from opposing H.R. 7152 as it was to ac-
tively persuade them to provide support.
3. The Architecture of Compromise: Analyzing the Amendments
Thus far, we have focused on the role of Senator Dirksen in nego-
tiating the compromise, concentrating primarily on congressional and
electoral politics. We now analyze the substance of Dirksen's amend-
ments to demonstrate that they materially changed the Act. We con-
clude that, although Dirksen's amendments neither emasculated the
bill nor changed its basic framework, his changes added up to more
than mere technical and clarifying alterations. Taken as a whole,
these amendments were designed to blunt the impact of the bill on
the North and to lower the perceived costs of the Act to Republican
constituents.
2,17 See supra text accompanying note 16 (explaining the legislative arithmetic that
at least twenty-one Republican votes were necessary to overcome the eventual filibuster
by southern Democrats).
2-4 8 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 18 (claiming that there were twelve
liberal Republicans). But see WHALEN & WHAI.EN, sulpra note 15, at 160 (counting a
total of twelve liberal and moderate Republicans).
2 19 See supra text accompanying notes 142-44 (arguing that these legislators' politi-
cal futures did not depend on voting in favor of civil rights legislation).
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Like all moderates bargaining with ardent supporters, the Repub-
licans sought to temper the legislation's impact on their constitu-
ents." 0 Yet, Dirksen's latitude to weaken the bill was limited by the
twin problems of avoiding a conference committee and of avoiding
being painted as weak on civil rights. Acting within these constraints,
Dirksen skillfully created a noticeably different bill.
The strategy of the Republicans in offering amendments was
threefold: (1) to weaken the overall impact of the bill; (2) to blunt its
impact on the North by focusing the provisions on the South; and (3)
to do so without being perceived as weakening the Act. In the House,
Representative McCulloch ensured that de facto segregation or racial
balance in the North was excluded from the bill's purview, thus ex-
cluding northern school districts from the Act's coverage."5 The
House bill also contained a number of explicit exemptions that were
retained in the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute.' For example, the provi-
sions in Title VI applying to government programs contained an ex-
emption for insurance and guarantee programs.
Table 2: Republican Changes to Blunt the Impact of
the Bill on the North
House of Representatives
(I) Exempted de facto school segregation (in the North) but not de
jure segregation (in the South). 
25
250 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note I1, at 15 ("[l]f these actors are risk
averse they, too, will prefer general decision making principles that avoid chaos and
tncertainty, and that reach policy accommodation with other actors, including law-
makers."); McNollgast, Positive Canons, snpra note I], at 711 (viewing the legislative
process as a compromise among ardent supporters, ardent opponents, and moder-
ates).
251 GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 148. Graham also notes that, "[t]he bill provided
that racial voting statistics be kept only for areas recommended by the Civil Rights
Commission, which was expected to confine its coverage largely to the South." Id. at
138. This strategy of targeting the South was central to the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. See generally ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 79-136
(1987) (discussing the passage of the bill through the House and Senate as based on a
strateg' that restricted the legislation's application largely to the south).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 605, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (2000)) ("Nothing in this title shall add to or detract from
any existing atithority with respect to any program or activity under which Federal fi-
nancial assistance is extended by way of a contract of insurance or guaranty."). At the
time, these programs would have inchlded Federal Housing Administration home
loans, Veterans Administration loans, and crop insurance programs.
253 Id. §§ 401-410, 78 Stiat. at 246-49 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to
2000c-9).
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(2) Exempted many insurance and guarantee programs, including
crop insurance.254
Senate
The EEOC was granted NLRB-like powers in H.R. 7152, including
rulemaking authority and significant enforcement authority so the
agency could play an active role in governing civil rights and policing
employment discrimination. Senate Republicans weakened these pro-
visions in several respects. The revised bill:
(1) granted only the Attorney General, rather than the EEOC, the
power to initiate suits;25,
S257
(2) gave the EEOC only limited rulemaking authority;
(3) deleted the authority for an outside group-such as the
NAACP-to sue on behalf of a worker;' 
8
(4) added a restriction that, before an individual could bring suit
under the Act, she must first exhaust remedies allowed under state or lo-
cal fair employment laws (twenty-eight states, all in the North, had fair
employment practice laws and commissions);25
(5) exempted seniority systems, a common and significant, provision
of tnions, which are highly concentrated in the Northl;2
(6) added a requirement that a suit brought by the Attorney General
must establish a "pattern or practice" of discriminationj language that
sought, in part, to focus federal suits on official-sanctioned, de jure dis-




(7) deleted a major portion of the broad, unqualified statement of'i 263
purpose in the introduction to Title VII, a change that would prove
important over the coming twenty years given the Court's reliance on
such language for expansionary readings of the Act;
(8) exempted employers whose employees worked less than twenty
weeks per year, largely removing coverage of seasonal agricultural work-
26,1
ers;
254 /d. § 605, 78 Stat. at 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cd-4).
255 Id. § 705, 78 Stat. at 258-59 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4).
26 /d. § 707, 78 Stat. at 259 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6). Subse-
quent amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act transferred the power to sue to
the EEOC effective March 24, 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)).
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 713, 78 Stat. at 265 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12).
259 Id. § 706 (e), 78 Stat. at 260 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)).
25 Id. § 706(b), 78 Stat. at 259-60 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).
26 Id. § 703(h), 78 Stat. at 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)).
2 1 Id. § 707(a), 78 Stat. at 261 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)).
262 Cf sources cited supra note 251 (suggesting the de jure/de facto distinction
created by the Act).
263 See 110 CONG. REC. 12,811 (1964) ("[l]t is the national policy to protect the
right of the individual to be free from ... discrimination.").
2,4 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 (b), 78 Stat. at 253 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
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(9) required a finding that the defendant had intentionally dis-
criminated before relief could be granted; r' and




In one important respect, the Republicans strengthened the Act, de-
finin union hiring halls as employment agencies for the purposes of the2-
Act. Unions at the time were typically supporters of Democrats, not
Republicans.
a. The contents of the amendments
Senator Dirksen carried the process of blunting the Act's impact
on the North considerably beyond the changes made by the House
Republicans. The Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill contained an in-
teresting pattern of changes to the House bill.' i
First, consider the many changes to the EEOC,2 changes that all
211
accounts agree were fundamental. In H.R. 7152, enforcement re-
sponsibilities for Title VII were lodged in a commission-form agency
modeled on the National Labor Relations Board . 7  This agency had
both rulemaking and significant enforcement authority, and was gov-
erned by the federal Administrative Procedure Act. 73 The impact of
this agency model was significant.' Vesting this agency with rulemak-
265 I. § 706(g), 78 Stat. at 261 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(l)).
266 Id. § 703(j), 78 Stat. at 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)).
267 Id. § 701 (e), 78 Stat. at 254 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e)).
-68 By limiting the federal provisions, Dirksen's changes sought to let stand a range
of civil rights and anti-employment discrimination laws on the books in the North.
269 The principal source for the following comparisons is Dirksen's annotations to
the text of H.R. 7152, showing deletions and insertions, inserted into the Congressional
RecordonJune 5, 1964 at 110 CONG. REC. 12,788-91 (1964).
270 See Francis J. Vaas, Tit/e VII: Legislative Histny, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
431,450-52 (1966) (listing significant changes to section 705 ofTitle VII).
271 See LOEVY, sora note 15, at 188-89 (admitting that changes were substantively
small yet important to selling the bill); WIALEN & WHALEN, supra note 15, at 164 (find-
ing that the EEOC amendments were dramatic yet consistent with McCulloch's com-
mitment to basic constitutional principles); Eskridge, supra note 27, at 616 (stating that
Congress changed the fundamental process by which the civil rights laws had been en-
forced since the 1960s).
272 See 110 CONG. REC. 11,932 (describing the power and functions of the pro-
posed agency, eventually the EEOC).
27:1 Administrative Procedure Act §§ 1-12, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
271 See GRAHAM, so/nr note 20, at 130-31 ("[1]n practice, the federal appeals courts
so rarely overturned the decisions of such administrative tribunals that the normal
burden of proof was reversed .... ).
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ing authority assured that the agency would be able to implement
federal policies in the civil rights area directly-that is, through sub-
275
stantive, legislative-type power. Moreover, giving the EEOC en-
forcement authority would enable the agency to play an active role in
setting enforcement priorities for policing violations of Title VII. This
model represented a strong institutional mechanism for the imple-
mentation of national social policY27
The substitute bill weakened the agency in several respects.2
77
First, Dirksen dropped the NLRB-like independent, prosecutorial
powers so that only the Attorney General, not the Commission, could
sue on behalf of the United States.2 78 These changes made the EEOC
dependent on the priorities of the Attorney General and clearly went
against the wishes of the ardent supporters of H.R. 7152.7 Second,
the EEOC was quite limited in its ability to pursue redress for viola-
tions of Title VII. The main Title VII enforcement mechanism be-
came private lawsuits by individuals.2 8 0 Third, the enforcement provi-
sions were further restrained in that the substitute bill deleted from
275 The deletion of provisions granting the EEOC this authority was particularly
ironic, since a coalition of Republicans led the charge for APA-type procedures in the
1940s. See id. at 130 ("The chief result under a Republican Congress was the [APA],
which sought to 'judicialize' the procedures of the quasi-judicial regulatory agencies.");
see also Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 452-54 (1986)
(reviewing the origins of the APA in political bargaining, first between "Republicans
and conservative Democrats on the one hand and New Deal Democrats on the other,"
and later among "New Dealers-between conservative and liberal Democrats").
.76 Indeed, since the 1930s this has represented the model of federal administra-
tive power. See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 3-4, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554 (giving agen-
cies both rulemaking and adjudicative authority); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 47-88 (1938) (discussing the rise of the administrative proc-
ess in a politically charged atmosphere).
V7 See supira 1488-90 Table 2 (listing changes designed to diminish the Act's impact
on the North).
278 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707, 78 Stat. at 261-62. As Tery Moe observes in the
case of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, making one agency de-
pendent on a second greatly weakens the agency's ability to pursue its own goals. De-
pendence grants an outside organization a veto over the agency's actions. See Terry M.
Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 297-
306 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (describing the placement of
OSHA in the Department of Labor).
279 This change "placed severe limitations on the bill's potential to restructure the
racial status quo in the South and elsewhere." MOORE, suna note 15, at 79.
788 See GRAH-AM, sup.ra note 20, at 89 (explaining that the EEOC had the responsi-
bility of enforcing private rights of action "by responding administratively to individual
complaints"). Indeed, it was not until 1972 that the EEOC was authorized to play an
independent role in litigating certain employment discrimination lawsuits.
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H.R. 7152 authority for an outside group-such as the NAACP-to
sue on behalf of a worker./
A second fundamental change was the requirement that a suit
brought by the EEOC establish a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
282tion. The evidence suggests that this language targeted government
suits against the officially sanctioned and prevailing discrimination in
the South and not the de facto discrimination in the North . 83
A third restriction added by Dirksen concerned extant state Fair
Employment Practices (FEP) offices. Section 706 of the Act required
that, before an individual could bring suit under the Act, she first ex-
haust the remedies allowed tinder state or local fair employment
laws.84 An important set of time limits was added to this exception , '
in part to prevent southern states from setting up sham FEP offices,
allowing them to mire suits in lengthy procedures. Moreover, as Dirk-
sen noted, the twenty-eight states that had such commissions were all
in the North. 8  This change also blunted the power of the EEOC,
since initial decisions about suits, the arguments under which they
were brought, and the conditions under which they might settle were
not under its authority.
Another potentially important change was Dirksen's deletion of
the broad, unqualified statement of purpose in the introduction to Ti-
tle VII. For example, section 701(a) of H.R. 7152 originally pro-
claimed:
The Congress hereby declares that the opportunity for employment
without discrimination of the types described in sections 704 and 705 is a
right of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, and that
it is the national policy to protect the right of the individual to be free
from such discrimination.
In light of what would become of civil rights policy in the first twenty
years after the enactment of Title VII, it is important not to understate
281 § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260; see GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 146 ("By preventing
third-party suits filed by groups like the NAACP, such an arrangement could avoid a
sea of unnecessary litigation against businesses while still providing for some certain
measure of enforcement by federal authorities.").
282 § 707(a), 78 Stat. at 261.
283 See LOEVY, supra note 15, at 258-59 (citing the "pattern and practice" formula as
a major breakthrough in negotiations over the bill's passage).
2 § 706(b), 78 Stat. at 259-60.
285 Id.
286' Supra text accompanying note 259.
287 110 CONG. REC. 12,811 (1964).
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the significance of this deletion. Much of the thrust of courts' ex-
pansive readings of the civil rights laws in the 1960s and 1970s rested
on views concerning the proper interpretive scope to be given to
vague language in the legislation.2' As we discuss in the next Part, in
a series of important decisions courts used just such language to ra-
tionalize expansionary readings and to ignore specific limitations con-
tained in the Act."' But Dirksen and his colleagues had no hindsight;
they had the bill qua bill before them. To the extent that Dirksen ra-
tionally feared that the broad phrasing of section 701 (a) would
authorize courts to expand the scope of the Act, his intent in deleting
the provision seems rather prescient.
Senator Dirksen also proposed a series of additional limitations.
First, employers whose employees worked less than twenty weeks per
year were exempted, largely removing coverage from seasonal agricul-
tural workers.2111 Second, seniority systems were exempted, even if.... 292
built on a history of past discrimination. Unions have long relied on
seniority systems, and such unions were highly concentrated in the
North.29 Third, the substitute bill required that courts find the de-
fendant had intentionally discriminated before granting relief.9" This
provision, along with the "pattern or practice" qualification on law-
suits, had the effect of making it much more difficult to. establish a
claim of discriminatory treatment in federal court.295 Fourth, the bill
provided increased clarity of the prohibition on a requirement of quo-
tas or preferential treatment.29 For example, new language was added
288 See suvpa text accompanying notes 269-76 (considering changes to the EEOC).
89 See infra text accompanying notes 318-20 (discussing how such expansive read-
ings went beyond carefully negotiated legislative compromise).
29)) See Eskridge, suna note 27, at 618-25 (stating that the cooperative relationship
between the Supreme Court and Congress began to erode as the Court's interpreta-
tions of civil rights statutes overrode legislative intent); cf ALFRED W. BLUMROSFN,
BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 69-74 (1971) (explaining the initial difficulties cre-
ated by the text of the Act's employment provisions, and describing the interpretive
moves made by the EEOC to invigorate Title VII enforcement).
2)1 110 CONG. REc. 11,930.
2!)2 Id. at 11,931.
2)3 Cf Vaas, supra note 270, at 453 (stating that the Senate provided a safeguard
for employers in federal courts by amending the statute to require intentional dis-
crimination).
294 110 CONG. REC. 11,933.
2115 See BLUMROSEN, sutpra note 290 (describing the challenges facing the nascent
EEOC regarding the collection and synthesis of information from employers and the
burdens of proof established by Title VII).
2) 110 CONG. REc. 11,931. On the controversy over racial quotas, see GRAHAM,
supra note 20, at 100-21.
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declaring that "[n]othing contained in this title shall be interpreted to
require any employer.., subject to this tide to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group.2 '7 This
language was designed to allay fears of a judicially mandated policy of
affirmative action .21 Fifth, Dirksen proposed modest changes in re-
cordkeeping requirements, notably in states with FEPs; a duplicate set
of records need not be kept, although the EEOC could require addi-
tional information.2 )1
One notable exception to these weakening provisions must be ac-
knowledged. In one particular instance, the substitute bill strength-
ened the coverage of the Act. In what became section 701(e), the bill
defined a union hiring hall as an employment agency for the purpose
of the Act: Perhaps, though, even that move was strategically moti-
vated. After all, unions, at the time, typically supported Democrats,
not Republicans."" In any event, the amendment passed and was car-
ried into the final bill.
b. Evaluating these changes
The literature has not ignored the transformative aspect of Dirk-
sen's amendments. For example, historian Hugh Graham notes that
the bill exempted de facto school desegregation in the North.0 He
draws similar conclusions about the weakening of the EEOC:
The first change was designed to further isolate the North and West
from the impact of the new law, although this was not acknowledged as
its goal. The civil rights bill was, after all, targeted primarily against the
intransigent South, as symbolized by Bull Connor. This alone made it
politically possible in 1964 ..
297 110 CONG. REC. 11,931.
298 This of course led to one of the most famous cases in statutory interpretation,
United Steelworkers of America v. Webet; 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The controversy was based
on whether the word "require" meant "require or permit," or, by virtue of omitting the
word "permit," the Act in fact permitted voluntary programs of preferential treatment.
Id. at 205-08.
299 110 CONG. REC. 11,933-34.
400 Id. at 11,931.
See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, suna note 13, at 263 (depicting the AFL-CIO's support of
the Democrats).
302 See GRAHAM, supira note 20, at 81 ("[T] here seemed to be little immediate cause
for non-southern alarm over Kennedy's proposed title on school desegregation.").
3 0 3 d . a t 1 4 7 .
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Graham further observes that "the bill's two job discrimination titles,
VI and VII, might impinge heavily upon their non-southern congres-
sional constituencies. Hence they must be carefully constrained." ''
Robert Loevy makes the same point. He discusses a key solution
to the negotiations between the Democratic leaders and Dirksen that
occurred with the emergence of the language, "pattern or practice" of
discrimination.
The idea [underlying this language] was that the United States would
initiate enforcement of the law only in those states where it could be
shown that racial discrimination was a widespread and generally ac-
cepted practice. The practical effect of this agreement was that, in
Northern states where racial discrimination was not widely practiced, the
United States Government could not initiate enforcement but would
have to wait for aggrieved individuals to file law suits to protect their civil
rights. In Southern states, however, where there was a "pattern or prac-
tice" of racial discrimination that could be easily documented, the
United States Government could initiate enforcement action without
having to wait for the aggrieved individuals to file law suits first.
The Whalens explain that, prior to consideration on the floor,
Dirksen presented fellow Republicans with forty amendments to
weaken Title VII. Many conservative Republicans "had long been
grousing over what they considered the too-powerful role of the fed-
eral government in Title VII," and "Dirksen also had been unhappy,
to some degree, because Illinois had strong laws in this area, and he
was concerned that the bill might usurp the state's jurisdiction..'' ..
Sundquist argues that "[a]ll of these provisions, taken together,
enabled senators from northern states that had already enacted civil
rights legislation to tell their constituents that the bill would not affect
their states. '07
Finally, several of the participants explicitly noted this aspect of
the bill. Congressional Quarterly's Almanac reports Senator Sam Er-
vin's reaction to the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute:
"The effect of the new bill was 'to lessen the impact on Northern
states and increase the impact on Southern states.' The bill 'puts the
stamp of approval on de facto school segregation in the North' by deny-
ing courts power to order their desegregation," Ervin said. (The com-
promise contained a section strengthening language declaring the bill
304 1d. at 148.
305 LoEVY, supra note 15, at 258.
WHALEN & WHALEN, suna note 15, at 159-60.
307 SUNDQUIST, supra note 1 3, at 269.
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was not to be used to overcome "racial imbalances" not caused by official
segregation policies.)308
Senator Richard Russell remarked that the bill "has been stripped of
any pretense and stands as purely a sectional bill .... Provisions have
been written into the bill which draw up a monumental wall ... (pro-
tecting) the states that are north of the Mason-Dixon line..'..
These conclusions directly contradict the same authors' assertions
that Dirksen's changes were merely minor, technical, and clarifying.
The fact that authors like Loevy, the Whalens, and Sundquist could
claim that Dirksen simultaneously blunted the impact of the bill on
the North but also that his changes were technical and minor is evi-
dence that they judged the overall effect on the Act based on struc-
ture rather than impact. In parallel with the conclusions just quoted,
our analysis shows that this narrow view ignores the import of Dirk-
sen's carefully crafted changes.
As we have noted, both Democratic and Republican participants
had strategic incentives to downplay the role of the Republicans and
their changes. In many ways they were too successful. The authors
just noted had the evidence before them of the Republicans' material
changes in the bill. They nonetheless missed the larger implications
of the evidence, in part because the participants' rhetoric so forcefully
and nearly unanimously points in another direction.
E. Lessons from the Senate Battle over Civil Rights
Dirksen's changes clearly had a material effect on the Act by
blunting the impact of the bill on the North. He carefully crafted a
bill that differed from H.R. 7152 and yet had the appearance of re-
maining the same so as to satisfy multiple constraints: avoid a confer-
ence committee; avoid giving the Democrats an electoral issue by
painting the Republicans as weak on civil rights; and allow Democratic
leaders to harm the interests of southern whites so that the Republi-
cans might make inroads in this region .
308 Senate Defeats Filibuster, Passes Civil Rights Act, 73-27, in CONG. QUARTERLY,
ALMANAC: 88TiH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 354, 361 (1964).
M9 /i. at 365.
310 See suna text accompanying notes 24-26 (describing Republicans' electoral
strategies). See generally BLACK & BLACK, supra note 25, at 74-75 (discussing the politi-
cal and social climate in the 1960s that helped to defeat the southern filibuster on civil
rights).
2003] POS177VE POLI7ICAL TH-IEORY OF LEGISLA 77VE HISTORY 1497
To see the force of Dirksen's changes for Republican constituents,
consider their effect on big business, located largely outside the South
at the time!" The "pattern and practice" provision, combined with
the requirement that courts find that the defendant had intentionally
discriminated, focused the Act on the pervasive and explicit discrimi-
nation in the South while exempting de facto discrimination in the
North.", Emasculating the EEOC's enforcement power also reduced
the risk to businesses.' : Statistical evidence indicates that Dirksen
succeeded: the Act had a major effect on black income in the South
but not in the North. For example, John Donohue and James Heck-
man show a declining black-white wage differential in the South after
1965 but not outside the South.""' Further, the prohibition on quotas
or preferential treatment prevented the Act from requiring major
changes in big business employment practices. The provision requir-
ing deference to the FEP commissions meant that businesses operat-
ing in states with commissions in place would experience much less of
a transition under the Act.""'
Did these changes constitute a "fundamental transformation" of
the bill? Hardly. But does this imply these were merely cosmetic or
technical? That too seems false. A third possibility instead seems
closer to the truth, namely, that Dirksen's changes were systematic,
meaningful, and limiting, but did not alter the basic framework of the
Act. These amendments were apparently intended to reduce the im-
pact of the Act, especially in the North, and particularly among Re-
publican business and middle-class constituents.l
3'' See GRAHAM, sujpra note 20, at 147-49 (discussing how Dirksen's changes re-
duced the authority of the EEOC).
312 See supira text accompanying notes 294-95 (concluding that the dual require-
ment hindered the ability to successfully establish a discrimination case in federal
COUrt).
31 See Vaas, supra note 270, at 450 ("[The amendment] will clearly restrain a 'cru-
sading' EEOC or court fr-om finding unfair employment practices in situations which
Congress never intended to reach.").
John J. Donohue, Ill &,James Heckman, Cortinos Versus Episodic Change: 7 e
Inpact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Statius oj Blacks, 29 J. ECON. Lrr. 1603, 1610
fig.6 (1991) (graphing "estimates of the racial differentials in hourly earnings for male
workers").
SSee GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 148-49 (addressing the effects of requiring EEOC
deference to state FEP commissions); cf MOORE, supra note 15, at 79-80 (" [T] he effect
of the 1968 concessions was to virtually ensure that the elimination of housing dis-
crimination would take place at a slow pace.").
311 See GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 146 ("During the five weeks following the first of
April, Dirksen floated dozens of trial amendments, most of which further refined,
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Significantly, however, this purpose had to be covert. Advertising
the true impact of the changes would havejeopardized Dirksen's goals
and those of Democratic leaders. Both sets of leaders wanted to avoid
a conference committee. Democrats wanted to claim the lion's share
of the credit, and Dirksen wanted to collude with them so that the
Republicans might make electoral inroads in the South.
In short, Republicans and Democrats had multiple, competing
agendas. In strongly preferring civil rights legislation to the status
quo, ardent supporters proved willing to go to considerable lengths to
secure a reasonably strong proposal; in doing so, they avoided a replay
of 1957 and 1960, years in which their proposals were scaled down to
veIy slender final products. Republicans, who were more divided, and
whose support was thus more precarious, were able to achieve a result
favorable to their interests as well. However, such accommodations
required careful leadership. Willing negotiators among the ranks of
ardent supporters were key; also key-though regrettably overlooked
in the histories of this period-were pivotal Republican legislators
such as Everett Dirksen.
II1. TRANSLATING LEGISLATIVE INTENT INTO PUBLIC POLICY: THE ROLE
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
After a statute's enactment, it must be implemented.' 7 In the pol-
icy implementation phase, disputes over the meaning of legislation
inevitably arise that end up before the courts, which are obliged to de-
termine the meaning of contested or ambiguous statutory provisions.
For legislation that was particularly contentious within Congress, these
controversies over statutory meaning will be particularly acute.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the meaning of key
elements of the Act raised considerable controversy. Litigation was
frequent, and courts were instrumental in sorting out the disputes
over the scope and coverage of Title VII and other critical parts of the
A ct .' 
8
moderated, clarified, or restricted the reach of federal enforcement power over private
enterprises and citizens.").
.1 For a good, concise overview of statutory interpretation and policy implementa-
tion, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET Al., LEIlsuvTnON AND STATUTORY INTER-
PRETAIION 211-374 (2000). See aLvo CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AKIrER THE Riirs REVO-
LUTION: RECONcEIVING Tii REGUI.ATORY STATE 227-33 (1990) (suggesting regulatoy
reforms to further the aims of statutory programs and government while protecting
constitutional values).
Ms ee Esk,'idge, supra note 27, at 617-41 (discussing the political history of judicial,
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In so doing, courts looked to the legislative history of the Act, and,
as part of their interpretations, they drew inferences from particular
aspects of the legislative history."' Frequently, these efforts served to
support broad interpretations of the statute that went beyond the bar-
gain to which the ardent supporters and pivotal legislators agreed. As
we show below, the courts typically relied on the ardent supporters'
statements to support their conclusions. The argument in Part II sug-
gests, however, that selective use of legislative history to support a
reading of the statute is common; indeed, the fact that legislative his-
tory has multiple, conflicting meanings facilitates such selective use of
history. Our discussion in Part III shows that the legislative history of
the Act fits this pattern.
What is problematic is not that judges interpreted the Act expan-
sively, but that they did not do so primarily on the basis of normative
principles favoring "civil rights," or on the basis that the plain mean-
ing of the statute supported such a reading. Instead, they argued that
the legislative history supported these results. In a number of rulings
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the courts read into the Act the per-
spectives of ardent supporters-including Senators Humphrey and
Chase, and other prominent liberal legislators-and largely ignored
the political context and the pertinent qualifications added to gain
the support of pivotal moderate legislators.
A. Reconstructing the Bargain Through Judicial Interpretation
In the first few years following the enactment of the statute, the
federal courts were called on to consider the meaning of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act32  The Court construed this title to expand the
scope of the Act beyond the meaning agreed to by ardent supporters
legislative, and executive interaction in civil rights issues); see also Drew S. Days, Ill,
Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HIARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rrv. 309, 313-19 (1984) (discussing the broad range of remedial measures used by
courts to address employment discrimination).
319 Cf. supira text accompanying notes 10-12 (suggesting that judges pick and
choose aspects of the legislative history that support their predetermined interpreta-
tions of statutes). See generally THEODORE EISENBERG, CiviL. RIGirTs LEGISLATION:
CASES AND MAIERIALS 3-1 1 (4th ed. 1996) (providing an overview of civil rights legisla-
tion implemented to protect constitutional rights).
320 See EISENBERG, supra note 319, at 909-1122 (discussing Title VII and cases in-
volving employment discrimination); see also BILUMROSEN, sulpra note 290, at 4 (discuss-
ing how the individual right to sue in federal court, as opposed to proceeding in an
administrative agency, was a sensible innovation that prevented civil rights interests
from being ignored in low-visibility decisions by agencies).
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and the pivotal legislators.22 ' The expansive rulings of the 1960s and
1970s reflect an effort to give the statute a meaning beyond that nego-
tiated by pivotal legislators-especially Senator Everett Dirksen-
whose support was central to ending the filibuster and hence to
passing the Act.
In several cases of expansive reading, judges relied on the so-
called Clark-Case memorandum to illuminate the meaning of Title
VII. Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case were ardent supporters
of the Act. They introduced a proposed bill on June 6, 1964, which
was intended to substitute for both H.R. 7152 and the Mansfield-
Dirksen version._=' Although their proposal failed, they were able to
enshrine much of their vision of Title VII indirectly, through the
preparation of the Clark-Case memorandum.
In a number of important Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has
suggested that the Clark-Case memorandum is generally reliable as a
source of guidance for the interpretation of the Act in cases where the
text is ambiguous. In contrast, our approach suggests that the utility
of this memo-as with other sources of legislative history-depends
on two factors: first, whether, and to what extent, these legislators
were engaging in cheap talk or costly signals; and second, whether,
because the memo focused on a version that failed to become law, the
version it elucidated was sufficiently similar to the version that became
law so as to be relevant for statutory interpretation. It is impossible to
assess this or any other piece of legislative history without knowing
more about its political context. What did these legislators have to
gain or to lose from making these statements? To whom were they
speaking, and how should we understand the veracity of their claims?
The following cases provide good vehicles for the consideration of the
role of context in understanding legislative history.
This memorandum, introduced on April 8, 1964, was intended to
clarify the meaning of the Clark-Case legislative proposal. It was pre-
pared before the introduction of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute and,
accordingly, cannot be considered a definitive illumination of the in-
S:i I ee Eskridge, sulra note 27, at 618-24 (describing the Court's shift on civil rights
issues from left to right between 1962 and 1986, and stating that the initial shift to the
left was reflected in the Court's dynamic interpretations that gave more liberal reme-
(ies for racial discrimination in the workplace than literally afforded by Title VIi).
322 Senator Clark had a perfect ADA score (tW 100, with an estimated probability of'
1.00; Senator Case had an ADA score of 81, with an estimated probability of 1.00. See
srt/n- 1488-90 Table 2 (listing Repulblican efforts to blunt the bill's impact on the
North).
323 110 CONG. REC. 12,863-70 (1964).
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tent of the framers of the version of the bill that became the Act's Ti-
tle Vii. 3 24 The fact that the Clark-Case memorandum was written be-
fore the introduction of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, that it fo-
cused on their own substitute bill, and that they were ardent
supporters hoping for a stronger bill than the administration-
Humphrey-Dirksen compromise all suggest caution in using this
memorandum as an authoritative explanation of the final bill's lan-
guage.
1. Employment Testing and Griggs
a. Disparate impact theory and historical justification
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 32" ushered in a major new construction of
employer liability under Title VII..2' With the imprimatur of the Griggs
decision, employees could bring claims alleging that avowedly neutral
employment practices-such as employment tests-had a disparate
impact on the employment status of groups protected under Title
V11I. 7 The Supreme Court's creation of the so-called "disparate im-
pact" cause of action in Griggs represents perhaps the single most im-
portant development in federal employment discrimination law since
the enactment of the 1964 Act.
32
The theory of disparate impact relies on the notion that one way
in which discrimination manifests itself is by deleterious outcomes.2
Under this view, a particular practice need not depend on evidence of
an intent to discriminate. Rather, a claim of employment discrimina-
tion arises when the practice results in members of protected groups
324 But see EISENBERG, sulpra note 319, at 1009 ("While these statements were made
before § 703(h) was added to Title VII, they are authoritative indicators of that sec-
tion'spurpose.").
325 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
326 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICI. L. REv. 59, 62 (1972) (stating that "tiggs
redefine[d] discrimination," and that this "definition [was] new to the field of em-
ployment discrimination"). See generally EISENBERG, supra note 319, at 444-49 (examin-
ing how Griggs affected the substantive reach of Title VII).
327 See Gfiggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32 (interpreting the Act to proscribe not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice).
See Blumrosen, supra note 326, at 62 ("Ciggs is in the tradition of the great
cases of Constitutional and tort law which announce and apply fundamental legal
principles.").
12FSee EISENBERG, sulra note 319, at 943-49 (describing the theory of disparate
impact).
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being disadvantaged relative to unprotected groups in the relevant
workplace, regardless of any intent to discriminate.
According to the Court in Griggs, the basis of this theory is the
Act's purpose and its legislative history. So far as the purpose is con-
cerned, the Court declared that "[t]he objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees."' ' ' From this view, the disparate im-
pact theory of employment discrimination flows from the underlying
purpose of the Act to eradicate impediments to equality of opportu-
nity.
The Court applied the logic of this conclusion to the issue of em-
ployment as follows: The purpose of the Act was to "remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. " '  Many employment tests have a
disparate impact on minority employees. They therefore diminish the
equality of opportunity for these employees. This is true whether or
not the tests were designed in order to disadvantage minority employ-
ees. : :"' The issue thus framed, the legal result follows logically from
the declared purpose of the statute.
In a fundamental sense, Griggs is best understood as a case in
which the Court elided legislative history altogether. '" As we discuss
330 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Conceplts of Disc imination in "General Ability "Job Testing,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1158, 1159 (1991) (describing fbur conceptions of discrimination
and exploring ways in which employment testing might be considered discriminatory
under each); Robert Follett & Finis Welch, Testi-ngfor Discrimination in Enplaviment Prac-
tices, ILAW & CONTEMI'. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 171, 172 ("[T]he emphasis on fair
employment litigation is on disparate effect of 'patterns of practice.'").
331 401 U.S. at 429-30.
: 32 d.
333 A full treatment of the legal debate over disparate impact theory is given in the
opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Gfiggs. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d
1225, 1235 (4th Cir. 1970) (Boreman, J.) (upholding the validity of tests because the
"testing requirement is being applied to white and Negro employees alike"), with id. at
1238 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting in part) (dissenting from the court's upholding of tests
because "the statute interdicts practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in sub-
stance").
33A To Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Griggs is a "decision poorly rea-
soned and vulnerable to the charge that it was a significant leap from the expectations
of the enacting Congress." ESKRIDGE ET AL., supr-a note 14, at 85. Professor Richard
Epstein is even more critical, arguing:
If in 1964 any sponsor of the Civil Rights Act had admitted Title VII on the
ground that it adopted the disparate impact test read into it by the Supreme
Court in Grigs, Title VII would have gone down to thundering defeat, and
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in Section B below, there is a different way to read the Court's reason-
ing and rationale in Griggs. Yet, the Court's majority did work with the
historical materials to paint a picture of a legislature in 1964 that was
supportive of the disparate impact theory.
The Court acknowledged that the "[p]roponents of Title VII
sought throughout the debate to assure the critics that the Act would
have no effect on job-related tests. ' '33 5 Nonetheless it reasoned that
the enacting legislature intended to forbid "giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reason-
able measure* ofjob performance."' " The Court looked to the Clark-
Case memorandum as its principal source of legislative history. Yet, it
drew a conclusion opposite from what a reasonable construction of
the memo would seem to indicate. In their memorandum, the sena-
tors explained that Title VII "expressly protects the employer's right
to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the
applicable job qualifications. Indeed, the very purpose of [T]itle VII
is to promote hiring on the basis ofjob qualifications, rather than on
the basis of race or color.""3 7
As ardent supporters, Senators Clark and Case were in a very good
position to provide reassurance to moderate and conservative legisla-
tors that the bill, as drafted, would not go too far. The acknowledg-
ment that section 703(h) would not, in fact, outlaw tests that exam-
ined applicable job qualifications is credible because it goes against
their own preferences for a more expansive reading. Their interpre-
tation thus went against the grain of the otherwise broad construc-
tions of the Act proposed in many other parts of their memorandum.
So, while not ideal from the perspective of the ardent supporters, this
reassurance was intended to bring pivotal legislators into the camp of
supporters. For this reason, the Court's reliance on the legislative his-
tory should have supported the argument of the defendants. Or, at
the very least, the Court ought not to have drawn upon the legislative
history to support the opposite conclusion, that the legislature in-
tended section 703(h) to forbid employment tests that resulted in a
disparate impact on minority employees.
perhaps brought the rest of the Act down with it.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAWS 197 (1992).
401 U.S. at 434.
I d. at 436.
337 Id. at 434 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7247 (1964)).
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Despite these efforts by ardent supporters at reassurance, pivotal
legislators were not, it appears, entirely convinced. Even with the
statements of Senators Clark and Case on behalf of the coalition of
ardent supporters, moderate legislators worried that section 703(h)
would nonetheless be read by the courts to outlaw employment tests.
Senator Tower's introduction of an amendment after the presentation
of the Clark-Case memorandum provides the best evidence of this
concern among the moderates. The amendment sought explicitly to
authorize such employment tests: Wholly apart from the fate of this
amendment (discussed in more detail shortly), the fact that such an
amendment was introduced in the face of these efforts at reassurance
strongly suggests that pivotal legislators were hardly persuaded by the
Clark-Case memorandum. '"
Given the Court's reliance upon the Tower amendment for its
conclusion that the legislature intended to forbid employment testing
with a disparate impact, we now turn to consider this legislative epi-
sode in some detail.
b. The legislative debate over employment testing
On March 5, 1964, during the height of the Senate struggle over
the Civil Rights Act, a hearing examiner in Illinois issued a ruling
338 See 110 CONG. REc. 13,504 (quoting Senator Tower as stating that his amend-
ment allowed for tests which were administered "honestly and firmly and applied to all
racial groups alike").
339 This fear was shared by a number of senators, including both pivotal legislators
and ardent supporters, and exploited by southern Democrats. See, e.g., id. at 5614-16
(quoting Senator Ervin of North Carolina: "Under [Title VII, the federal government]
could dictate to the employer whom he must hire, whom he must discharge, whom he
must promote, and whom he is to dismiss in times of financial adversity."); id. at 5999-
6000 (quoting Senator Smathers of Florida: "[I] f by refusing to hire a prospective em-
ployee [an employer] is going to run the risk of going to jail, they do not have to ask
him any more .... [T]he employer says, 'If lie looks like a troublemaker perhaps I
had better put him on.'); id. at 7013-14 (quoting Senator Holland of Florida: "If we
take away from employers the right to prescribe the qualifications of the people whom
they employ ... we shall have left private enterprise and ... the Federal Govern-
ment ... would in effect be telling employers whom they could employ and whom they
could not employ."); id. at 9025-26 (quoting Senator Tower of Texas: "[The bill] does
not guarantee anybody a job, but it would compel an employer to hire persons whom
he does not believe to be competent to perform the work."); id. at 9599-600 (quoting
Senator Fullbright of Arkansas: "[T] he threat of litigation which must inevitably weigh
heavily on the mind of any employer subject to this bill will ... subject [many employ-
ers] to capricious intimidation by any job applicant ... who happens to be a racial mi-
nority."); id. at 9600 (quoting Senator Ellender of Louisiana: "Under the provisions of
Title VII, then, few, if any, companies would be able to establish ways and means of ob-
taining employees who would fit into their pattern of employment.").
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against Motorola Corporation in Chicago for using a general ability
test in considering applicants for employment on their assembly
lines."  The judge ruled that this test failed to consider environ-
mental inequalities and differences and therefore was unfair to "cul-
turally deprived and disadvantaged persons." 4  He ordered Motorola
to cease and desist from using this test.
This decision sent shockwaves through Congress. Opponents and
pivotal legislators expressed great concern that Title VII would, in the
form in which it was then being considered (pre-Mansfield-Dirksen),
leave other corporations unable to use employment tests.4
In the shadow of the Motorola decision, Senator John Tower intro-
duced an amendment on June 11, 1964, that provided that employers
could use "professionally developed ability test[s]" under certain con-
ditions. '" This amendment, explained Senator Tower, was introduced
expressly to overrule Motorola and to unambiguously remove the legal
basis for the EEOC to pursue employers who relied upon employment
tests to gauge the capability ofjob applicants.444 Ardent supporters of
the Act argued strongly against this amendment. Senator Case
claimed that the amendment would permit an employer to give any
test "whether it was a good test or not, so long as it was professionally
designed."'"" In one sense, this was a peculiar statement for an ardent
supporter. After all, Senators Clark and Case declared in their inter-
pretive memorandum, introduced one month after the Motorola deci-
sion, that Title VII "expressly protects the employer's right to insist
that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the appli-
cable job qualifications.""'" Although the Clark-Case memo did not
refer to the Motorola decision by name, it would seem that the purpose
340 See Myart v. Motorola, Inc., No. 63C-127 (Ill. Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n Feb. 27, 1964) (ordering Motorola to cease and desist from the use of its em-
ployment test), rep inted in 110 CONG. REc. 5662-64.
341 110 CONG. REc. 5664.
.42 For a description of the public and Congressional reaction to the Motorola deci-
sion, see GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 150-51.
343 110 CONG. REC. 13,492.
34,1 In introducing his amendment, Senator Tower explained:
If we should fail to adopt language of this kind, there could be an Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ruling which would in effect invalidate
tests of various kinds of employees by both private business and Government
to determine the professional competence or ability or trainability or suitabil-
it), of a person to do ajob.
Id.
345 Id. at 13,504.
346 Id. at 7247.
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of this section was to reassure fellow senators (especially pivotal sena-
tors) that Title VII would not outlaw employment tests. Moreover,
during the debate over the first Tower amendment, Senator Case de-
scribed the Motorola decision as a "'red herring,' ... which has been
dragged across the trail, in an attempt to obscure the situation.
Senator Humphrey asked Senator Case whether it was true that the
Motorola case was "nothing but a preliminary finding, and [therefore]
has no binding effect," to which Senator Case replied, "[t]hat is abso-
lutely true. "' Tower's first amendment was defeated on a roll call
vote, 38 to 49. " '
Senator Tower then introduced a second amendment.1" This
amendment was virtually identical to the first. This time, ardent sup-
porters relented and agreed to the amendment by a voice vote. Sena-
tor Humphrey declared:
I think it should be noted that the Senators on both sides of the aisle
who were deeply interested in [T]itle VII have examined the text of this
amendment and have found it to be in accord with the intent and pur-
pose of that title. I do not think there is an, need for a rollcall. We can
expedite it. The Senator has won his point.
Senator Humphrey, acting in his official role as one of the principal
bill managers, is issuing a costly signal: Tower has won his point and
this amendment is "in accord with the intent and purpose" of Title
VII. The Court explicitly chose to ignore this language.
Although Senator Tower and other senators (at least the thirty-
eight who voted for the first version of the amendment) won the legis-
lative battle and enshrined their concerns into the Act, they lost in the
courts. The Supreme Court in Griggs read this amendment as essen-
tially requiring employment tests to be job related, that is, to be justi-
fied by a business necessity in order to pass muster under Title VII. As
has been pointed out elsewhere, this is a strained reading of the Act's
legislative history. 31
2
3-17 Id. at 13,081-82.
3"8 Id. at 13,08 1.
3.19 Id. at 13,505.
35,)Id. at 13,724.
351 Id.
352 See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 387 ("Burger's interpretation in 1971 of the
legislative intent of Congress in the Civil Rights Act would have been greeted with dis-
belief in 1964."); DONAID L. HOROwITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 14-15 (1977)
("There is convincing legislative history to show that Congress intended the opposite
of the result reached in Criggs."); Gary Bryner, Congress, Courts, and Agencies: Equal Irm-
ployinent and the Lnils of Policy hnplernentation, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 411, 423 (1981) ("[T]he
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Indeed, the Court's analytic leap about these amendments falls
prey to the critique we have developed in this Article. The Court
jumps from Senator Humphrey's assent to the second Tower amend-
ment to the view that this amendment was so different from the first
that, while the first clearly overruled the Motorola decision and would
have barred Griggs's claim, the second amendment compels the
Griggs result. This leap rests on the view that the expressed under-
standing of the ardent supporters (Humphrey's view about what the
Tower amendment meant) should determine the meaning of an
ambiguous statute. Yet, by accepting the second Tower amendment,
the ardent supporters receded from this view.
Of course, an argument that would provide a pedigree for Senator
Tower's views would prove too much; he was, after all, an ardent op-
ponent of the Act., 414 Yet the key group to recognize in this episode is
the group of legislators who supported both versions of the Tower
amendment. Senator Humphrey's circumvention of a roll call vote on
the second amendment obscured the composition of this group
somewhat; we can reasonably assume, however, that it includes the
thirty-eight who made up the group supporting the first Tower
amendment. Although thirty-eight senators are insufficient to pass
legislation, they are sufficient to cause a motion for cloture to fail.
The fact that Tower pressed on this issue and that Humphrey relented
suggests that Humphrey cared less about winning this particular point
than about whether winning this point would hurt the larger goal of
obtaining cloture.
We make two additional observations about the Tower amend-
ments. First, the language of the two is nearly identical." . Although
Court's Gfiggs ruling... conflicts with the wording and legislative history of Title
VII."); Hugh Steven Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Rumina-
tions on Job Testing, Discriminalion, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844,
852-58 (1972) ("The overwhelming legislative response in opposition to the result of
[Motorola] and the extensive commentary regarding the possibility of a similar result
tinder Title VII reveal the weakness of the Supreme Court's conclusion ... in
Grig ....").
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971) ("Speaking for the
supporters of Title VII, Senator Humphrey, who had vigorously opposed the first
amendment, endorsed the substitute amendment, stating: 'Senators on both sides of
the aisle... found [the amendment] to be in accord with the intent and purpose of
that title."').
54 See LO.VY, supra note 15, at 163 (recounting Senator Tower's role "on the fili-
btister team").
5 Compare 110 CONG. REC. 13,492-93 (1964) (regarding the first amendment),
with id. at 13,724 (regarding the second amendment).
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the Court in Griggs claimed that "[t] he opposition to the amendment
was based on its loose wording which the proponents of Title VII
feared would be susceptible of misinterpretation," :5 comparison of
the two versions undermines this claim. Both amount to essentially
the same thing; that is, both versions seem directed to overturning the
Motorola decision and permitting employers to use job tests for em-
ployment purposes. Significantly, neither version squarely supports
the linchpin argument in Griggs that all employment tests must be job
related to meet the mandates of section 703(h) of Title VII.
Second, consider the Senate voting lineup on the first amend-
ment as indicated in the roll call list. 7 Within the group of ardent
supporters, three voted in favor of the amendment, thirty-seven
against, and six abstained; of the ardent opponents, twenty-one voted
in favor of the amendment, two against, and three abstained; finally,
in the group of moderates, there was a nearly even split, with thirteen
voting for, eleven against; and three abstaining. The Act's ardent
supporters had become the ardent opponents for the purposes of this
amendment, implying that their views about this amendment were as
hostile as the ardent opponents' views were about the overall Act.
Clearly, something more than "loose wording" was at stake here.
Supporters of the bill rightly feared that the passage of the amend-
ment would cut the legs out from under Motorola. Griggs, it seems
clear, would be quite impossible in light of this amendment's text.
The fact that a majority of the Senate voted in favor of the amend-
ment makes the supporters' position-essentially the position that
had prevailed in Motorola and would prevail later in Griggs-precari-
ous. In this light, it was sensible legislative strategy for Senator Hum-
phrey to emphasize that the Tower amendment that was subsequently
adopted reflected the consensus of the body. "Senator [Tower] has won
his point," Humphrey explained: However, Senator Humphrey's ar-
dent-supporter colleagues would hardly have conceded so much
ground to Tower. Since Tower and his ardent-opponent colleagues
would vote against the Civil Rights Act, the audience for Humphrey's
rhetoric was the moderate "swing" legislators. Without a roll call vote,
we will never know how they divided in the final tally. Yet we can sup-
pose that their support, that is, their decision to accept Senator
Tower's position, on Motorola, combined with the ardent supporters'
356 401 U.S. at 436 n.12.
37 Barry Weingast, Summary of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Roll Call Vote (n.d.) (on
file with authors).
358 110 CONG. REC. 13,724 (emphasis added).
2003] POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF LEGISIA77VE HISTORY 1509
strategic decision to give up the fight to defeat the proposal to permit
employment tests represents the basic compromise worked out during
theJune 11 to 13, 1964, episode.
The legislative history argument in Griggs, following the logic of
the argument developed in much greater detail by Judge Sobeloff's
dissenting opinion in the circuit court below, rests on the view that
the introduction of the second amendment represented a retreat by
ardent opponents and some pivotal legislators from the view ex-
pressed by the first amendment. This view cannot be reconciled with
an understanding of the legislative history of section 703(h) as devel-
oped in light of our theoretical arguments described above. We thus
echo Hugh Graham's observation that "Burger's interpretation in
1971 of the legislative intent of Congress in the Civil Rights Act would
have been greeted with disbelief in 1964."':
c. A missing piece of the puzzle: scienter and section 706(g)
An additional argument from the legislative history casts doubt on
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Griggs. Here we return to Senator
Dirksen and his pivotal role in constructing a suitable compromise
provision of Title VII through the introduction of key amendments.
On April 16, 1964, Senator Dirksen introduced an amendment (la-
beled Number 507) that added the term "willfully" to the then-current
language of section 706(g).-;" According to the legislators, "it is not
intended that an accidental or unintentional violation should subject
an employer to the provisions of this title.-361
Although the issue raised by section 706(g) did not specifically
pertain to employment tests, the thrust of this amendment to the sub-
section was to establish a scienter requirement for employers. With
this requirement, employers in all employment discrimination cases,
including those involving employee tests, could defend themselves by
asserting that they did not "willfully" discriminate against any em-
ployee. Hence, even if one were able to stretch the meaning of the
term "discriminate" in Title VII to include employer actions that result
in disparate impacts on minority employees, the requirement added
by Dirksen in section 7 06(g) that such discrimination be willful ap-
.59 GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 387; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 76-80 ("My
judgment is that Gtiggs represented a policy more vigorous than that which Con-
gress... would have wanted in 1971.").
360 110 CONG. REc. 8194.
361 Id.
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pears to preclude the claim, accepted by the Supreme Court in Griggs,
that facially neutral employment practices could have a disparate im-
pact on minorities and as a result violate Title VII.36)
It is difficult to reconcile the inclusion of a scienter requirement
in Title VII through the amendment introduced by Senator Dirksen
with a decision establishing a nonscienter, disparate impact cause of
action. Yet, the Supreme Court in Griggs was silent on the subject of
scienter and section 7 06(g). If one accepts, as we urge above, the view
that Dirksen's role in constructing the final compromise version that
became the 1964 Civil Rights Act was critical,"3 it is difficult to see how
section 7 06 (g), along with Dirksen's explanation, could be disre-
garded. The intent of Dirksen's amendment seems clear: to avoid a
situation in which "[a]ccidental, inadvertent, heedless, unintended
acts could subject an employer to charges.
2. Seniority Arrangements and Employment Discrimination:
Selective Use of History in Franks and Teamsters
A central worry for the pivotal legislators considering the pro-
posed Tide VII was whether the bill would affect existing seniority sys-
tems. Many businesses had longstanding seniority arrangements. Of
course, typically, few minority employees had substantial seniority in
these businesses and, therefore, the maintenance of such arrange-
ments impeded progress for minority workers. Many pivotal legisla-
tors were concerned that Title VII would require the dismantling of
seniority arrangements in order to correct for past discrimination.
These concerns were assuaged in two different ways: First, sup-
porters of the bill attempted to reassure their colleagues that existing
seniority systems would be preserved . Second, Senator Dirksen re-
362 Our view is consistent with the position of the EEOC in the years immediately
following the Act's passage. See EEOC, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNI'IY
COMMISSION DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
NOVEMBER 1963-JANUARY 1969, at 17 (1968) (stating that the legislative history "estab-
lishes that the use of professionally developed ability tests would not be considered dis-
criminatory"). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 334, at 205-41 (explaining the effect of
g' n on employee-testing requirements).
See supra text accompanying notes 310-16 (defining Dirksen as one of the Act's
"pivotal Republican legislators").
4 10 CONG. REC. 8194; see aLvo GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 147 (concluding that
the word "intentionally" was added "to Section 70 3 (g) of Title VII, to make it clear that
discrimination could not be legitimately inferred from statistical distributions in em-
ployment practices").
365 See, e.g., 110 CONG;. REC. 7213 (quoting an interpretive memorandum on Title
VII submitted by Clark and Case in which the Senators explained that "Title VII would
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vised section 703(h) to mitigate any potential problem connected with
these seniority arrangements.
When H.R. 7152 was the principal legislative proposal before
Congress, the aim of Senators Clark and Case, and also of Senator
Humphrey who spoke on the issue of seniority, was to reassure sena-
tors who were concerned about seniority and Title VII without alienat-
ing supporters of the bill.:"'  To go too far in the direction of shielding
seniority systems from civil rights enforcement would create an island
of immunity in a sea of liability for employment discrimination.
The issue brought before the courts was how to consider the post-
1964 operation of a seniority system on minorities who complain that
the system perpetuates the effects of discrimination "occurring prior
to the effective date of the Act."'"7 A reading of the Act that shielded
all the effects of a seniority system established before 1964 from scru-
tiny on the grounds that the system predated the Act and that senior-
ity systems are immune from Title VII liability would temper signifi-
cantly the scope of the Act."'8 On the other hand, many legislators-
surely a critical number-worried about the extension of the Act to
cover all the effects of post-Act operation of a seniority system estab-
lished pre-1964. The reason for this concern was straightforward: in
many businesses that contained employee seniority systems, the vast
bulk of the most senior employees were white. Thus, these seniority
systems were particularly vulnerable to challenge under Tide VII.
This worry persisted beyond the insertion of the Clark-Case
memorandum into the legislative record on April 8 and also beyond
the introduction of the Clark-Case substitute proposal on June 6. No-
tably, Senators Mansfield and Dirksen offered new language in section
703(h), providing that "it shall not be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to apply ... different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or. merit sys-
have no effect on established seniority rights"); id. at 7207 (recording Senator Clark's
statement that "it is clear that the bill would not affect seniority at all").
36 Sources cited supra note 365.
.67 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976); see also Lorance v.
AT&T Techs., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (deciding a case involving the manipulation of sen-
iority rules to discriminate based on sex); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553
(1977) (holding that a plaintiff cannot claim a Title VI violation based on a neutral
seniority system that upholds the effect of a prior, time-barred discriminatory act).
368 See EISENBERG, supra note 319, at 1011-17 (describing the dilem ia of Title VII
and seniority systems).
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tern. ,, :,! The scope and reach of this revised section was the subject of
two significant Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1970s.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., the Court considered a
class action brought against Bowman Transportation Company and
certain labor unions.37" The group of plaintiffs asserted that the em-
ployer/unions were perpetuating, through the operation of a senior-
ity system adopted prior to 1964, discriminatory practices. The plain-
tiffs were black truck drivers who complained that they were not hired
because of their race. The district court found for the plaintiffs and
ordered appropriate relief, including back pay and reinstatement of
the seniority status that these employees would have enjoyed but for
the discriminatory practices of Bowman Transportation. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit decided that section 703(h) insulated em-
ployer/unions from the responsibility to award retroactive seniority
on the grounds that pre-Act seniority systems were immune from Title
VII liability and therefore that "make whole" relief was improper."'
Overruling the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that "make
whole" relief was proper under section 703(h).372
The Court rested this reading of section 703(h) on the absence of
any limiting language in section 703(h) and of any corresponding leg-
islative history, indicating that the perpetuation of post-Act discrimi-
nation should be shielded from Title VII merely because the seniority
system predated the Act. The Court explained that
the thrust of the section is directed toward defining what is and what is
not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act
operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects
of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act. There
is no indication in the legislative materials that section 703(h) was in-
tended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal
discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act is• 373
proved-as in the instance case, a discriminatory refusal to hire.
In reaching its unanimousjudgment that section 703(h) was not a
complete bar to "make whole" relief in the face of continuing dis-
criminatory practices, the Court noted, but avoided analyzing specifi-
cally, the section's legislative history. Indeed, it preceded the above
quoted paragraph with the phrase, "whatever the exact meaning and
78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified ts amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000)).
370 424 U.S. at 750.
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scope of section 703(h) in light of its unusual legislative history and the
absence of the usual legislative mateials."74
Given its multiple references to legislative history, the Court's de-
cision is peculiar in its neglect of that history as a source of interpre-
tive guidance. The Clark-Case memorandum, other statements by
supporters of the bill, and the fact that section 703(h) was introduced
by Senator Dirksen in order to settle once and for all questions con-
cerning the impact of this section on existing seniority rights, all
seemed to point toward a conclusion that pre-1964 seniority systems
were shielded from scrutiny.
Yet, the Court never grappled with these historical materials. In-
stead, it asserted that a reasonable interpretation of the "thrust of the
section" supported its view that the Act was not intended to limit the
sort of relief requested by the plaintiffs. At best, the Court regarded
the legislative history as singularly unhelpful in understanding the
problem posed by this litigation. At worst, the Court ignored it be-
cause it forced a legal conclusion different from its own.
By contrast, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 3' the Court gave a much closer look to section 703(h)'s legisla-
tive history. In Teamsters, the Court considered a claim by a group of
black and Hispanic employees that their employer had discriminated
against them in the following fashion: minority members were hired
as "servicemen" or "local city drivers," less desirable jobs than higher
paid long-distance drivers, a position held entirely by whites.: 7' The
United States also filed suit "challeng[ing] the seniority system estab-
lished by the collective bargaining agreements between the employer
and the union." Under that agreement, some benefits such as bid-
ding on jobs and layoff orders were determined based on seniority at
the job level rather than seniority with the company. As a result, when
minorities with seniority, within the organization transferred over to
more desirable jobs, largely as a consequence of Title VII enforce-
ment, they felt locked into lower seniority than whites who had been
at the job level for much longer. The government sought a remedy
that would have allowed minority employees to transfer over to these
more desirable jobs with full company seniority. The Supreme
Court held that section 703(h) barred this result, to the extent that
37-1
Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
375 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Id. at 329.
377 Id. at 330.
378 Id.
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the Act shielded "bona fide" seniority systems from liability, regardless
of whether the system perpetuated pre-Act discrimination.
The Court relied on three elements of the legislative history to
support its argumnent in Teamsters. The first was a provision of the
Clark-Case memorandum:
"Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect
is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has
been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would
be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would
not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire
Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white
workers hired earlier.'8(
The second represented a statement by the Justice Department,
prepared at the request of Senator Clark:
"Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it
takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides
that in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off
first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by Title VII.
This would be true even in the case where owing to discrimination prior
to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than
Negroes."'s'
A third statement was the declaration of Senator Humphrey made
after passage of the Mansfield-Dirksen compromise substitute bill to
the effect that the addition of section 703(h) "merely clarifies [Title
VII's] present intent and effect.'1
8 2
The Teamsters Court put together these three pieces of historical
evidence to make the following argument in favor of its construction
of section 703(h):
While these statements were made before section 703(h) was added to
Title VII, they are authoritative indicators of that section's purpose....
It is apparent that section 703(h) was drafted with an eye toward meet-
ing the earlier criticism on this issue with an explicit provision embody-
ing the understanding and assurances of the Act's proponents, namely,
that Title VII would not outlaw such differences in treatment among
i. at 353-54.
/d. at 350-51 (quoting the Clark-Case memorandum, 110 CON(G. REC. 7213
(1964)).
Id. at 351 (quoting the Justice Department's response to Senator Hill, 110
CON.. REC. 7207).
3K2 /d. at 352 (quoting Senator Humphrey's statement, 110 CONG. REC. 12,723).
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employees as flowed from a bona fide seniority system that allowed for
fill exercise of seniority accumulated before the effective date of the
Act.
The Court's account of the legislative history is a plausible one, given
the political context of the Act. By contrast to other, questionable
statements in the memorandum by Senators Clark and Case, their
statements about seniority systems were credible, since they articu-
lated the moderates', rather than their own, position. After all, they
were expressing to the pivotal legislators the moderates' view during
consideration of the Tower amendments, namely, that section 703(h)
would not affect seniority systems.
Senators Clark and Case were willing to go rather far in their reas-
surance. In a prepared colloquy, Senator Clark responded to Senator
Dirksen's questions as follows:
Question: Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions,
when that management function is governed by a labor contract calling
for promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally,
labor contracts call for "last hired, first fired." If the last hired are Ne-
groes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first
fired and the remaining employees are white?
Answer: Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a
"last hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired,"
he can still be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as
"last hired" and not because of his race.'
These statements from ardent supporters were costly signals. As a
floor colloquy about the text of the amendment, ardent supporters
would pay a high price for mischaracterizing the shared understand-
ing about the provision's meaning. Moreover, they are credible given
that they go against the grain of the larger objectives of ardent sup-
porters to restrict the impact of seniority systems on the plight of mi-
nority workers. Indeed, Justices Marshall and Brennan in dissent in
Teamsters stress the fact that the overall spirit and purpose of the Act is
in conflict with the restrictions embodied in section 703(h)."' As one
commentator quoted by the dissenters in Teamsters aptly noted:
"[The] statute conflicts with itself. While on the one hand Congress did
wish to protect established seniority rights, on the other it intended to
383 d.
384 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (reprinting Clark's prepared response to the Dirksen
memorandum); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 76(0 n. 16 (1976)
(relying on this exchange).
3 , 431 U.S. at 388 (Marshall]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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expedite black integration into the economic mainstream and to end,
once and for all, the de facto discrimination which replaced slavery at
the end of the Civil War.""
Per our theory that statutes are mixes of provisions and aspirations
of the ardent supporters in combination with specific restrictions and
narrowing added to gain support of the moderates, the Civil Rights
Act does indeed "conflict with itself." It contains broad and expansive
aspirational provisions alongside provisions which, designed to attract
pivotal legislators, limit the scope of the Act. As noted above, the
statements of Senators Clark and Case espouse the moderates' view
that section 703(h) leaves seniority systems mostly alone. Signifi-
cantly, these statements were supplemented with confirming messages
from other ardent supporters, including Senator Humphrey, Senator
Thomas Kuchel, and Representative Celler.
This reassurance was not enough, however, from the perspective
of the pivotal legislators. In June, Senator Dirksen introduced a re-
vised section 703(h). This section provided:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system .. provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
In the end, the disagreement between the majority and dissenters
in Teamsters involved the difficult question of what meaning to accord
to the language of section 703(h) and its implication that seniority sys-
tems should be exempted firom the Act. Justice Marshall's dissent in
Teansters shares with justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Franks
the view that pre-1964 seniority systems that have the effect of per-
petuating discrimination are invalid under the Act. The Court's deci-
sion in Franks, as Justice Marshall points out, ruled unlawful the post-
Act operation of a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of dis-
Id. at 390 n.17 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Caroline Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23
UCLA L. Rrv. 177, 191 (1975)).
397 See 110 CONG. REC. 1518 (quoting Representative Celler: "It has been averted
also that the bill would destroy worker seniority systems and employee rights vis-a-vis
the union and the employer. This again is wrong."); id. at 6549 (quoting Senator
Humphrey: "This bill is not an instrument to abolish seniority or unions themselves, ats
some here have charged."); id. at 6564 (quoting Senator Kuchel: "Neither would sen-
iority rights be affected by [Title VII].").
Id. at. 11,931.
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crimination "'occurring prior to the effective date of the Act. '"'
"Congress was concerned," Marshall writes, "with seniority expecta-
tions that had developed prior to the enactment of Title VII, not with
expectations arising thereafter to the extent that those expectations
were dependent on whites benefiting from unlawful discrimina-
tion.
Yet, the conclusion Justice Marshall draws from this assessment of
legislative intent-that is, that the pre-1964 seniority system was vul-
nerable to challenge under Title VII because of its lingering effects on
nonwhite employees of the company-is not obvious. Indeed, the
evidence cuts against the dissenters' view: their opinion is contra-
dicted by both Dirksen's amendment and the costly signals sent by ar-
dent supporters who could be expected to share the underlying views
held by Justices Marshall and Brennan about what the Act ought to do.
Considered in context, the Teamsters decision jibes with a sensible
construction of section 703(h). Such a construction represents a
compromise, an intermediate solution to a vexing problem raised by
opponents to Title VII-a problem that did not go away with the reas-
suring statements of ardent supporters, such as Senators Clark, Case,
and Humphrey. The analysis in these two cases and, in particular,
Teamsters, illustrates that legislators can effectively offer costly signals
in some instances and cheap talk in others. In Griggs, Senators Clark
and Case offered what we regard as cheap talk, and the Court wrongly
credited these statements in support of its view-a view that read the
circumstances surrounding the Tower amendment as irrelevant to the
outcome of the enactment process. Yet, the statements of these same
legislators were costly signals in the context of section 703(h). Here,
they ought to be credited for the light they shed on the meaning of
this important part of Title VII.
3. Affirmative Action and Weber
United Steelworkers v. Weber involved a claim by a class of white em-
ployees of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation against the use
of hiring goals that reserved fifty percent of the positions for new craft
trainees to blacks)' This set-aside would operate until the percentage
of black skilled craft workers in the plant approximated the percent-
389int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 384 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 761).
43 
Ud.39 1 443 .S. 193 (1979).
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age of blacks in the local labor force.3 2 The legal de.ision turned
primarily on the construction of section 703(a) and (d) of Title VII.
Section 703(a) provided that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.4" Section 703(d) further
provided that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for any
employer... to discriminate against any individual because of his
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or em-
ployment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or
other training.""' The question before the Court was whether these
provisions outlawed the use by a private employer or labor organiza-
tion of a voluntary affirmative action plan.
Although these provisions had remained intact from the introduc-
tion of H.R. 7152 through the Senate debate and the introduction of
the Mansfield-Dirksen compromise, which added a critical provision.
The Court, following the sentiments of the ardent supporters, mini-
mized the impact of these changes. Nonetheless, this amendment
represented a significant alteration to the proposed legislation. The
compromise added section 703(j) to ameliorate the concerns of piv-
otal legislators that Title VII could be construed to require preferen-
tial treatment and racial quotas.'"" Moreover, this provision would not
have become part of the law had the ardent supporters not accepted
the pivotal moderates' proposed change.
In a costly signal on June 4, 1964, Senator Humphrey explained
the purpose of this amendment:
A new subsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of racial bal-
ance among employees. The proponents of this bill have carefully stated
on nmnerous occasions that [T]itle VII does not require an employer to
392 Id. at 197.
393 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
34 I. § 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d).
495 Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
396 See, e.g., I10 CONc;. REc. 8616-19 (1964) (recounting a discussion among Sena-
tors Sparkman, Stennis, and Keating concerning the Act's effects on school desegrega-
tion, fair housing, and equal employment); id. at 11,471 (reprinting Senator Javits's
argument that, contrary to the myths propagated by its opponents, the Act would not
establish quotas in employment, nor would it abrogate seniority in trade unions); id. at
12,817 (providing Senator Dirksen's summay of the changes made to the Act's provi-
sions on voting rights, public accommodations, and public education) id. at 14,313-14
(providing Senator Miller's description of the process through which the bill was
amended in the Senate to retlect states' and individuals' rights with regard to busing,
employment, and freedom of association).
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achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving preferential
treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts have persisted, sub-
section (j) is added to state this point expressly. This subsection does not
represent any change in the substance of the title. It. does state clearly and accu-
rately what we have maintained all along about the bill's intent and meaning"
As codified, section 703(j) provides:
[N]othing contained in this [subsection] shall be interpreted to require
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer..
With these three provisions in mind, the Court in Weber construed
the legislative history in essentially the way suggested by Senator
Humphrey. To begin with, the Court emphasized that "Congress'
primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of
the Negro in our economy.' '  Much of the thrust of the legislative
history, according to the Court, was toward opening up employment
opportunities for minorities by, in the words of the House Report ac-
companying H.R. 7152, "'creat[ing] an atmosphere conducive to vol-
untary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination. ''41 The
critical pieces of evidence for the Court were the extended statements
by Senator Humphrey in opening the Senate debate on the proposed
legislation, statements made long before the design and passage of the
Mansfield-Dirksen amendments. Both the House Report and Senator
Humphrey are thus talking about the bill as constituted prior to the
critical amendments dealing with this topic, and their statements thus
must be used with caution, if at all.
Echoing the purposive approach described above, the Court
looked beyond particular history that might shed light on the mean-
ing of the latter provision-section 703(j)-and the only provision
dealing with affirmative action expressly, instead resting its argument
on the view that Title VII should receive an expansive construction
and that, with respect to the legislative history, the introduction of sec-
tion 703(j) did not change the Act in any substantial way. After all,
397 Id. at 12,723 (emphasis added).
398 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
399 Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. REc. 6548).
400 Id. at 204 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. I, at 18 (1963)) (emphasis omit-
ted).
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section 703(j) merely ruled out a construction of Title VII that would
require employers to use preferential treatment; it did not, the Court
noted, expressly limit employers' decisions to pursue affirmative ac-
tion voluntarily......
The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist considered the his-
torical evidence relating to the question before the Court in Weber
from a very different perspective. Section 703(j), as Rehnquist em-
phasized, was construed with a precise purpose in mind-to respond
to the concerns expressed repeatedly in Senate debates over whether
Title VII could be used as a means of authorizing discrimination
through preferential treatment and affirmative action. 2 The central
question before the Senate during the long debate on this issue was
whether Title VII was designed to ensure a color-blind workforce.....
In an oft-quoted statement, Senator Humphrey declared: "Title VII
prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and na-
tional origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing. Title
VII is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifi-
cations, not race or religion. ' 4 In their memo, Senators Clark and
Case likewise emphasized the complete prohibition against any dis-
crimination intended by H.R. 7152;' however, many senators re-
mained unmollified. Section 703(j) was added as part of the Mans-
field-Dirksen package in order to placate concerns that Title VII
would authorize preferential treatment.0
Considered in the context of our suggested approach to the use of
legislative history, Weber was incorrectly decided. Senator Dirksen's
statements concerning the impact of section 703(j) on the legality of
affirmative action should be taken most seriously; after all, Dirksen
spoke for the group of pivotal legislators and insisted that affirmative
action was a central issue for this group. In our view, there are very
good reasons to believe that permitting affirmative action would have
broken apart the coalition necessary to pass the Act. Moreover, Sena-
tor Humphrey's statements about section 703(j) are also significant
here. His statements that the Act would encourage "hiring on the ba-
401 Id. at 205-08.
402 See id. at 230-55 (Rehnquist, l., dissenting) (reviewing the legislative history of.
Title VII, with particular attention to the amendment process).
403 Cf supra note 339 (providing examples of the rhetoric used by southern
Democrats to amplify the reservations and fears of moderates).
40, 110 CONG. REc. 6549.
405 Id. at 7213, 7216-17.
406 See id. at 7215, 7217 (expressing the concerns of senators, including Senator
Dirksen, that H.R. 7152 would result in quotas).
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sis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion, were made in
his role as legislative floor leader and were, therefore, costly signals.
As such, we might credit his views about the meaning of this section,
even in the face of other statements-also costly signals-by the sec-
tion's architects.
4 0 8
The critical mistake the Weber majority makes is its reliance on
Humphrey's aspirational statements, statements that, as we explain,
are cheap talk, instead of his later costly signals. Ultimately, the Court
is simply, to recall Judge Leventhal's description, picking out its
"friends"; that is, pulling together a hodgepodge of statements by ar-
dent supporters to rationalize its conclusions. Thus, while there may
be other defensible rationales to support the result in Weber, as we
consider in the following Section B, the Court's use of legislative his-
tory is unsupported by the evidence and indefensible from the per-
spective of our theory of legislative history.
B. Statutory Meaning Revisited
The previous Section explained the Court's use of legislative his-
tory in several important civil rights cases. Our intent now is to ana-
lyze critically the Court's use of legislative history.
One response to our analysis might be that this critique is not mis-
taken but is misguided, in that it assumes that the courts care at all
about a statute's "real" history. In other words, our critique assumes
both that legislative intent is to be taken seriously and that the Court
in fact takes it seriously.
In light of the problematic use of legislative history in the cases
just described, we might well ask whether the Court was truly inter-
ested in getting to the bottom of what actually happened in the en-
actment process. There are plausible reasons to believe that the
Court for the most part avoided grappling with the history of the Act.
A logical thread running through the decisions described above is
captured well in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Teamsters,"" '
in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Griggs,4'0 and in Justice Black-
407 Id. at 6549.
408 See supra text accompanying notes 322-25 (discussing the Clark-Case memoran-
dum as a source of judicial interpretation of Title VII).
4 431 U.S. 324, 377 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
410 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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mun's concurring opinion in Weber."" In bolstering his argument for
a more expansive reading of plaintiff remedies under section 706(g)
of Title VII and for a correspondingly narrower reading of section
703(h) in Teamsters, Justice Marshall relies upon an interpretive argu-
ment that might be loosely described as purposive.4 2 "[I] t is important
to bear in mind," begins Justice Marshall, "that Title VII is a remedial
statute designed to eradicate certain invidious employment prac-
tices. ' Justice Marshall argues that Title VII should receive a con-
struction that is generous and expansive in light of its avowed purpose
to root out the effects of discriminatory practices. In other words,
courts should err on the side of broad rather than narrow construc-
tions.
Similar emphases on the overarching purposes of the Act arise in
Griggs and Weber. Although resting part of its ultimate result on the
legislative history of the Act, the Court in Griggs stressed the point that
employment testing undermines principles of equality of opportunity.
This opportunity principle drives the Court to move the civil rights
agenda forward through several expansionary decisions in the 1960s
and 1970s. Indeed, in much of the case law in the first years following
the Act's passage, the federal courts stressed the idea that "[c]hief
among the complex of motives underlying the equal employment op-
portunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was doubtless a de-
sire to enhance the relative social and economic position of the
American black community."""
In an influential article written just after the Griggs decision by a
central figure in the early EEOC implementation of the Act, Alfred
Blumrosen explains that, when construing Title VII, "the principle of
liberal construction of the statute is relevant. ' '415 He describes the
411 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
412 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 25-28 (describing purposivism as a
method of statutory interpretation that resolves ambiguities by "identifying the pur-
pose or objective of the statute, and then ... determining which interpretation is most
consistent with that purpose or goal"); HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 102-07, 166-67
(discussing the role of courts in reviewing statutes and illustrating the inconsistencies
among courts applying principles of statutory interpretation).
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 381 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
414 Developments in the Lav--Eminployment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1971) (citation omitted).
415 Blurnrosen, supra note 326, at 73; cf Owen M. Fiss, A Theoy of Fair Emlployment
Laws, 38 U. Ctii. L. REV. 235 (1971) (arguing for the need to go beyond anti-
discrimination and color blindness to achieve equal employment).
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EEOC's efforts to "make the statute effective in dealing with the social
problem by giving it the broadest construction."'" And he commends
this approach to the federal courts, highlighting the ways in which
cases like Griggs manifest this "liberal construction" principle. 17
Justice Harry Blackmun's concurring opinion in Weber provides a
good example of this strand in the modern civil rights jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court. Justice Blackmun begins his opinion with a
statement that nicely illustrates this purposive approach: "While I
share some of the misgivings expressed in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent.., concerning the extent to which the legislative history of Title
VII clearly supports the result the Court reaches today, I believe that
additional considerations, practical and equitable, only partially per-
ceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Congress, support the conclu-
sion reached by the Court today ....
The characteristic quality of the argument for expansionary read-
ings of the Act is that they rely on aspirational goals to avoid confront-
ing squarely the arguments about specific provisions in legislative his-
tory."' Instead, as Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Weber illustrates,
the courts rely upon the general purpose of the Act to ensure equality
of opportunity and to enhance the life and work prospects of minority
Americans. Legislative history, in this view, is only important insofar
as it illuminates the broad purposes of the statute. Where there is a
conflict between purpose and intent, the latter is disregarded, not-
withstanding overwhelming evidence in the statute's historical record
about what Congress meant.
There are three separate ways to understand the logic of this ap-
proach. First, we can understand the Court to be providing guidance
as to how to do proper historical interpretation; perhaps Chief Justice
Burger in Griggs, Justice Blackmun in Weber, and the Court's majority
in Franks read Congress as wanting the Act to be read broadly. This is
plausible, given that the Court says that it is considering the statute's
416 Blumrosen, supra note 326, at 73.
417 See id. at 101-07 (arguing that to overcome the potential limits of Griggs, "liberal
judicial construction and a maximum enforcement effort are ... essential").
411 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (Blackminu, J., concur-
ring).
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1177-84
(2000) (criticizing the Court's use of legislative history and departure from the statu-
tory text of Title VII in deciding Weber); George Schatzki, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 55-58
(1980) (considering possible ambiguities in Title VIl's statutory language and their
effect on application of the statute).
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legislative history. 42 However, in the absence of a coherent theory to
explain how the Court goes about unraveling the statute's legislative
history, we are left with a very odd and unsatisfying collection of ra-
tionales for the Court's interpretive results.
Second, this approach may indicate that the Court cares centrally
about the purpose of the Act and not the intent of the legislature as
evidenced by the statute's legislative history.42' Although this perspec-
tive is beyond the scope of our argument in this Article, we acknowl-
edge that this view is prominent in the contemporary debate about
statutory interpretation theory and raises a challenge to many inten-
tionalist and textualist theories of legislative intent.
Our theory of legislative history answers one of these challenges
head-on: the challenge that the purpose of the statute is more illumi-
nating as a guide to interpretation than statutory history and legisla-
tive intent because the latter cannot be sufficiently decoded. With a
proper theory of statute making and legislative rhetoric, we can effec-
tively ground the interpretation of legislative history. Thus grounded,
this more effective way of understanding legislative intent can reply to
a critical challenge made by these purposivist interpretations. Moreo-
ver, if what the Court had in mind in cases such as Griggs, Teamsters,
Franks, and Weber is statutory purpose, rather than legislative history,
then our approach raises serious questions about the reliance on pur-
posive reasoning, a topic to which we turn in the next Part.
Third, and finally, the Court's confusing approach to interpreting
legislative history may suggest that it wants to decouple its role from
intentionalist theory altogether. Perhaps, at base, the Court is saying
that the Civil Rights Act is special; it is, in William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn's phrase, a "super-statute"; that is, a law
that (1) seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework for
state policy and (2) over time does "stick" in the public culture such that
(3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a
420) See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 (discussing how the Court makes use
of legislative history).
42' Ronald Dworkin, for example has argued that,
[i]f it were clear that "discriminate ... because of... race" was used in the
neutral sense, it would have made no sense for the Court to leave open the
question of whether it applied to affirmative action. The majority in Weber
was right, both as a matter of ordinary language and precedent: the question
of how Title VII should be interpreted cannot be answered simply by staring
at the words Congress used.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MAIrrER OF PRINCIPLE 318 (1985).
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broad effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four corners of
the statute.
Tagging the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a "super-statute" seems to take it
out of the realm of intentionalist interpretation altogether. Whatever
the strengths and weaknesses of this perspective on statutory analysis
and interpretation, we note that this renders the project of historical
interpretation meaningless. As we show in the next Part, this view also
creates unintended problems.
IV. STATUTE MAKING AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION VIEWED
THROUGH THE LENS OF POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY
Thus far, we have argued that the meaning of legislative history
ought to be viewed in light of the structure of legislative coalitions
and, in particular, the comparative roles of legislators involved in the
strategic processes of statutory enactment. Moreover, assessing that
history requires consideration of the purposive efforts of legislators to
communicate and strategize with one another prior to passage. In
this final Part, we discuss how our approach sheds light on the mean-
ing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on contemporary theories of statu-
tory interpretation, and on the patterns of American social policy.
A. Perspectives on Statutory Interpretation and Legislation
Our study of the Act reveals a series of conspicuous legislative
compromises among ardent supporters and pivotal legislators. The
result of these intralegislative negotiations was a truly historic civil
rights law, one which helped secure basic civil rights for millions of
Americans, particularly African Americans. To the extent that the
civil rights laws were a critical instrument in the battle for social jus-
tice, the carefully negotiated agreements within Congress were key to
.123
this success.
The essential problem with the judicial interpretations identified
above is that they look past the architecture of these compromises.
The Justices relied on the selective use of legislative history to set aside
critical elements of the legislative compromise necessary to produce
the Act. This type of judicial decision making has a larger risk,
422 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001).
423 See MOORE, supra note 15, at 81-143 (considering the role of race in policymak-
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namely, that it increases the possibility that members of Congress will
not pass social legislation in the first place. Legislators operate in the
shadow of other institutions that directly affect policy outcomes. Be-
cause legislators anticipate the effects of outside institutions, these ef-
fects are reflected in legislator incentives."'
We have emphasized that moderates will be willing to support leg-
islation when they believe their changes-often placing limits on the
scope, coverage, and meaning of an act-will be administered as part
of the law.' Thus, the prospect that the terms of their bargain will be
unraveled or ignored by courts makes it much less likely that pivotal
legislators will put themselves at risk by negotiating with ardent sup-
porters on the language of, and similarly by creating the legislative
history of, an Act. If courts regularly set aside restrictive language in
favor of the broad aspirational purposes of ardent supporters, then
moderate compromises are not meaningful. Courts of this type essen-
tially say to moderates, "You can have the status quo or you can have
the expansive reading of the ardent supporters, but you cannot craft
moderate legislation that restricts the ardent supporters' purposes."
Faced with this stark choice, many moderates will rationally decide to
oppose the legislation.
The moderates' reluctance to compromise presents ardent sup-
porters with a difficult choice. Although they would most prefer to
propose strong legislation and compromise with the moderates, the
Court's expansionary interpretations make the moderates reluctant to
do so. The ardent supporters must then decide between accepting
the status quo and proposing more moderate and minor legislation
that, by being more and minor, has far less a chance of being read in
an expansionary manner by the courts.
In the end, then, an expansionary judicial interpretive regime
creates negative feedback to the legislature, making major social legis-
lation less likely. To the extent that most major pieces of social legis-
lation require specific compromises between moderates and ardent
supporters, expansionary courts paradoxically make such legislation
less likely.
As we saw in the civil rights episode, ardent supporters succeeded
by fashioning compromises with pivotal legislators; the consequence
was a bill of historic dimensions that also assuaged many of the con-
, . See RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 6, at 5 ("[E]nforcement is the necessary
comnpanion of selection.").
25 See supra text accompanying notes 6-9 (discussing the process of securing the
support of pivotal legislators).
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cerns of more moderate legislators.412 6 The efforts to assuage moderate
legislators were critical; after all, pivotal Republicans could well have
walked away from the bargaining table, leaving ardent supporters to
bear the blame for failing to manufacture an acceptable compromise
bill. Indeed, at a number of junctures in the enactment process, the
civil rights bill was in jeopardy. At those junctures, influential legisla-
tors within both coalitions-McCulloch, Halleck, and Dirksen for the
moderates, Humphrey, Clark, and Case for the ardent supporters-
saved the day by careful negotiations and savvy leadership. 417 In the ab-
sence of such carefully negotiated compromises, no civil rights bill
would have been enacted in that Congress.
The Court's expansionary reading of the Civil Rights Act raises a
question of whether the moderates failed to anticipate judicial action.
Our discussion above shows that, to a degree, the moderates did an-
ticipate the possibility of expansionary readings. Many of Dirksen's
"clarifying" amendments were designed to limit later court interpreta-
tion of particular provisions. So too was his deletion of the statement
of purpose in Title VII. Yet no one in 1964 could have known the de-
gree to which the courts would expand various new social legislation
in the late 1960s through the 1980s. It is the unanticipated portion of
this judicial behavior that moderates in 1964 could not have correctly
anticipated.
One of the main lessons of positive political theory's application
to the law is that the judicial process of interpretation affects the legis-
lative process of statute creation.2 8 Legislators, in their bargaining
over the contents of statutes, will rationally take into account how
courts use messages and texts in the process of statutory interpreta-
42')tion.
426 See supra Part ll.G-.D (examining the influence of moderate Republicans on the
Act).
427 See supra Part II.D (stressing the importance of pivotal legislators in passing the
Act).
428 See McNollgast, Positive Canons, suprfa note 11, at 706 (arguing that judicial
methods of statutory interpretation should use explicit theories of legislative processes
for consistency).
421, Cf. Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 228-30 (considering the interaction between
legislative rhetoric and judicial interpretation); see also Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging
the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political 7"heoy, 80
GEO. L.J. 653, 653-55 (1992) (discussing "the extent to which ... courts and Congress
take into account one another's processes in making their own decisions").
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To illustrate this abstract claim, consider two interpretive re-
gimes."" In the first regime, courts respect the bargains made by legis-
lators to pass their legislation. In particular, judges respect the restric-
tive language within the text when this interpretation is supported by
the costly signals of ardent supporters and moderates. Further,judges
under this regime respect this restrictive language, even when it con-
tradicts the broad aspirational language of the legislation's preamble
and of the cheap talk phrases of ardent supporters. In the second in-
terpretative regime, courts do not feel bound to honor restrictive text
that contradicts broad aspirational language, even if this restrictive
meaning is supported by costly signals. Judges in this regime feel free
to set aside restrictive text when this contradicts the broad aspirational
language or other purposes they seek to read into the act.
Our claim is that, to the extent that legislators correctly anticipate
these regimes, they will behave in different ways. Under the first in-
terpretative regime, moderate legislators are far more likely to support
legislation because they expect courts to respect the critical legislative
compromises that are necessary to garner their support for the legisla-
tion. In contrast, moderates legislating under the second interpreta-
tive regime are much less likely to compromise, for fear that judges
will set aside the very provisions necessary for them to support legisla-
tion. To the extent that legislators anticipate that courts will set aside
provisions necessary for their support, they will refuse their support in
the first place."' ' Ardent supporters may also react by proposing mi-
nor legislation that is less likely to provide courts with opportunities to
read in broad social purposes.
Interpretive regimes may therefore dramatically affect how legisla-
tors construct legislation. Under the first interpretative regime, mod-
erates have faith that courts will respect their desired provisions and
are thus induced to behave moderately. Under the second interpreta-
tive regime, moderates have no faith that courts will respect their de-
sired provisions and thus are induced to avoid legislative compromise.
Put another way, judges acting tinder the second interpretative regime
will generate a more polarized legislature than judges acting under
the first interpretative regime. Because, in the second interpretative
regime, moderates cannot be assured that their compromises will be
430 See generally William N. Eskridge,Jr. &John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and
the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI 265, 268 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994)
(considering the relationship between judicial interpretive regimes and democratically
elected legislatures).
131 For further discussion of this point, see supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
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acknowledged by the courts, they are more likely to align with ardent
opponents than produce a legislative compromise with the ardent
supporters.
This perspective yields an important comparative statics predic-
tion about how a change in interpretative regime by the courts will
shape legislative politics. Suppose that courts move from the first in-
terpretative regime to the second. In reaction to this change in inter-
pretative regime, legislators alter their behavior in accordance with
their rational expectations of how their legislation will be interpreted.
So long as the courts move to broaden the scope of the legislation en-
acted by Congress, moderates are less likely to behave moderately, and
legislative politics will become more polarized. To put it simply, mod-
erate legislators perceive very little gain from acting "moderately" and
from settling on a middle ground.
This perspective is consistent with aspects of American politics
from the 1960s through today. The mid-1960s through the mid-1970s
witnessed a broad set of social policy initiatives not seen since, includ-
ing a range of new safety, health, environmental, and social regulation
that, in toto, changed the relationship of the federal government to
American society.W Most scholars studying this period and its after-
math take this change in legislative behavior after the mid-1960s as
433
exogenous•. Our perspective, however, suggests that the courts may
have influenced the tendencies away from enactment of broad-scale
social legislation. To the extent that courts in the 1970s interpreted a
range of social policies broadly, consistent with the statute's aspira-
tional language, they may have unwittingly contributed to the greater
political polarization that emerged in the late 1970s and matured in
the 1980s, as Democrats and Republicans opposed one another far
more frequently on major social issues.'" In sum, a principal reason
to be wary of approaches to statutory interpretation that neglect the
role of pivotal legislators is that they frustrate efforts within the legisla-
ture to seek agreement across coalitions and thereby makes historic
432 See, e.g., RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIs, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY
CHANCE 92-95 & tbl.3.2 (1989) (describing significant social regulatory measures of
the 1960s and 1970s shaping public policy, such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 and the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); SUNDQUIST, supw note
13, at 250-86 (describing civil rights legislation of the 1960s).
433 E.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 212; SUNDQUIST, supra note 13.
434 See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE lMI'ACT
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 137-53 (1991) (tracking increas-
ing Democratic and Republican differences as to issues of race and civil rights in the
wake of aggressive civil rights legislation during the 1960s).
1530 UNI VERSITY OFIYENNS YL VA NIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1417
social legislation less likely. When courts fail to respect legislative bar-
gains, moderates are deterred from compromise and ardent propo-
nents are deterred from proposing major new legislative initiatives.
Ironically, then, those who favor activist judicial interpretations in or-
der to broaden the scope of civil rights and other social legislation
may be defeating their own purposes by making it less likely that such
protections will be enacted in the first place.
One additional concern with our approach bears mention. The
prescriptive literature on statutory interpretation often focuses on the
perceived need to develop approaches to correct pathologies in the
legislative process. Cass Sunstein,Jonathan Macey, Jane Schacter, Wil-
liam Eskridge, Jr., and others have argued for doctrines and theories
of statutory interpretation that restrict the scope of self-interested leg-
islative decision making and that advance important social policies'
These theories share a common concern that the structure of legisla-
tor incentives and the tendencies of the modern Congress favor the
pursuit of private aims over the public good.
We accept that it is important to regard Congress with a careful
eye and without naivete about legislator incentives, motivations, and
behavior. Nonetheless, it is clear that, despite these problems, mem-
bers of Congress are capable of passing landmark legislation, such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, interpretive approaches that
are designed to improve legislative decision making should ensure, at
the very least, that the structures and incentives which enable signifi-
cant, and even controversial, legislation to get passed remain intact.
435 See ESKRIDGE, st/ra note 1, at 151-61 (evaluating the possibility that "statutory
interpretation can ameliorate some dysfunctions in the political process"); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 317, at 111-59 (arguing against the belief that policy considerations should
not influence statuto y interpretation by a court); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Ver-
meule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DuKE L.J. 1277 (2001) (suggesting
institutional changes by which to improve the quality and candor of congressional de-
liberation on constitutional issues); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legis-
lation Through Statuntoly Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,
266-68 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution permits judges, using traditional methods of statu-
tory interpretation, to play a role in regulating the activities of special interest
groups."); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Low Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutoly Interpretation: lnm/lications for the Legislative Histo y, Debate and Beyond, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1, 38-53 (1998) (considering the implications of the Court's "commnon
law originalism" for the use of legislative history to identify the policy issLes embedded
in statutory text);Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy
in Statutmy Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 595 (1995) ("[D]emocratic legitimacy
[in statutory interpretation] is measured not by the elimination ofjudicial discretion in
statutory interpretation, but instead by the interpretive principles and default rules
that shape and channel that discretion.").
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Our approach demonstrates that interpretative regimes which purport
to further public-regarding policy goals at the expense of private-
regarding legislative intent may have exactly the opposite effect than
intended.
Our approach also implies a great irony for those arguing that
courts should correct legislative pathologies. To the extent that these
corrections lead courts to look to broad social goals to interpret acts
and set aside specifics designed to protect particular constituencies,
they make it much less likely that Congress will rise to historic occa-
sions to pass social legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act, in the first
place.
While not denying that many serious pathologies exist within the
contemporary Congress,"'' a sensible approach to statutory interpreta-
tion must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water.
Misuse of legislative history or conscious disregard of the historical
context of legislation may reduce some lawmaking pathologies only to
create new ones.
Moreover, our approach confronts one key pathology in the law-
making process, to wit, the incentive for legislators to engage in cheap
talk in order to influence postenactment policy outcomes."7 Cheap
talk may affect electoral outcomes by allowing legislators to grand-
stand and to announce positions favored by their constituents, but it
does not improve the quality of legislative deliberation on the propos-
als. As we have demonstrated, cheap talk often fails to serve the func-
tion of clarifying ambiguous terms for the benefit of the legislature as
a whole-indeed, it accomplishes just the opposite task by making it
harder for outside evaluators, such as courts, to understanding the na-
4,48ture of the legislation's bargain. Although cheap talk statements,
such as the Clark-Case memorandum, sometimes serve as efforts to
help guide legislators in the process of making up their minds, they
simultaneously operate on a much more manipulative level. Although
many forms of strategic behavior are ubiquitous in the modern Con-
436 See, e.g., Rodriguez, sulpra note 34, at 52-80 (explaining that the lack of guid-
ance as to procedural components of legislative and presidential decision making in
the Constitution leads to procedural and legislative choices overinfluenced by political
processes).
437 See supra text accompanying notes 87-96 (describing the distinction between
cheap talk and costly signaling that may lower the probability of a bill's passage).
See sufra text accompanying notes 87-91 (explaining the ease with which ardent
supporters can plant cheap statements in o,'der to support subsequent broadening in-
terpretations).
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gress, there is precious little reason to encourage legislators to ob-
scure the meaning of legislation-either to their constituents or to
their colleagues-in a legislative battle.
Thus, decreasing the value to legislators of engaging in this strate-
gic use of cheap talk helps tackle a significant pathology in the law-
making process. The theory of legislative rhetoric suggests that legis-
lator incentives to spin the legislation in one way or another will be
unlikely to disappear. However, controlling one facet of this strat-
egy-namely, the opportunistic effort to influence postenactment
statutory interpretations-minimizes at least one of the incentives to
engage in such rhetoric.
B. Perspectives on Contemporary American Social Policy
Central to the view of those who argue for expansionist readings
of the Civil Rights Act is the idea that Congress stepped into the
breach in the early 1960s and provided the essential legislative under-
pinnings of the modern civil rights era."' In one sense, this is abso-
lutely true; in another sense, it is greatly exaggerated. While appreci-
ating what Congress did in 1964, we believe it is equally important to
look at what did not happen. Looking at the roads not taken gives us
important lessons for modern legislative policymaking.
We know with hindsight that the 1964 Act was a landmark piece of
legislation in several senses: first, it transformed American race rela-
tions in many ways; " second, it ushered in a new era that transformed
the relationship of the American federal government to the American
people; and third, it became a major factor in the regional shift in
American electoral politics. The Democrats started losing the solid
South and many urban working-class communities in the North, while
439 See su-pra Part 11 (analyzing strategic behaviors such as acting within legislator
coalitions, cheap talk, and manipulation of legislative histories in the context of the
Civil Rights Act.).
'1'11 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 27, at 618-23 (describing the cooperation between
the Supreme Court, the President, and Congress in addressing civil rights legislation in
the 1960s); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 422, at 1237-42 ("[T] he Civil Rights Act's
antidiscrirnination principle has saturated American social and political culture.").
+11 See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 20, at 153-76 (exploring the effect of the 1964 Act,
and its accompanying regulatory apparattts, on social and business relationships);
THERNSTROM & TiHERNSTROM, s4/n-a note 15, at 158 ("As Bayard Rustin noted, with
dizzying speed the 'legal foundations of racism in America' had been 'destroyed' [by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the subsequent Voting Rights Act]. The 'elaborate
legal structure of segregation and discrimination' had 'virtually collapsed.'").
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gaining the overwhelming support of African Americans."2 Although
the creation of new federal civil rights policy during this era suggests
that the 1964 Act was an inevitable step in the march toward an ex-
panding national presence in this area, none of this was foreseen from
the vantage point of the legislators in 1963 as they took up H.R. 7152
and, later, the various Senate amendments. Hence, the incentives of
pivotal legislators were to hedge their bets and to guard against ex-
pansive, and thereby politically risky, civil rights legislation. Obtaining
the support of the moderates through careful cultivation of their sup-
port and through compromise was essential to the objectives of civil
rights' ardent supporters.
These elements of legislative deal making are not unique to civil
rights or to the 1963 to 1964 time period. The last thirty-odd years
have seen almost unbroken divided government."' Agreement has
been difficult to achieve across this partisan divide. 4 One of the con-
sequences of this division during the 1960s and early 1970s, a period
in which public demands for strong economic and social legislation
were paramount, was that several landmark statutes were passed only
after bitter, intralegislative struggles. 4' As with the civil rights episode,
the results were typically compromise statutes that reflected less than
the ardent supporters would have liked and hoped, but more than
nothing. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977; 44 for example, also
indicated carefully crafted agreements between opposing forces.4' 7
442 See ALEXANDER P. LAMIs, THE Two-PAR'Y SouTi 20-43 (1984) (describing the
Democrats' loss of southern support after the party's embrace of equal rights issues in
the 1960s); SUNDQUIST, supra note 25, at 66-101 (describing how, after the Democrats
suffered defections in tie South, there was a torrent of Republican activity leading to
the collapse of the racial rationale for the one-party South); THIERNSTROM &
THERNSTROM, supra note 15, at 303-06 ("Black allegiance to the Democratic Party-
across social classes-has been extremely stable since 1964.").
443 See DAVID R. MAYIEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN 1 (1991) ("Since World War II, di-
vided party control of the American national government has come to seem normal.");
Morris Fiorina, An Era of Divided Goveni ment, 107 POt. SCI. Q. 387, 387 (1989) (noting
that in the last quarter century "we seem to have settled into a persistent pattern of di-
vided government").
44. See BRAD), & VOLDEN, s'prva note 9, at 94 ("[B]y the time of the 1992 election
divided government had become part of the normal vocabulary of American poli-
tics.").
445 See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supr-a note 44, at 29-33 (describing the struggle in-
volved in passing clean air legislation).
446 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
447 See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, sutpr note 44, at 29-33 (describing the political bat-
tLie behind the amendments to the Clean Air Act); BERNAR) AsBEIL, TEii SENA1E
NOBODY, KNOWS 173-89 (1978) (chronicling the maneuvering of multiple legislative
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What is perhaps even more striking is the fact that several efforts
to enact other major pieces of social legislation failed. Our approach
suggests one plausible reason for these failures: pivotal legislators
were afraid to enter into agreements with ardent supporters because
these agreements would be susceptible to expansionary interpreta-
tions. The terms of the deal were therefore precarious; moderate leg-
islators could rightly fear that their agreements would not remain
moderate. From this perspective, it is not surprising that efforts to
fashion compromises similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 floun-
dered.
This development is especially interesting in connection with civil
rights legislation. From 1964 to the early 1980s, Congress enacted a
few pieces of civil rights legislation. Two of these acts were truly his-
toric: the Voting Rights Act of 1965,'"" and the Civil Rights Act of
1968 .4" The scope of the other statutes enacted during this era was
more limited.'5  Moreover, several efforts to expand the reach of fed-
eral intervention in civil rights were defeated in Congress, often with
the help of many of the same legislators whose support for civil rights
in 1964 was critical.15 ' This result is, on the surface, perplexing. After
all, the conditions would appear ripe for expanding civil rights protec-
tions: Congress became more liberal during this period,"2 and the
demise of the entrenched southern Democrats signaled a greater op-
portunity within Congress to pass civil rights legislation. Further, the
political changes wrought by significant legislative and judicial deci-
proposals and special interest groups from the perspectives of Senators Muskie and
Hart).
+IK Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
119 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
450 See MOORE, suptra note 15, at 79-8(0 (explaining how the 1965 and 1968 acts
were subjected to less "devastating" policy compromises than were earlier proposals).
See id. at 79 ("[S]ixties civil rights legislative proposals were, in effect, stripped
of their most critical enforcement provisions."); SUN)QuiST, supra note 13, at 275-86
(analyzing the defeat of civil rights legislation in 1966, including Senator Dirksen's role
in defeating the bill).
.52 Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder provide evidence for this broad claim. See Tim
Groseclose et al., Comparing Interest Group Scores Across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA
Scoresfor the U.S. Congress, 93 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 33, 39-42 (1999) (discussing how both
Republicans and Democracts shifted leftward). Moreover, Eskridge uses this fact to
explain why the Supreme Court expanded the scope of civil rights legislation in tie
1960s and early 1970s. See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 619-20 ("On the Court, senti-
ments shifted dramatically to the left after 1962.... The national shift to the left was
reflected in the Court's lopsided votes upholding the constitutionality of the [Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965].").
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sions, including the Voting Rights Act and the reapportionment deci-
sions, shifted the political landscape in a direction favorable to the
pro-civil rights agenda."3
To be sure, the scope of civil rights protections grew during this
era, but largely through expansionary statutory interpretations by the
courts, not through legislative action.454 Whether Americans were bet-
ter or worse off depends, of course, upon your underlying views about
federal civil rights policy. Yet our approach suggests that expansion-
aryjudicial interpretations worked at cross purposes with the pro-civil
rights agenda within Congress. Our view explains an important
asymmetry between legislative and judicial action: pivotal legislators
were likely nervous about agreeing with ardent supporters on legisla-
tive bargains which, when they came before the courts, would be re-
written .
Our view offers a new perspective on the growing polarization of
the modern Congress in the area of social policy. Because the courts
frequently rewrote the terms of legislative bargains, there were de-
creasing incentives for moderate behavior and, thus, fewer moderate
legislators. With greater polarization, there are fewer opportunities
for historic breakthroughs; we would expect to see less social legisla-
tion passed.
453 SeeJ. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RiGHITS
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCIION 366 (1999) ("[T] he new aboli-
tionists dismantled mandatory segregation, strengthened the guarantee of equal par-
ticipation in politics, and attacked public and private discrimination in public accom-
modations, housing, employment, and other areas."); Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofinan, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN
TIE SOUTH 378, 380 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (discussing
how the Voting Rights Act changed the political landscape "by giving the executive
branch extraordinary monitoring and enforcement powers in that region of the coun-
try where adamant opposition to black voting rights was still widespread").
454 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 14-28 (describing the Court's interpretation of
Title VII in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 93 (1979)); see aLvo supra text accompa-
nying notes 98-99 (discussing how courts choose different interpretations of legislative
intent).
Professor Eskridge also argues that the expansionary judicial readings made
congressional civil rights legislation less likely. By taking advantage of congressional
veto groups, such as the filibuster pivot, the court expanded civil rights interpretation
just enough to forestall congressional action. See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 646-50
(explaining the interaction between the Court's expansionary judicial readings and
Congress's unwillingness to enact new legislation). Our" approach suggests that Esk-
ridge's argument tells only part of the story in that his argument misses how judicial
willingness to set aside moderate compromises means that moderates are less likely to
support legislation.
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In the period from the mid-1970s to the present, Congress has en-
acted relatively few pieces of major social legislation. In the civil rights
area, few statutes have been passed whose scope and significance
could be compared to the watershed acts of the 19 6 0s and early
1970s . Without minimizing the various reasons for this result, we
would highlight the impact of legislative polarization, polarization fa-
cilitated by the court-fueled disincentives for compromise.
We draw two lessons from our analysis for American social policy.
First, courts engaged in statutory iriterpretationi of contentious statutes
should use available legislative history to appreciate the bargaining
process between ardent supporters and moderates that precipitated
the statute. By honoring this bargain when construing such laws,
courts may create incentives for future legislators to be accommodat-
ing and to behave in more moderate ways. At the same time, by de-
creasing incentives among moderates to become polarized, courts in-
terpreting statutes can facilitate legislative agreement and therefore
fulfill the objective of getting controversial social legislation enacted.
This latter observation is admittedly a speculative one. It remains
for future work to delve more analytically into the question of a rela-
tionship among judicial activism, legislative polarization, and the de-
cline of sweeping public policy. The process by which the 1964 Act
was enacted into law, however, provides at least one important exam-
ple of how moderation and compromise are critical to legislative suc-
cess. Additionally, the difficulties faced by civil rights supporters in
the years following the passage of the 1964 Act provide additional evi-
dence in support of our observation in this Section.
Second, court interpretation of a range of statutes has generated a
lively debate about the role, if any, of courts in social policy. '7 Many
scholars argue for restraint by the courts for reasons based in demo-
cratic theory: by virtue of being unelected and relatively insulated,
judges should not extend their authority into arguably political
spheres. Our argument shows that more is involved than simply
unelected representation, as expansionary interpretations may actu-
ally create disincentives in subsequent legislative efforts.
456 See supra text accompanying notes 432-35 (indicating that "[t]he mid-1960s
through the mid-1970s witnessed a broad set of social policy initiatives not seen
since").
457 See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 352, at 17-19 (noting that "[t]he appropriate
scope of judicial power in the American system of government has periodically been
debated").
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CONCLUSION
The story of modern civil rights legislation is often fashioned as a
story of great events and heroic figures. Given the powerfully reso-
nant episodes that underlay the larger social context within which key
civil rights laws were passed, this is not surprising. The political his-
tory of the civil rights laws, especially the foundational Civil Rights Act
of 1964, easily conjures up the images of the March on Washington,
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr,'s paean to social justice in his "I Have a
Dream" address, and the forceful rhetoric of.the key advocates of fed-
eral intervention in the name of civil rights, including Hubert Hum-
phrey and Lyndon B. Johnson.' s Without doubt, the historical 1964
Act would not have happened without these events.
The trouble with this heroic picture is that we may well come away
with a distorted view of what actually happened within Congress be-
tween the summers of 1963 and 1964. The focus on the social context
of civil rights too easily leads to the presumption that meaningful civil
rights legislation was, by the beginning of the 1960s, inevitable. A
more nuanced look at the history of the Act reveals that passing the
legislation was not inevitable, and that its passage required critical
compromises-compromises which, while not altering the essential
nature and spirit of the Act, nonetheless meaningfully reshaped it in
ways that appealed to more moderate, and more pivotal, legislators.
The story of the civil rights movement is, quite rightly, a story of he-
roic figures triumphing over ignorance and inertia. However, the
story of the Civil Rights Act is also a story of legislative politics, strate-
gic behavior, and compromise in the face of what had previously been
insurmountable obstacles to enacting meaningful civil rights legisla-
tion.
The principal consequence of this revised history of the Civil
Rights Act, and the approach it portends for other statutes, is a new
approach to statutory interpretation. The main critiques in the statu-
tory interpretation literature of reliance on legislative history have
been directed toward practical objections, stressing that legislative his-
458 See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 121, at 282 ("Senator Hubert Humphrey formally
commenced a final debate on the civil rights bill with a speech of three hours and
twenty-six minutes, opening with the Golden Rule quotation .... ); KIINKNER &
SMrH, supra note 13, at 242-87 (describing the roles that Senator Humphrey and
PresidentJohnson played in the civil rights movement).
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tory is messy, convoluted, difficult to assess, and frequently contradic-
tory.
Our perspective, building upon the work of positive political theo-
rists, rescues legislative history from a central strand of this critique.
Although legislative history may be confusing, this does not imply that
it is worthless. The theory of political rhetoric provides an explana-
tion for why the legislative record necessarily provides multiple and
conflicting views. More usefully, it also suggests how to unpack these
conflicting views in ways that are not arbitrary. Although we agree
with many scholars of statutory interpretation when they observe that
the legislative record is confusing, we disagree with those who con-
clude that it is therefore worthless.
The chief lessons for statutory interpretation are threefold. First,
because legislative history is inherently contradictory, courts should
make an effort to disentangle who said what, when, and about what
version of the legislation. Our approach suggests that not all support-
ers are alike. Because ardent supporters have different incentives
than pivotal legislators, courts should be sensitive to the ardent sup-
porters' strategic incentives to expand the scope of an act's meaning.
Second, courts should distinguish between different types of
statements by the ardent supporters. Following McNollgast459 we dis-
tinguish between statements that are cheap talk and those that are
costly signals; that is, whether an ardent supporter may pay a cost for
mischaracterizing the nature of the legislation. Legislators are more
likely to characterize a provision accurately when mischaracterization
jeopardizes the bill's passage.
Costly signals include discussions on the chamber floor about the
language in question and committee reports that explain the meaning
of that particular version of the bill. Ardent supporters who
mischaracterize the nature of the legislation at these stages jeopardize
the support of the pivotal legislators, and hence of the legislation it-
self. Cheap talk occurs in contexts where a legislator pays no price for
mischaracterization. This includes grandstanding statements at the
opening of committee or chamber considerations; statements made
459 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supa note 1I, at 28 (discussing the danger of
cheap talk and suggesting that legislators' statements be used for statutory interpreta-
tion "[o]nly when the majority exerts effort to monitor and to constrain talk");
McNollgast, Positive Canons, supa note II, at 707 ("When talk is cheap-when mem-
bers of Congress or the president cannot be held accountable for their statements
about a bill by members of the coalition-is information content is not reliable.").
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outside the legislature, such as in press conferences; and statements
made after the legislation has passed, such as memoirs.
Third, courts should distinguish among statements made at dif-
ferent points in the legislative process. Thus, opening statements at
the beginning of the process are not only typically cheap talk, but they
also typically take place prior to the critical compromises necessary to
transform a proposed bill into an act. In the case of the Civil Rights
Act, for example, Humphrey's statements at the opening of floor con-
sideration could not have accurately characterized the nature of the
final legislation since he could not have accurately anticipated the
compromises necessary to ultimately pass the Act.
We applied our perspective to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in two
ways. First, we analyzed the Act's passage. Second, we studied the ma-
jor civil rights cases of the 1970s to consider how the Court con-
structed arguments based on legislative history to support its rulings
and how the history was used in dissent. We summarize these points
in turn.
A. Politics of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
We have argued that analysts too often have taken the rhetoric of
the principal leaders at face value without a sufficiently critical eye to
the incentives of these leaders to bias and shade their rhetoric to serve
political ends. This has led many to misunderstand the scope and in-
tent of the changes made in the Senate in order to gain the support of
Republicans to pass the historic Civil Rights Act. Our analysis of the
Act highlights the special role played by pivotal legislators, particularly
Senator Dirksen, in securing enactment of a strong, yet more moder-
ate, version of the legislation. ' 3" The success of this endeavor was a re-
sult of intricate maneuvering on the part of ardent supporters and
moderates, a process that took place within-and, indeed, was facili-
tated by-the industrial organization of Congress. Without exaggerat-
ing the role of pivotal legislators, it is fair to say that the expressed
views of this group were not only essential to getting the bill passed,
but they also represent the intent of the pivotal legislators whose votes
were critical.
Our approach yields a number of specific lessons about civil
rights. First, as every account of the Act's passage suggests, breaking
the filibuster in the Senate was central to the Act's passage, and doing
40A See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Senator Dirksen's role in securing the votes
necessary to obtain cloture through the tactical moderation of certain provisions).
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so required the support of most Republican senators."' What is not
well understood is the nature of the bargain necessary to gain that
support. We emphasize that, although the Republicans did not alter
the Act's structure significantly, they did materially affect its meaning
by blunting the impact on the North.
Second, we argue that all parties involved had an incentive to
minimize the perception of the effects of these changes. Democratic
leaders had three compelling reasons to minimize the perceived im-
pact of the Republicans. They did so because they supported a
stronger version of the Act and wanted to enshrine this vision in legis-
lation. Democratic leaders also sought to claim the lion's share of the
political credit for the Act as part of their repositioning of the Demo-
cratic party in national politics. In addition, these leaders wanted to
minimize the nature of the Senate changes as part of their effort to
obtain assent by the House to their changes so as to avoid a confer-
ence committee.
The Republicans had equally compelling reasons to minimize the
effects of their efforts. Like the Democrats, they too wanted the
House to accept the Senate's changes and thus avoid a conference
committee. Looking ahead to the 1964 elections, Republican leaders
also wanted to avoid giving Democrats the ability to paint Republicans
as having sold out on civil rights. Finally, and most subtly, Republican
leaders wanted to take a relatively low profile on civil rights so that the
Democrats, in claiming the lion's share of the credit, would risk losing
the South. Put simply, Democratic losses in the South would be Re-
publican gains.
The evidence suggests that, as to this last objective, Republicans
profited greatly in fact from the Democrats' action on civil rights and
voting rights, particularly by improving the Republicans' ability to win
the presidency. From the election of Franklin Roosevelt and the ini-
tiation of the New Deal era in 1933 until 1968, Democrats held united
government-that is, control of the House, Senate, and presidency-
in thirteen congresses, while the Republicans held united government
in just one, with control divided in the remaining four congresses. By
contrast, from 1969 through 2002, divided government has been the
norm-holding in fourteen congresses-with the Democrats holding
461 See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining the legislative arithmetic which made moder-
ate Republicans the key to overcoming resistance by southern Democrats).
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united government in only three congresses and the Republicans not
at all."'"
Analysts typically-and, in our view, accurately-ascribe this trans-
formation to the civil rights era.' : What is infrequently considered,
though, is how the Republicans developed strategies, through and
within the legislative process, to facilitate these long-term political
aims. The development and implementation of a legislative strategy
in the area of civil rights was, as we have explained, a critical part of
this larger political objective. It remains for future work to consider
more systematically how Republicans and Democrats forged strategies
through the legislative process to implement their aims and how
courts assisted and resisted these strategic devices.
B. Supreme Court's Use of Legislative History in Major Civil Rights Cases
Part III considered how the Court used and misused legislative
history in a number of significant civil rights cases. In construing es-
pecially controversial provisions of Title VII, the Court rested its deci-
sions on dubious pieces of legislative history. In the case of Griggs, the
Court eschewed reliance on costly signals, instead relying on legisla-
tors' statements which were little more than cheap talk. When exam-
ining the disputes over bona fide seniority systems, the Court scram-
bled to find textual and historical support for its conclusions about
discrimination and seniority. In one case, it turned away from the leg-
islative record altogether; and, in the other, it attached significance to
legislators' statements that did not support the conclusion reached." "
Finally, in Weber, the Court rested its very controversial conclusion up-
holding voluntary affirmative action on aspirational statements from
ardent supporters, even where the leading ardent supporter himself-
Hubert Humphrey-had elsewhere made costly signals supporting the
views of the leading pivotal legislator, Senator Dirksen.
4 12 We use 1968 as the dividing line because this was the first election after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, allowing the two parties and
southerners to adjust to the new circumstances. For the data regarding the partisan
composition of the Senate and House of Representatives, see ERIK W. AUSTIN, PO-
LITICAL FAcTs OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789 tbis. 1.20-.21 (1986).
463 See, e.g., KLINKNER & SMITH, sllpra note 13, at 290 (describing how "contrasts on
racial issues" between political parties had a clear effect on elections).
464 See supra Part III.A.2 (comparing the Court's reliance on legislative history in
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
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As we described more fully in Part II1.B, one lesson to be learned
from this survey of some key civil rights cases is that the Court strug-
gles with the historical record because it lacks any coherent theory of
legislative history. The judges are left with little else to guide them
than the understandable temptation to pick out their "friends" by us-
ing legislative history selectively.
We focus attention so closely upon the use of legislative history by
the Court in order to illustrate the normative objective of this Article;
namely, that there is available to courts a better approach to statutory
interpretation, one which ties the objective of figuring out what the
legislature intended with a coherent rendering of the statute's history.
Yet, even at the end of a very long Article, we leave some questions
unanswered, in anticipation of future work. What is the proper role
of courts in construing legislative history in which the text appears to
point in a particular direction? This raises the classic puzzle of textu-
alism versus intentionalism, a puzzle about which we have had little to
say here . What is the relationship among expansive or narrow judi-
cial interpretations of statutes and legislative decision making? We
have made some preliminary observations about this question in Part
IV, but a more systematic consideration awaits future work. Finally,
what light does a positive political theory of legislative decision mak-
ing and statutory interpretation shed on our views about public policy
and the role of government in the modern regulatory state? This last
question is an enduring preoccupation of the growing cadre of law-
yers and social scientists hard at work on the Positive Political Theory
project.
465 For discussions of textualism versus intentionalism, see SCALIA, suna note 1, at
9-36; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown ldeal?, 96 MiCi. L. REV. 1509
(1998); Manning, supra note 1, at 684-90; Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The
Decline of Textualism in Statulty Cases, 1997 Wisc. L. REV. 235.
